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Chapter 1 
Introduction  
1. Background of the study 
The Executive is a very important branch of government. It becomes the center point in 
constitutional systems mostly because in a modern government system, the concentration of 
government powers is on the Executive. The branch plays its significant roles in any 
government system. Indonesia, which has developed as a modern constitutional state, has 
experienced many changes of executive powers. Historically, the executive power in Indonesia 
has grown under different Constitutional and government regimes. By a series of constitutional 
amendments (the First Amendment of the Constitution of 1999 – the Fourth Amendment of the 
Constitution of 2001), the Amended Constitution reduced and limited the executive powers of 
the President. A significant change was implied by Article 5 of the First Amended Constitution, 
shifting the law‐making power away from the President to the DPR.1In general, the amendment 
of the Constitution has created protective mechanisms for the Indonesian executive powers in 
many ways.  
The Amended Constitution does not give latitude to the President anymore.2 In almost 
all the executive powers, the President should rely on the DPR to obtain its authorization to 
                                                           
1
The DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) is the Council of Peoples Representatives. Before the First Amendment 
Constitution, Article 5 of the Constitution granted the President the power to make Law with approval from the 
DPR. Article 5 of the First Amendment Constitution changed the power of the President. The Article says that the 
President has no power to make law but only has the right to initiate law.  However, According to Article 20, the 
President has the same power as the DPR to jointly discuss and jointly approve Bills of Legislation to become the 
Legislation in the legislation process. 
2 With regard to Cabinet appointments, the President is bound by the constitutional and legal framework. Unlike 
before the Amendment Constitution, the President no longer has full power to establish and name a ministerial 
department. He has no discretion to form, name, or establish a ministry that he might think important to support 
his programs. The name and design of a ministry is defined and limited by the Law. However, even though the 
President has the right to nominate, select, reshuffle and dismiss a minister; practice shows that the President 
can’t do it freely. The President is also bound by the pre‐political coalition deals during the presidential candidacy.  
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
16 
 
exercise the executive powers. 3  Furthermore, the Amended Constitution gives real and 
substantial executive powers to the Legislature; whereas, the President is given the residual 
and formal executive powers.4 For example, with most of the appointment powers, the 
Indonesian President acts more like a King or Queen by just formalizing the appointment.  
After more than a decade, although many changes had been made as a result of the 
Amendment process, it seems that the Amended Constitution functions as a curb on the 
executive power of the President. However, it fails to provide a balanced constitutional 
framework for the allocation of powers and institutional system for Indonesia. What is written 
in the Constitution has not yet been consistently implemented in practice. There are still 
missing links and loopholes in particular issues of the executive powers. The Amended 
Constitution provides much ambiguity and vagueness in most of the text.5 The process of 
amendment that was predominantly inspired by a strong spirit to reduce the executive powers 
of the President seems contradictory to the purpose of the amendment process. It even 
undermines the equlibrium among branches within the constitutional system. It creates more 
branch dominancy and represses the President as the Executive. 
The Amended Constitution has succesfully introduced a limited presidency under a 
presidential system by setting limits and interventions to the executive powers of the President. 
The framers of the Amended Constitution missed the point that a presidency in a presidential 
system is an independent and a strong branch in running the state administration. Ideally, the 
President should be allocated a proportional amount of powers to run state administration. In 
addition, the framers had even made some of the constitutional provisions more ambigous and 
obscure. Such a situation may trigger an unsolved conflict of powers between executive and 
                                                           
3
 The DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) is the Peoples Representative Council, one of the parliaments, and has 
functions similar to the House of Representatives, elected directly by the people, representing the people and 
public opinion. It has the budget, legislative, and oversight functions. 
4
The executive powers for the purposes of this research are divided into the primary and residual power to explain 
the actual power which is given to the DPR while the residual or the rest of the power is given to the President. The 
executive power can also be divided into the substantive and formal power in order to distinguish that in the 
substantive power, the legislative is actually the decision maker while the President has the formal power to 
formalize the decision made by the Legislature. 
5
 Many ambiguities and vague areas occur with regard to the constitutional concept in the constitutional 
provisions. The overlapping of constitutional concepts can be determined in the Constitutional text. Such 
provisions, for example the treaty clause and the emergency clause encounter difficulties in practices. 
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other branches. The institutional framework that has been made to equalize the government 
branches even gives the legislature more powers to control the President. On the other hand, 
the Court, particularly the Constitutional Court, came up with some of its decisions that seem to 
indirectly overrule and intervene in the executive powers of the President.6 It has even acted 
beyond its competence by setting alternative mechanisms that may potentially be 
contradictory to the government’s mechanisms in order to indirectly control the President’s 
exercise of power.7 
In the future of modern democratic government, Indonesia does need a modern 
Constitution that gives a proportional framework for the Indonesian government system. This is 
intended to minimize the conflicts of power between state institutions, to anticipate unsolved 
conflicts, to stabilize the government system, and to reconcile the global international 
challenges. To this extent, this study has a main goal to come up with an alternative design for a 
constitutional framework of the executive powers. In general, the purpose of this study is to 
review the theory of the governmental system, the executive and its power, to reflect on a 
comparative perspective of practices of other states, to reveal the history on how actually the 
Indonesian framers figured out the Indonesia presidency, to analyze the existing presidency and 
determine the problems, and finally to design a proposal for the future Indonesian presidency. 
2. Concept and scopes 
There are many studies on the executive powers which have been conducted. However, 
this research on “Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative 
Study”is more specifically concerned with the executive powers of the Indonesian President as 
explicitly written in the Constitution. Since this research will offer a more appropriate 
constitutional design for the Indonesian executive powers, it will deal with theory and 
                                                           
6 The Law No. 12/ 2011 on the Establishment of Laws, Article 10 stipulates that the President as well as the DPR 
has duties to follow up the Court’s decision. The following up is intended to anticipate any legal vacuum in 
Indonesia. 
7
 In one of the cases of budgetary power, the Court was acting beyond its competence by its decision on setting a 
method confronting the calculation method that the government had set. It has created another conflict between 
the President and the Court, but ended up with the government’s compliance with the Court’s decision. 
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constitutional frameworks of the executive power in some other states. In this research, the 
term “power” will mostly be used to refer to the executive powers of the President. 
The executive powers in this research will be mostly referred to 8 areas, namely: the 
law‐making power, the appointment power, the foreign affairs power (including the treaty 
power and the diplomacy power), the administrative power (including the budget and 
expenditure power), the emergency power, the military power, the war power (which in 
modern times is called the self‐defense power), and the pardoning power. In general, those 
executive powers are commonly mentioned in the Constitution.  
The last chapter offers a framework of the executive powers for the future Indonesian 
Constitution. The main idea of the framework will be that the executive power should be 
exercised as either a shared power, a dependent power, or an independent power. The 
indication depends on the fact that an executive needs to be vested with independent and 
unilateral power in certain situations; on the other hand, it is constitutionally important to 
preserve the checks and balances among branches. The framework will also introduce some 
new concepts to Indonesia such as executive immunity which may be relevant for the executive 
power, and some modern models of executive power that may be compatible to the global 
development of international law.  
3. Research questions 
Based on the background of the study, there are two major issues to be addressed in 
this research: 
a. Description of the existing constitutional framework for the executive powers based on 
the historical and comparative perspective, and the effect of the Amendment to the 
Constitution on its implications for the executive power in Indonesia 
b. An idea of solution of constitutional design on how the Indonesian executive powers 
should be organized in order to improve the Indonesian presidency 
In order to resolve those issues, the study will mainly focus on the Constitution, its practice, and 
theory, and rely upon a comparative approach.  
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4. Scientific relevance 
The research conducted for this dissertation is relevant to the development of 
constitutional law, in particular the subject of the executive and its powers in Indonesia. It will 
enrich the perspective on how the executive and its powers should be established within the 
Indonesian Constitution. Furthermore, the use of comparative constitutional law in this work 
may be beneficial for understanding the global context of constitutional values, theory, and 
common practices. For the specific purposes, the scientific result in this research may help in 
developing the Indonesian Constitution, the Indonesian government system, and particularly 
the development of the executive power. By using the method of constitutional comparative 
law, studying constitutional concepts from other states experiences, the dissertation will deliver 
some recommendations for an alternative design of the future Indonesian Amended 
Constitution related to the executive powers. The Indonesian Constitution should give the 
President, as the chief of the executive, appropriate portions of executive powers, most 
importantly substantive and accountable powers.  
5. Methods and approach 
This research is supported by a comparative constitutional method. The output of a 
comparative constitutional study commonly plays a central role by bringing into focus 
similarities and contrasts among states; that in the end, helps to learn from experiences from 
other Constitutions and states practice. For the comparative approach, one would be expected 
to enhance a capacity for self‐reflection on a system in order to develop a better understanding 
of it.8 
The main sources of this research are the Constitutions, Legislations, treaties, judicial 
decisions, and doctrines. In general, legal sources will be interpreted systematically, based on 
the hierarchy, the original intent, the purpose of the Laws, and the coherency of laws. 
Furthermore, the political practice, historical experiences, political phenomena, and social 
political culture will also be briefly analysed.  
                                                           
8
 Vicky C. Jackson, “Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law”, Penn State International Law 
Review, Vol. 28/2010, pp. 319‐ 326, accessed from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1739756, 28/07/2011, p. 320. 
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There are two groups of Constitutions in the comparative constitutional section in this 
study, namely: the primary Constitutions and the secondary Constitutions. The primary 
Constitutions are the Constitution of the Philippines, the US Constitution and the French 
Constitution. The Constitution of the Philippines and the US Constitution will represent “the 
most similar Constitutions” to the Constitution of Indonesia, within the same system of 
government (presidential system); whereas, the French Constitution represents “the most 
different Constitution”from the Constitution of Indonesia since it is a different system of 
government (the semi‐presidential system). The three Constitutions selected for comparison 
have some points in common: they are pluralistic democracies with free elections, and claiming 
to be democratic in the system of government. Moreover, the secondary Constitutions are 
these of Germany, the Poland and South Africa. The second group will be used only for 
comparing some relevant issues. The selection of Constitutions in both groups in this thesis is 
mostly intended to permit an inquiry into whether there are some functional, recurrent 
similarities in terms and practices of executive power in comparable government systems. The 
different experiences of the constitutional history, the post‐colonial experience (the 
Philippines), the political turbulence (the US), and the regime transition from authoritarian to 
the more democratic system of government (South Africa) in the Constitutions chosen are also 
very interesting from a comparative point of view. 
The focus of this research is limited to the executive branch and its power specifically in 
a presidential system. To be more specific, it will only focus on the head of the executive, the 
President. 
6. The structure of the book 
The following Chapter 2 will contain general theory and comparison. It will present the 
general theory of the executive powers and government systems. Moreover, the Chapter will 
briefly depict the executive powers in 6 Constitutions (the US Constitution, the Philippines 
Constitution, the French Constitution, the Polish Constitution, the German Constitution, and 
the South African Constitution). Chapter 3 will be achapter about the constitutional history of 
Indonesia. It will describe how the Indonesian constitution has developed the executive power 
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in different regimes. Chapter 4 will provide an analysis for the current issues of the executive 
powers under the Fourth Amended Constitution. Chapter 5 will offer a design of constitutional 
provisions for a future framework of the Indonesian executive powers. Chapter 6 will be the 
concluding and general remarks chapter. 
 
Chapter 2 
Executive Power in a Theoretical and Comparative Reflection  
This chapter is a descriptive chapter of executive powers from a theoretical and 
comparative perspective. First, it deals with literatures about executive branches; then the 
powers, and the powers in different systems of government. The following section deals with 
the comparative perspectives and a reflection on how executive powers have developed in 
presidential systems, parliamentary systems, and in hybrid systems of government. This 
comparative perspective will give insight on how each government system works with 
executive powers and this will be used as a basis for the constitutional design of the proposed‐
future Indonesian executive power in chapter 5.  
2.1. The Executive in the Constitutional System of Government: the General Theory 
 
5. The term and nature of the executive branch 
The word executive has long been recognized from the Latin words “ex sequi”, which 
means “follow out or carrying out” in English, and then in practice refers to the executive’s 
roles to carry out the political system’s policies, laws, or directives.9 The Executive becomes the 
more significant branch in a political and government system since the branch is the key to 
implementing laws and running the state administration as a whole. Duncan Watts clarifies the 
role of the executive branch as the branch which is charged with the responsibility for the state 
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 Duncan Watts, British Government and Politics: a Comparative Guide, Edinburgh University Press, 2006, p. 111. 
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administration and the implementation of laws made by the legislature.10 The role is mainly as 
political leadership to take decisions and assume overall responsibility for the direction and 
coordination of government policy.11 Furthermore, as the policy maker and political leader, the 
roles of the executive include initiation, formulation, articulation, and implementation of policy 
with the responsibility of ceremonial tasks, control of policy making, political leadership, 
management of the bureaucracy, and crisis management. 12  In daily administration, the 
executive branch of government performs three main functions, namely: 1. Decision‐making: 
initiating government action and formulating public policy; 2. Implementation: executives 
implement (apply) the laws, which means they must also run the main departments and 
bureaucracies of a state; 3. Coordination: coordination and integration of the complex affairs of 
state.13From this point of view, the executive is not just a decision maker but also an executor 
in all matters of state administration.  
In practice, there are several models of executive branches: a single chief executive of a 
president, a prime minister, a chief minister, a supreme leader or a monarch and a dual 
executive of two offices, which consists of the president and prime minister or a ruling junta‐
exercising shared leadership.14 While a single executive enjoys all the executive powers, a dual 
executive has to share the powers. In literatures, writers commonly refer the executive to the 
phrase “core executive” to describe the complexity of integrated institutions which are in 
charge of daily state government affairs.15 Meanwhile, Will Storey considered that independent 
regulatory commissions could also be considered as the executive branch, since these 
commissions are empowered to establish for the policy area they regulate rules which have the 
force of law, and to enforce these rules.16 
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 Duncan Watts, Understanding US/UK Government and Politics: a Comparative Guide, Manchester University 
Press, 2003, p. 66. 
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Id. at p. 67 – 69. 
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Duncan Watts, Op.Cit., p. 115‐116. 
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 Ken Newton and Jan W. Van Deth, Foundations of Comparative Politics: Democracies of the Modern World, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 45. 
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Duncan Watts, Op. Cit., p. 111. 
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Duncan Watts, Op. Cit., p. 111: They are the first minister, the cabinet and its committees, the office that serves 
the first minister and cabinet, and the departments headed as they are by senior ministers and senior civil 
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 William Storey, US Government and Politics, Edinburgh University Press, 2007, p. 289. 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
23 
 
In political constitutional history, the executive branch found its roots as the concept of 
the state had been introduced. In the late medieval transformations, John Locke proposed that 
the executive branch is a branch that necessarily exists to execute and enforce laws.17However, 
in a special case, John Locke confirmed that where the public good is concerned, the executor 
of the laws may be given discretion to perform his powers in specific terms.18Accordingly, the 
main executive area is to execute laws, but, it could be possible to be broader than just 
executing laws in the development. In a more current study, Andraz Sajo emphasized that the 
executive branch is important as an institution because it has a monopoly on coercion.19 The 
executive has the right to influence decisions.20 In current and global development, the 
executive branch finds its area to be broader as the scope of state administration is also 
broader. The roles are moving forward even more from just performing state administration to 
the key‐centre of deciding the path of the state. 
Table 2.1 Summary: Executive term and definition, roles and functions, and Model  
The executive 
Term and 
definition 
The executor of laws 
Roles and 
functions 
Run the state administration and government affairs, execute the laws,  
Model 
 
 
A single executive of A Monarch, a President, a Prime Minister, a Chief of Minister,  
A dual executive of President and Prime Minister 
A collective executive of a Prime Minister and Ministers 
 
6. The Executive and its power in a democratic regime of parliamentary, presidency, and 
hybrid system 
 
In modern democratic regimes, there are three models of government system: a 
parliamentary system, a presidential system, and a mixed system. Donald S. Lutz stated that in 
a parliamentary system, the executive usually refers to the prime minister who is selected and 
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The Founders' Constitution Volume 1, Chapter 10, Document 3, the University of Chicago Press, John Locke: 
Second Treatise Edited by Peter Laslett. New York: Mentor Books, New American Library, 1965, p. 143, 144, 150, 
159, paragraph 144, accessed on http://press‐pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch10s3.html, at 
12/12/2012. 
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Ïd. at paragraph 159. 
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 Andraz Sajo, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism, English Translation, Central European 
University Press, 1999, Budapest, p. 174. 
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Id. at p. 175. 
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is part of the legislative; where in a presidential system, the executive is popularly elected and 
is not part of the legislative.21 In a presidential constitution, the president is both the head of 
state and head of government, the president is directly elected, and both president and 
legislature serve for a fixed term; while in a semi presidential constitution, a president is 
directly elected or popularly elected and serves for a fixed term, there is a separate position of 
prime minister, and the prime minister and cabinet are collectively responsible to the 
legislature.22 A government system could also be determined by the executive‐ministers (the 
cabinet) relationship. With respect to the Cabinet, a presidential cabinet consists of presidential 
cabinet officers who hold their posts purely on the decision of their chief (the president), while 
in contrast, parliamentary ministers are parliamentary colleagues; a president in a presidential 
system can protect his cabinet members from criticism much more effectively than a prime 
minister.23 Furthermore, the relationship between the executive is different in a parliamentary 
system and in a presidential system. In a parliamentary system, a prime ministeris much closer 
to being on an equal footing with their fellow ministers; while in a presidential system, a 
president will never be equal with cabinet appointees.24 The president in a presidential system 
has hierarchical relationships with the ministers in the cabinet, while in a parliamentary system, 
the prime minister as the chief executive has a collegial relationship with the ministers in the 
cabinet. 
Moreover, Stepan and Skach argue that the minister in a cabinet can be more frequently 
changed in a presidential system rather than in a parliamentary system.25 This could indicate 
that the government in a presidential system is more flexible and exists within the authority of 
the President, but its relationship with the parliament is different, since the parliament does 
not have the power to change the cabinet. In a presidential system, if no coalition government 
is established as a result of the election process, representatives of the president’s party may 
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be invited to fill all vacancies in the cabinet. On the other hand, in a parliamentary system, 
every portfolio within government, either minority or coalition, enjoys the support of a 
legislative majority.26 
Besides being determined by the executive‐cabinet relationship, the government 
systems could also be valued by the executive‐legislature relationship. With regard to the 
executive‐legislature relationship, Ken Newton and Jan W. Van Deth observed that even though 
presidential systems and parliamentary systems are theoretically different, in practice the two 
systems tend to converge since in practice both systems depend on a close working relationship 
between executive and legislature.27 To this extent, in a presidential system, the relationship 
between the executive and legislature also contributes to the stability of the state 
administration and support to the presidential survival. A good relationship between the 
executive and the legislature would contribute to the greater stability of the state 
administration. 
a. Executive power in a presidency  
A pure presidential system in a democracy has two fundamental characters that are: (1) 
the legislative power has a fixed electoral mandate which has its own source of legitimacy and 
(2) the chief executive power has a fixed electoral mandate which also has its own source of 
legitimacy.28 Moreover, Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach argue that in a presidential system, the 
system may face the possibility of a political impasse between the executive and the legislature; 
a situation that may happen as a result of a president’s and legislature’s direct election that 
creates a mutual independence between both institutions.29 The situation occurs even more 
when a president‐elect is from a minority political party sitting in the legislative. S/he will face 
difficulty in making policy when many of the parties sitting in the legislature are not supportive. 
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28
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A presidential system could have parliamentary tendencies. The tendencies may occur 
by combining elements of both presidential and parliamentary systems but still strongly 
bringing out the elements of the presidential system.30 In a presidential system with a tendency 
towards “parliamentarization”, there is a mechanism of parliamentary control.31 Another 
mechanism of parliamentarization in a presidential system can be observed from the 
operational dynamics of executive‐legislative relations when they exemplified the 
establishment of rules governing the attendance of members of the government in the 
legislative chambers, the obligation to be periodically present at the legislative’s sessions, the 
power of the legislature to call for the ministers to appear before the assembly, soft control by 
the legislature (by interpellation or parliamentary question), and a vote of no confidence that 
translates into the censure of a minister or of the cabinet as a whole but not the president.32 
The executive in a presidential system mostly has three essential features according to 
the position and powers being inherently logical in a presidential regime, namely: leadership 
power resources, leadership autonomy, and personalization of the electoral process.33 The first 
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Héctor Fix‐Fierro, Pedro Salazar‐Ugarte, Presidentialism in: the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional 
Law edited by Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 26. 
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Id. at p. 23. 
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Id. at p. 24: In some systems, ministers have the possibility of making use of the legislative rostrum (in Latin 
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 Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern 
Democracies, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 5: “1. Leadership power resources: The logic of presidentialism 
provides the head of government with superior executive power resources. This emanates directly from the fact 
that he or she is not responsible to parliament, is usually directly legitimated and has the power to form a cabinet 
without significant interference from other institutions. 2. Leadership autonomy: This is also a direct result of the 
separation of powers. While in office, the head of the executive is well protected against pressure from his own 
party. 3. Personalization of the electoral process: This follows directly from the natural focus on the highest 
elective office and implies that all aspects of the electoral process are decisively moulded by the personalities of 
the leading candidates.” 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
27 
 
feature, thatof the leadership power resources, may be related to the executive‐cabinet 
relationship where the president is the chief of the cabinet and other state administration 
institutions. On the other hand, the leadership’s autonomy and personalization of the electoral 
process could be seen as a consequence of the fact that the executive in a presidential system 
being independently elected by the people. As a consequence of direct suffrage, a President 
has a personal democratic mandate. The personal mandate allows the President as the chief of 
executive to unilaterally make policy.34 An elected President has full authority to establish his 
government and be responsible for the state administration entirely. The president has full 
authority for cabinet appointments and dismissal; while ministers in the cabinet are 
accountable directly to the President. Furthermore, the President is an independent institution 
from the legislature and thus, has full authority and responsibility for his public affairs. The 
independent relationship between the President and the legislature is ensured by the real 
separation in which neither the president nor the ministers in the cabinet are members of the 
legislature.35 
In a presidential system, the executive power is vested in the hands of the president and 
commonly known as presidential power. Chiebub mentions three powers in which the 
President may have dominance over the budget process; the power to initiate budget laws, the 
power to amend the budget proposal, and the expenditure power in a situation where there is 
noapproval for a budget law.36 In most of the presidential constitutions, the President is given 
some legislative powers including veto, decree, and urgency powers, as well as the 
government’s exclusive power to introduce certain legislation.37 Cheibub’s view is that the 
President, as the executive, may dominate the legislative initiative in most crucial areas of 
policy‐making since the President has the exclusive right to initiate legislation that concerns the 
budget, taxes, and public administration.38 In a presidential system, Cheibub defines that the 
veto power of the President is relevant to the power of the President to enact a bill to become 
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Law by appending his signature; the veto power may have meaning in the sense that the 
President can refuse the bill either entirely (identified as a complete or total veto power) or 
partly (a partial veto power); however, the legislature, by a majority vote, has the right to 
override such presidential power: 
“The legislative majority required for veto override is usually larger than the majority required for the 
approval of the bill in the first place. Most presidential constitutions (including the U.S. Constitution and 
the majority of the Latin American presidential constitutions) require a two‐thirds majority of the 
legislature in order to override a presidential veto. If such a majority exists, the president is required to 
sign the bill and it then becomes law”.
39
 
 
In some countries, the Constitution may give the president the power to make decrees. 
The presidential decree powers refer to a law‐making power that exists in the Constitution both 
in presidential and parliamentary constitutions. The determination of decree power by Carey 
and Shugart states that decree power varies with respect to the areas where decrees may be 
issued: 
“First, it varies with respect to the areas where decrees may be issued. Some constitutions allow only for 
presidential “executive orders” – that is, purely administrative proclamations pertaining to the 
implementation of laws already approved by the legislature. Others allow for presidential decrees under 
special circumstances, which are often sufficiently vague that presidential action is possible in virtually 
any area (e.g., “relevance,” “urgency,” “economic or financial matters when so required by the 
national”.
40
 
 
In practice, decree powers are mostly used for special circumstances when there are urgent 
matters. 
A presidential system may potentially lead to an autocratic regime. This is relevant in 
that in a presidential system, the power of the executive is mostly vested in the hands of a 
single‐institution, the President. According to Héctor Fix‐Fierro and Pedro Salazar‐Ugarte there 
may be two mechanisms to stabilize and prevent the system from becoming an autocratic 
regime: 1. by strengthening the president’s ability to influence legislative work (strengthening 
the executive) and, 2. by reinforcing the ability of the members of the legislature to influence 
the operation of the government (increasing the power of parliament).41 Moreover, the 
alternative measures to strengthen the Executive could be by strengthening the president’s 
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veto power on legislation passed by the legislature; giving preference to the legislative bills 
introduced into the legislature by the President (any such bill must be passed or rejected within 
a limited time); giving the President more powers to issue decrees with legislative force, or, 
ultimately reserving the power of introducing legislative bills to the President. On the other 
hand, the mechanism to increase the power of parliament could be by increasing the 
involvement of the legislature in the appointment and removal of cabinet members, so it can 
strengthen its powers to make the government accountable; or broadening its powers to shape 
public policy.42 
In history, the idea of the executive branch and its power in a presidential system could 
be traced down from the US Constitutional history. As the first written constitution and first 
presidential constitution, the US Constitution represents the standard on how the executive 
branch and its power established a presidential system. According to US Constitutional history, 
the executive branch in a presidency was intended to be a strong branch but with little 
independent power; the President is in a position to lead, influence, persuade, but rarely to 
command or order.43 In the beginning, the President was intended to be selected by the 
Congress.44 The US constitutional framers designed a mechanism to control as well as to 
empower the executive in 4 ways: 1. Limited government, a reaction against the arbitrary, 
expansive powers of the king or state and a protection of personal liberty; 2. Rule of law; the 
government could only act on the basis of legal and constitutional grounds; 3. Separation of 
power; each of the three branches of government would have a defined sphere of power; 4. 
Checks and balances; each branch could limit or control the executive powers.45 To this extent, 
the feature of the US presidential system reflects that the president is not the dominant and 
central institution among other constitutional branches. The powers of the executive really 
depend on the Legislature (the US Congress). 
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b. Executive power in a premiership 
The history of parliamentary systems started when the UK Bill of Rights 1689 left the 
executive power in the hands of the Monarch but imposed conditions upon the exercise of that 
power to protect the interests of Parliament. Thus, the emergence of the office of the Prime 
Minister in 1723 required the Queen to ensure the ministers were supported by the two houses 
of Parliament, in particular the House of Commons, and had the exclusive privilege to 
determinepolicies of the government that are conducted on behalf of the Monarch.46 The 
British Westminster Parliamentary system is the root model of a parliamentary system. It 
consists of and separates the three traditional branches of government powers.47 In general, 
the parliamentary system in the UK emphasizes two important elements as features in the 
parliamentary system model: 
1. ministers must be members of Parliament mainly in the elected house, although in Britain a few ministers 
may sit in the House of Lords and may be granted peerages for this purpose; 
2. ministers must account to Parliament for their policies and decisions, and are thus ultimately accountable 
to the electorate.48 
 
The parliamentary system puts the UK in the situation where ministers belong to part of the 
government, and are able to exercise executive powers, whether acting in their own name or in 
the name of the head of state in whom the powers are vested, and are accountable to the 
parliament for their use of powers.49 This reflects that the relation between the legislative and 
executive powers is to be fused and does not follow a formal separation between legislative 
and executive. Furthermore, the system was mainly grounded on the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature; the legislature’s powers and the confidence that the executive 
received from the legislature, might prevail over the other in the exercise of political power.50 
The system entitles the Monarch to participate in the legislative process by giving the royal 
assent; the Monarch also has a discretionary power to dissolve the assembly whenever the 
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parliament is acting contrary to the state’s interest.51 However, the Constitution generally does 
not designate the Monarch or the president in a parliamentary system as head of the executive; 
instead they have the position of the head of the state. Accordingly, a definite parliamentary 
majority only asserts the powers of appointing the prime minister and of dissolving parliament 
as a formal matter of the head of the state. Anthony W. Bradley and Cesare Pinelli argued that 
in a parliamentary system, the position of head of the state is maintained equally by the 
definite existence of parliamentary majority.52 Furthermore, a motion of confidence may be 
proposed by the government with the aim of ensuring that it has the support of a majority for 
its program, or for a single bill or policy.53 In principle, a government must resign whenever 
parliament approves a “no confidence” motion, or rejects a confidence motion. The 
parliamentary system in the UK, according to Anthony W. Bradley and Cesare Pinelli, recognizes 
the principle of ministerial individual accountability; the principle has the meaning that the 
ministers are responsible in the sense that they are answerable to the parliament for each of 
their departments; it reflects a chain of accountability.54 
According to the UK and most of the parliamentary Constitutions, the existence of the 
executive branch (the government) depends generally on the motion of confidence of the 
legislature; whereas, in a presidential system model, a government is independent of the 
legislature as a result of a direct election.55 Anthony W. Bradley and Cesare Pinelli said that 
most parliamentary systems corresponded to federations.56 
 Commonly, the political executive in a parliamentary system (chancellor, premier, prime 
minister and their cabinet or council of ministers) is not directly elected but emerges from the 
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majority party or ruling coalition in the assembly.57 Ken Newton and Jan W. Van Deth state that 
the executive, in a parliamentary system usually consists of a prime minister and a cabinet or a 
council of ministers, in which, they share responsibilities among their members.58A Prime 
Minister is not only the chairperson of the Cabinet but also responsible for the party 
organization.59 In addition, according to Stephen Buckley, in a parliamentary system, the 
executive branch is usually performed by two distinct groups of people who are politically 
appointed and serve as permanent officials such as the civil service in the United Kingdom.60 
c. Executive in a hybrid system 
The concept of a Hybrid system of government: a combination and deviance  
The hybrid system of government (half‐presidential, quasi‐presidential, quasi 
parliamentary, premier presidentialism, or pseudo‐presidential) emerges as a combination or 
deviation of traditional types of presidential and parliamentary systems. Maurice Duverger 
introduced and elaborated the hybrid system of a semi‐presidential system as a combination 
system between a presidential system and parliamentary system and pointed out the French 
Constitution of 4 October 1958.61 According to Robert Elgi’s study, since 1920 the term has 
been used to describe a situation when there was either a powerful prime minister or a 
powerful president.62 Elgie noted that the dual executive may potentially provoke a conflict 
between the president and the prime minister.63 On the other hand, according to Pasquino, the 
system of semi presidentialism may run risks, such as:  
“1. Turn out to be a hyper‐presidentialism, when the President of the Republic is also recognized as the 
leader of the parliamentary majority and cumulates the executive and legislative power; 2. create a 
constitutional crisis caused by a decision‐making paralysis while this situation may be raised when the 
parliamentary majority is made of a coalition of parties that are opposing the president and a political and 
institutional clash between the prime minister and the president may ensue; 3. the paralysis is a 
consequence of anytime the president put too much interference with the parliamentary decision‐making 
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process and the power of the prime minister; the likely reaction of the prime minister and his attempt, 
one way or another, to legislate may also push to a situation of constitutional crisis.”
64
 
A hybrid system of government creates a framework where the President may hold 
considerable powers and a government.65 Unlike in a presidential system with the President as 
the single executive branch who has the full command in performing the executive power, a 
hybrid system allocates shared‐executive powers to the President and other institutions. On the 
other hand, unlike in the Parliamentary system where the Monarch or the President cannot be 
brought down by the Parliament, in some hybrid systems of government, though the President 
is mostly elected by direct suffrage, the Parliament may have a significant role in removing the 
President; thus, this may make the President dependent on the Parliament. 
In addition, Elgie observed that since the practice varies, the constitutional powers of 
the Presidents, Prime Ministers, and the Cabinets also multiply; sometimes the Presidents 
dominate Prime Ministers, or vice versa, the Prime Ministers have stronger power, or it may be 
that sometimes neither one dominates the other.66 In general, a semi‐presidential system has 
often been an easy system to choose for strategic reasons since the system offers the prospect 
of a strong president; while on the other hand it enables power sharing and facilitates coalition 
building.67  
Table 2.2 Executive under three models of democratic government systems 
Parliamentary system Presidential system Hybrid system 
Executive branch: 
‐ collective  
‐ headed by a Prime Minister 
‐ dependent to the parliament 
Executive branch 
‐ single 
‐ headed by a President 
‐ independent branch 
Executive branch 
‐ dual 
‐ a President and a Prime Minister 
‐ independent branch 
Executive power 
‐ vest in a Prime Minister 
 
Executive power 
‐ mainly vest in a President 
Executive power 
‐ shared between President and 
Prime Minister 
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7. Executive power: scopes, sources, features and limits 
 
The scope of executive power has been increased in modern days.68 However, it has a 
tendency to be formally limited in order to preserve the power balance with other branches; 
namely, the legislature and the courts.69 Moreover, the features of the executive powers in 
most legal systems have evolved over time and are not fixed since they greatly fluctuate with 
the actual distribution of powers at any given moment shaped by social and political 
circumstances.70 
d. The sources and categories of the power  
The executive powers are derived from various sources, both constitutional and extra‐
constitutional, and they exist in two forms of formal and informal power.71 Michael A. 
Genovese specified the formal and informal power of the President. The formal power is 
derived from the Constitution and extends beyond the strictly legalistic or specifically granted 
powers that find their sources in the literal reading of the words of the Constitution; while 
informal powers find their sources in the political as opposed to the constitutional.72 On the 
other hand, Sakrishna Prakash in his work “Taxonomy of the Presidential powers” proposed 
that the executive (presidential) powers may be sourced from the Constitution, or from other 
sources. Prakash proposed four categories of executive powers that can be viewed from its 
sources, namely: "specific powers,""vesting clause powers," "structural powers," and "extra‐
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textual powers."73 The specific powers may be variously found in the constitutional provisions 
and are specific in the sense that the powers are particularly listed.74 The vesting clause powers 
are mentioned to be power of removal, power of executing laws, and power in accordance to 
the exercise of certain authority in emergency situations.75 The structural powers according to 
Prakash may refer to the constitutional structure; whereas, the extra‐textual powers may arise 
from sources outside the Constitutional text and structure.76 
Debates over the executive powers have come to the question of whether or not the 
powers are inherently attached. While in practice, the executive powers are not fixed but 
rather shaped by political context and the path dependent evolution of particular legal 
systems.77 The term Executive has been potentially misleading since it may create the 
impression that the executive power is like a fortress in which the leader does whatever he 
wants.78 The executive powers could be categorized based on the character of powers, namely: 
the regularable powers, residual powers, and absolute powers.79 The regularable powers are 
the powers that can be limited by the legislator through legislation; on the other hand, the 
residual powers are powers that are normally allocated to other branches, such as the 
legislature, or the judiciary, but where some remaining aspects are left to the President.80 In 
contrast with both powers, the absolute powers are the power that can be exercised without 
any checks.81 On the other hand, C.F. Strong viewed the executive powers from their 
functionsand asserted that the modern executive branch is more flexible rather than only 
executing laws.82 
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As the main executive powers commonly originate from the Constitution and are known 
asconstitutional powers, other powers are commonly known as delegated powers. Delegated 
powers are the powers that may not be derived from the Constitution since they may be given 
by legislation, made by the legislature or the Parliament. The powers are usually given because 
the executive runs the state administration and government activity. Those powers are 
necessary for the Legislature in case there is something urgent in the area of government. 
Therefore, the Legislature may delegate the power to the executive. Such powers may 
extendthe executive powers. In a presidential system, a modern President has even more 
executive powers from both the Constitution and political resources (the elections, political 
parties, interest groups, the media and public opinion).83 There are three factors that can 
influence the expansion of the executive power in a presidential system:  the party, popular 
mobilization, and administration.84 
Moreover, any kind of laws (such as: the executive orders, presidential decrees, 
presidential decisions, executive agreements, executive directives, etc) issued by the President 
are also known as the instruments that may contribute to the expansion of the executive power 
of the President. Such laws may be issued and implemented unilaterally; it will, then, justify any 
kind of presidential actions. However, such presidential law should be based on the 
Constitution, as the primary power source, and the Legislation as the source from which the 
power of the executive is derived from Parliament. Therefore, the Presidential law‐making 
power is actually derivative and residual from the Constitutional power and the legislation (the 
delegated power from the parliament).  
 
Scheme 1: Summary of the Executive Powers  
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e. The limits of the executive powers 
 
The exercise of the executive powers depends on other branches, in particular, the 
legislature and the Court. Therefore, executive power is not a power without check and balance 
from others. Mostly, none of the democratic countries give the executive broad and unchecked 
power even in the area of national security; all divide powers in this area between the 
executive and the legislature, often including a role for the courts as well.85 In general, 
contemporary democracies limit the executive powers and preserve a balance of political 
power with the legislature and the courts that protect liberty.86 
In the US, the limitation over the executive branch is mainly by Congress: the Senate, by 
confirmation of presidential appointments and the ratification of treaties, and the House of 
Representatives by analyzing the budget and other forms of day‐to‐day scrutiny, shared by both 
chambers.87 The formal constitutional powers of the US President are originally the power that 
belongs to other branches.88 To this extent, the executive powers of the president are actually 
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INHERENT POWER: 
‐ Power inherently attached naturally 
to the President as result of his role 
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attached to the President as a 
consequence of his oath 
‐ Such as Political Power, 
Constitutional Power, Legal Power 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: 
‐ Expressed in the constitutional 
provision 
‐ Implied from the constitutional 
provision 
DELEGATED POWER 
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not independent but depend on other branches.In a political sense, the executive power in the 
US may be checked by the Congress and Senate by some obvious political checks that can be 
used to restrain a president: 
“Congress has some obvious political checks it can use to restrain a president, such as refusing to pass key 
legislative proposals urged by the chief executive, overriding a presidential veto, or denying funding for 
presidential priorities. Congress may also pass legislation to reserve an executive order or to overturn 
administrative rules and regulations. Other tactics are Senate refusal to ratify treaties or attaching 
conditions and reservations to them, and, similarly, Senate failure to confirm a president’s nominees for 
executive or judicial appointments. Upping the ante a bit is the practice of congressional oversight, both 
as a routine, ongoing activity to keep watch over executive branch agencies and departments, and, more 
pointedly, when claims of questionable executive branch conduct arise, where more specific 
congressional investigations may be warranted. This basic list of legislative checks against a president is, 
however, juxta‐posed within an existing political context. Thus, in eras of divided government, it is 
reasonable, although not always correct, to presume a higher degree of contentiousness and 
confrontation between a president and Congress, while a period of unified party government 
presupposes fewer legislative checks and greater policy coordination and consensus. Even this rough 
generalization, to be more accurate, requires closer attention to the exact party make up in each chamber 
of Congress (and even to the relative strength of specific wings of each party in each house) and to the 
internal rules of each house”.
89
 
In most practice, the check from the Legislature may be imposed by a rejection of a legislative 
proposal or of state budget. Whereas, in order to balance the executive powers, the legislature 
may share the power with the executive branch, such as on the appointments, ministerial 
performance supervisory, and government policies review. Meanwhile, the Court may check 
the executive powers of the President. Nancy Kassop argued that the Court is a potent branch 
to limit the exercise of executive power and prevent the President from going beyond the 
boundaries.90 However, apart from all checks, there is always an opportunity for the President 
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to respond to all the checks and balances that other branches may invoke by, for example, 
using the veto power or wielding the appointment power.91 
f. Other mechanisms to constrain the executive power 
Besides the mechanism of checks and balances, some mechanisms are also significantly 
effective to restrain the executive powers. Jody C. Baumgartner argues that impeachment is the 
ultimate check on the power of a chief executive in a presidential system.92 Impeachment may 
be a signal that there is no perpetual branch existing with absolute power. 
Other mechanisms to limit the executive powers may be taken by clarification and 
limitation of the application of the executive immunity in the Constitution. The idea of 
executive immunity is mostly beyond the doctrine that anyone is treated equally before the 
law. Commonly, immunity may be given conditionally in certain circumstances. In general, the 
ground of giving the immunity to the executive is mainly to encourage effective decision 
making and protect discretionary action from suits.93 However, according to some scholars, 
executive immunity may be granted to the executive as an absolute immunityor a qualified 
immunity.94 The chief executive is granted an absolute immunity when the immunity could 
shield him from all actions within the scope of his authority; on the other hand, a qualified 
immunity is given to the chief executive as a conditional immunity or a limited immunity 
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whenever he acts in good faith and reasonably in the circumstances.95 Furthermore, qualified 
immunity is about balancing the need to promote effective government and the interests of 
protecting citizens’ constitutional rights; it provides fair protection for Presidents when there is 
a presidential function which does require absolute immunity.96 
8. Executive powers: a-z 
The executive powers include the whole state administration affairs; both in domestic 
and foreign areas. They cover all the strategic state affairs. The post‐conflict organization has 
classified the executive powers into domestic affairs power and foreign affairs power. The 
domestic affairs power includes: (1) signing, promulgating, and executing laws, (2) vetoing 
legislation passed by the legislature, (3) declaring a state of emergency, (4) conferring titles, 
orders, and decorations, (5) granting individual pardons and amnesties, (6) appointing state 
officials and judges, (7) announcing elections, (8) calling referenda, and (9) dissolving the 
legislature. 97  The foreign affairs power includes: (1) representing the state abroad; (2) 
negotiating the terms of treaties; (3) appointing ambassadors and envoys; and (4) accrediting 
and receiving foreign ambassadors and envoys.98 In general, there are at least 8 executive 
powers that are mostly found in the Constitutions, namely: the law‐making power, the 
appointment power, the foreign affairs and treaty power, the administrative power, the 
emergency power, the military, war power, and the pardoning power. 
a. Law-making powers 
The law‐making power may include the participation of the Executive in the legislative 
process, the power to make sub‐ordinate laws, the power to make any executive rule, the 
power to make Emergency Laws (decree or executive order), and the power to make any other 
Executive Rules and Regulations. The legislative power, on the basis of separation of powers is 
commonly exercised by the Parliament or the Legislature; the Parliament has full authority over 
the whole legislative process, while the Constitutions confirm the right of the government to 
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submit draft bills.99 In some states like the US, the Executive does not have the right to formally 
submit a bill. By not having the right to submit a bill, it does not mean that the Executive has no 
power in the legislative process. The Constitution gives veto power to the executive. Veto 
power is more like a bridge in a divided government and veto bargaining is an essential part of a 
theory of divided government. Charles Cameron observed that under divided government, the 
probability of a veto increases dramatically with the significance of the legislation.100 A veto 
power in a legislative process will reflect the more democratic system of government. It gives 
an opportunity for the Executive to disagree with the Legislature and bring through the 
opportunity to bargain in a democratic sphere. According to Charles M. Cameron, the President 
can shape legislation through the vetoes: 
“There are three ways vetoes can shape legislation. First, an intransigentpresident can try to kill a bill. He 
uses the veto to force its re‐passage,hoping outside events derail the legislation. Second, the president 
canforce Congress to craft a new, veto‐proof version of the bill, one he maystill find objectionable but 
nonetheless preferable to the original version.Third, the president can force Congress to rewrite the 
vetoed bill, offeringenough concessions so he will sign the repassed bill. The presidentmay do this even 
though he would have been willing to sign the first billif it were a one‐shot offer. In each of these cases 
the veto is a form ofstrategic holdout intended to shape the outcome of the inter‐branch 
bargaining.Skillful presidents can use sequential veto bargaining to impresstheir preferences on policy 
much more than static conceptions of theveto would suggest”.101 
 
The veto does not always mean that a president can dominate the law‐making power. Yet, it is 
not about a strong power since the veto could always be over‐ridden by the legislature. 
However, a presidential system does not always provide the executive with veto power. Many 
presidential Constitutions do not have veto power for the executive; while some others give the 
veto power implicitly. The veto power cannot be used to assess whether the Executive has a 
significant and dominant power or whether it has weak power in a legislative process. The 
Executive with veto power may still be the dominant party when in the bargaining process s/he 
can influence and raise support from the Legislature. On the other hand, veto power indeed 
appears as a weak power when it is over‐ridden or waived. The Executive with the power to 
submit bills, on the other hand, may be weaker when there is lack of support from the 
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majorityin the legislature. In general, the legislative power of the President does not depend on 
the veto power or the power to submit the bill. It mainly depends on the bargaining process 
between the President and the Legislature during the process, in the legislative session, or 
outside the legislative forum. The indicators for the legislative power of the Executive may be 
viewed from the portions of distributions between the executive and legislature. However, 
when the veto power is combined with the power to initiate a bill, the legislative power of the 
Executive may be dominant in the legislative process. Meanwhile, when the Executive has only 
the right to initiate or propose bills, the Executive has the ability to shape legislation and 
control the agenda by choosing a proposal.102 In this context, the President would have more 
portions of power than the legislature in the legislative process if the Constitution gives both 
legislative initiatives and a veto of the bills. 
b. Appointment powers 
 
In order to perform his roles and duties, the head of the executive branch has the power 
to appoint state officers. The appointment power may be only a formal power to appoint, or a 
real power acting as the final decision maker to nominate, to promote, to elect and to appoint 
including to dismiss and reshuffle. Commonly, the appointment powers include the power to 
appoint the executive officers and judges. The appointment powers are usually implied fromthe 
Constitution and from the laws. For example, in the US Constitution, the appointment clause in 
Article II explicitly vests the nomination power to the President and establishes three categories 
of federal officials namely: the non‐inferior (or principal) officers, inferior officers, and non‐
officers (employees).103 
As the appointment power could be extended but not limited, usually, the power is 
exercised with checks and balances and is vested in the head of state or head of government. 
Some constitutions, such as the US Constitution and the Philippines Constitution, explicitly 
allow the appointment power to be exercised during the recess orduring the session. According 
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to the US Constitution, the appointment power may be exercised during the recess and has 
raised controversies since the power then is a unilateral power by the President without advice 
and consent from the legislature.104 The scopes of appointment are commonly clarified in the 
text of the Constitution as well as the mechanisms of appointment. It may include the judicial 
appointment (the appointment of judges), the executive appointment (the appointment of 
ministers, the appointment of state ambassadors and the Consuls, and other executive officers 
under the executive branch), the military appointment, and/or other political appointment. 
c. Administrative powers: internal state administration affairs,budget and 
expenditure, and other affairs of state government 
The administrative powers refer to the power to execute laws and to establish a state 
administration. The administrative powers also include the power to direct, control and 
supervise the ministerial cabinet and the executive departments as a whole, and state or local 
governments, issue executive regulations, the power to spend state budget that has been 
approved by the Legislature, establish any executive agencies and commission, and other state 
administrative affairs. In order to run the daily activities and state administration, the Executive 
usually has the privilege to submit budget bills.105 However, the power to approve the budget 
bill is vested in the Parliament. 
d. Emergency powers 
The emergency power is usually an extra‐ordinary power to take any extra‐
constitutional actions in order to deal with a situation that cannot be dealt with by regular 
powers. The power may justify any actions deriving from discretionary powers and may allow 
suspension of rights. The exercise of emergency powers usually has a time limit so that any 
extra‐ordinary actions may be applied only during an emergency situation. The emergency 
powers may be applied when the emergency situation cannot be sufficiently dealt with by 
regular powers set in the Constitution. Debates about the justification of such emergency 
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power, raised some pros and cons. However, it is believed that constitutionally and historically 
speaking, the power is not unlimited and unchecked.106 Within a constitutional framework, any 
institution attached with the emergency power is limited in itscoercive powers to deal with 
emergency situations. The emergency power is constrained by other branches which may check 
and balance the presidential emergency power. 107 
According to political and constitutional theory, the emergency powers have been 
discussed since the experience of dictatorship of the ancient Roman Republic right up to the 
modern democracy in the new era of global terrorism threats.108 According to John Ferejohn 
and Pasquale Pasquino, there are two main differences between the ancient classical Roman 
and the Constitution in modern era; 
“In the Roman dictatorship the agency declaring the emergency (the Senate) is different from the agent 
appointing the official who can exercise the emergency powers (the Consuls), and is different from the 
agency exercising Emergency Powers (the dictator). Moreover, the dictator is not an active magistracy 
during the regular government. In the modern, or neo‐Roman, model the head of the executive 
recognizes an emergency and the same agent exercises Emergency Powers. And, the executive is a regular 
(not a dormant) organ of the constitutional system. One can suspect immediately that the Romans were 
much more concerned with potential abuses of emergency powers than were the designers of the 
modern constitutions who perhaps put more faith in the fact that the executive had to stand for 
election.”109 
 
According to John Locke, the emergency power is an extra‐legal power dictated by 
necessity that is given to the executive, and in nature was associated with the English doctrine 
of prerogative to deal with incidental necessities where the law‐making power was excessive or 
too slow to be executed. On the other hand, it permits the executive to act with discretion for 
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the public good without prescription of the Law or even sometimes in contradiction with the 
Law, and it permits the disregard of even the direct letter of the Law.110 
The emergency power is usually written in the Constitution. According to Bruce 
Ackerman, defining the scope of emergency power is a serious and sensitive concern.111 
Ackerman considers that there are two kinds of emergency: 
“One kind is created by a terroristattack, an atomic blast, a killer epidemic, and another when the 
governmentis paralyzed and can’t respond in a credible fashion.The first kind of emergency is an 
inevitability of twenty‐first‐centurylife and it will be a miracle if we can prevent all terrorist attacks, and I 
don’tbelieve in miracles. But the second kind is merely a product of an ostrich‐likerefusal to confront the 
obvious inadequacies of our present arrangements.It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to come up with a 
bettersolution; it just takes a little foresight and a bit of political will, not a lotsince there is little reason to 
expect significant political resistance”.
112
 
 
In common constitutional practice, the text of the Constitution usually provides certain 
circumstances that may be defined as an emergency, including International and internal 
conflict, direct military attack or military invasion, civil conflicts including internal disturbances, 
and is extended for other humanitarian catastrophes such as natural disasters, epidemics, 
famine, economic and political crisis, or any event which occurs and potentially contributes to 
the state’s collapse, a threat to national security like terrorism. Such events may be an 
international or internal threat to the state and community. Modern Constitutions usually also 
provide checks and balances for such emergency powers. Courts have the main role to review 
any measure during the emergency, and to conduct post‐checks against the constitutionality or 
legality of the use of emergency power. On the other hand, legislatures may have a role to set 
laws concerning the state emergency and put limits onthe use of emergency power. Modern 
Constitutions have attempted to set any measure that may be taken in time of emergency, and 
design certain limitations to the emergency power by providing strict and clear definitions of 
certain circumstances that may be classified as an emergency. The emergency powers are also 
restrained by international political and legal circumstances; while public participation would 
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reduce the power of the centralized government altogether with legal restraint provided 
horizontally within the national government by separation of powers and supplemented by 
vertical restraints imposed by international society and popular community pressures.113 
The emergency powers include the power to determine certain circumstances as an 
emergency situation, the power to declare a state of emergency in part of the state or the state 
as a whole, the power to take any unilateral measures to deal with the emergency situation, 
and the power to issue and enact emergency laws. The emergency power is a temporary 
power. It may have a slightly unilateral character during the exercise of such power. However, 
the exercise of emergency power has a limited enforceability. After it has expired, such power 
may not be exercised unless it is authorized by the Legislature. However, according to Jules 
Lobel, the best response to anemergency situation is by forcing the President to immediately 
seek congressional and public ratification instead of putting a temporary limitation and allowing 
broad executive discretion.114 
e. Military powers 
The military power of the executive is commonly expressed in the Constitution as a 
consequence of the Commander in chief clause. Edward S. Corwin indicates divisions within the 
particular area of power:  
‐ The power in the presence of domestic war, as shown by the events of the Civil War,  
‐ The powers in the presence of conditions of violence, real, or threatened, that are less than war 
‐ The powers in the establishment of martial law 
‐ The power as the delegate of Congress when the country is involved in foreign war,  
‐ The executive’s organizational relations with the national forces.
115
 
The power authorizes the executive to command the national forces in active service. 
Moreover, the military power also allows the executive to terminate hostilities and conduct 
peace negotiations. In peace situation, the power enables the executive to decide the 
mobilization of national military forces for peace‐keeping or humanitarian intervention.  
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f. Foreign affairs power 
The foreign affairs power is generally derived as a consequence of the role of the 
executive as the head of state. According to Michael Genovese, the powers can be classified as 
the inherent power of the executive. However, since foreign affairs are also state affairs, the 
powers may also be executed by the executive as the head of the government. The powers are 
generally specified in the Constitution although the term foreign affairs power is not commonly 
written in the Constitution. Foreign affairs powers implied in the Constitution cover the treaty 
power, the diplomacy power, foreign policy making, conducting peace keeping operations, and 
other external affairs. 
According to the British precedents, all the external affairs are assigned to the monarch 
including declaring wars, raising armies, making treaties, appointing ambassadors, and issuing 
letters of marque and reprisal (to authorize private citizens to engage in military actions.116 
Prakash and Ramsey argued that the foreign affairs powers arose from the executive power of 
the Crown under a parliamentary system; while in a presidential system, the foreign affairs 
power is given to the President which implies that the President has the executive power 
including the foreign affair power.117 In some countries, like in the US, Louis Fisher observed 
that not all foreign affairs power was given to the President: 
“ the US Constitution grants not a single one of those powers to the president. The powers to declare 
war, mobilize armies, and issue letters of marque and reprisal are placed exclusively in Congress. The 
powers to make treaties and appoint ambassadors are given jointly to the president and the Senate”.
118
 
 
The foreign affairs power of a President may be determined as enumerated powers that include 
the President’s explicit power to make treaties (with the advice and consent of the senate), 
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appoint ambassadors (with the advice and consent), and to receive foreign ambassadors 
(considered in the context of a broader foreign affairs).119 
With regard to the treaty power, Louis Henkin argued that the treaty making power is 
an important power not only as an occasional power; the appointment of ambassadors is an 
ordinary routine, not consequential, and even more infrequent; receiving ambassadors seems 
as a function and assigned duty, a ceremony that in many countries is performed by a 
figurehead. 120 While the treaty making powers are explicitly laid down in the Constitution, 
most of the Constitutions are silent about the treaty termination power. Louis Henkin 
considered that the silence of the Constitution renders a textual analysis impossible, but the 
nature, character, and structure of the treaty‐making power permits logical inference to 
determine the locus of the authority to terminate treaties.121 
g. War powers 
The war power is one of constitutional powers to empower the executive branch to act 
not above the law, but within the Constitution and in order to protect the state.122 The war 
powers include the power to declare war, the power to mobilize the military force and the 
power to order any military actions. The war power in a parliamentary system commonly 
requires parliamentary consent. Parliamentary consent for the performance of war power may 
have several beneficial effects: parliamentary consent in war power accords more legitimacy to, 
and consolidates popular support for, military operations, increasing their effectiveness, 
providing the public with a strong incentive to avoid unnecessary wars, keeping military forces 
anchored in a given society, in contrast to standing armies, which tend to embrace interests 
which differ from those of citizens.123 
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In the UK, the war powers are vested solely in the executive and it leaves the British 
Parliament having no formal role in the deployment of the armed forces.124 However, according 
to the Bill of Rights of 1689, a standing army within the Kingdom in time of peace, unless it be 
with consent of Parliament, is against the law; thus, while the Royal Navy may be maintained 
without authorization by virtue of prerogative, the authority of Parliament is required for the 
maintenance of the British Army, the Royal Air Force, and other land‐based forces.125 The war 
power in the UK is proposed to require a parliamentary consent.126 However, the war power in 
a presidential system finds an ambiguity. In most of the presidential constitutions, the war 
power is formally vested in the executive but practically develops into more ambiguous ones 
since it mostly requires the authorization from the legislatures. 
In general, the definition of war in the constitutions may be defined differently. Seth 
Weinberger observed that legal theorists and policy makers generally staked out two opposing 
views defining the constitutional meaning of a war declaration clause: 
“On one side are those who argue for the broadest understanding of the declare war clause and a very 
limited conception of executive power. In this formulation, war must be formally declared each and every 
time American troops are to be sent into battle (with the possible exception of a sudden attack on 
American soil in which the enemy must be met before deliberations over declaring war can be held). On 
the other side are those who read a very narrow definition of the declare war clause, and claim that 
declarations of war are only necessary in extreme cases and are used to transform the legal status of the 
nation from a peacetime to a wartime footing. This side tends to argue that such a transformation does 
not require a formal declaration of war, but can be achieved through various kinds of congressional 
authorizations. A declaration of war, in the narrow definition, is only necessary to activate certain 
domestic laws that are not part of the president’s war powers, such as the power to seize private property 
or establish price controls or rationing patterns.”
127
 
 
In practice, declaring war could be by formally declaring war, claiming military confrontation to 
other states, or by launching a military operation against other states. However, some 
Constitutions, for example the US Constitution, give the war power to the Congress, while the 
formality to declare war has to be done by the President. Whereas, some constitutions, such as 
the Indonesian Constitution give the war power to the President. 
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h. Pardoning powers 
The pardoning power is the power to grant pardon, clemency, abolition, reprieve, 
amnesty, commutation and any kind of removing all or some of the monetary penalties (fines 
and forfeiture), or the punitive consequences of a criminal conviction.128 It is a singular tool of 
governance that is intended to restore balance in the justice system and put important issues 
on the national agenda.129 The power may be exercised unconditionally or conditionally, given 
as full or partial pardon by the head of the state or the executive. It can be exercised by 
changing the punishment (in the case of death penalty to life imprisonment), reprieve the 
punishment, pardon or remit the punishment. The pardoning power comes from the British 
Crown which was vested in the Monarch in accordance with the Monarch’s divine right to 
rule.130 
According to the US legal system, the pardoning power may be in the form of pardon, 
amnesty, reprieve, commutation and remission of fines; and may be exercised in an absolute, 
full, or unconditional pardon in which the pardon is granted without any conditions; or partial 
or conditional pardon which limit the pardon in time. Some scholars distinguish between 
amnesty and pardon by saying that amnesty is in the legislative area.131 In Russia, the Duma 
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may give amnesty and sometimes serves as a positive check on the presidential pardoning 
power.132 
In common practice, the pardoning power is given to the head of the state or generally 
to the executive with the rationale that the executive may give effect to widespread public 
opinion in favor of or against the sentence of a particular accused person.133 Naturally, the 
pardoning power is typically broad without significant constraints.134 Considering the nature of 
pardoning power as merely a prerogative power, without significant limitation, as well as to 
ensure the accountability of such power in modern democratic atmosphere, James N. 
Jorgensen suggests that the pardoning power is exercised only after trial, conviction, and 
sentencing; and only in certain offences.135 
2.2. Executive Power in a Comparative Study: Different Models of Constitution of 
Government System and Experiences 
a. A comparison of constitutional models in different government systems 
This section discusses the classic model of constitutional government systems in modern 
democracies commonly studied in most of literatures, namely: parliamentary constitutions, 
presidential constitutions, and hybrid/ intermediate constitutions. The focus of this part is on 
the executive branch and its powers. It provides a general overview on how executive powers 
are written in the text of the Constitution and how the Constitution prescribes the exercise of 
the powers. The Constitutions chosen represent different government systems: Germany, 
South Africa, the US, the Philippines, France and Poland.136 The US Constitution is a primary 
example of a presidential Constitution.137France’s hybrid system embeds the concept of 
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executive powers and how they develop in modern days. The German post‐war and Polish 
Constitution represent modern constitutions. On the other hand, South Africa with a 
progressive constitutional development, after being revived from constitutional crisis, has 
managed and developed the constitutional system progressively. The Constitution of the 
Philippines is chosen because the Phillippines is a state in South East Asia relevant for regional 
comparison. It may give a spectrum of development from an entrenched democracy and 
constitutionalism under a similar presidential system as Indonesia. Two Constitutions are 
chosen to represent a parliamentary system model: the German Constitution and the South 
African Constitution. Under the parliamentary system, both Constitutions provide a contrasting 
experience of an executive branch. The Philippines Constitution is chosen on the basis that it 
represents alternative aspects of the presidential system, namely, a low level presidential 
systemas the President has more weight and hassubstantial powers, but meanwhile, the 
parliament has less power to check on the president’s powers. The French Constitution and the 
Polish Constitution are chosen since both Constitutions have been known as the first observed 
Constitutions with a hybrid or semi presidential system. The semi presidential system 
establishes a unique dual executive. The French Constitution may have some modern 
mechanisms that are relevant to be of inspiration for Indonesia. Poland, on the other hand, has 
developed its Constitution with more modern concepts and it has set a coherent‐systematic 
framework for the executive and executive powers.  
b. Executive power: reflections on countries with a parliamentary system (a 
fusion power: executive and legislative) 
1. Germany 
Germany is a republic with a parliamentary system as the system of government. It is a 
federal state. As a parliamentary system, the head of state and the head of government are 
separated. The head of state is the Federal President and the head of government is the Federal 
Chancellor. The Germany Constitution is the German Basic Law (Grungesetz fur die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland) of 23 May 1949 as amended by federal statute of 29 July 2009 
and incorporating the amendments resulting from the federal statute of 8 October 2008 which 
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entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009.138 The German Basic Law 
does not explicitly clarify what are the executive powers, but instead implicitly refers to them in 
some of the provisions. The German Basic Law provisions indicate that the executive power 
belongs to the Federal Government which consists of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal 
Minister, and the Lander as a consequence that German is a federal state. The Lander has the 
executive power in a Land. It has also the power to execute federal laws in their own right.139 
The Federal president  
The German Basic Law determines the Federal President as the head of the state. The 
Federal President is absolutely not the Federal government. According to Article 55 section (1), 
the Federal President may not be a member of the Federal Government or of a legislative body 
of the Federation or of a State. In general, the Federal President is not a strong President; it is 
because the German Basic Law does not provide provisions to empower the Federal President 
with real powers and does not create a strong presidency; while also, the Federal President has 
a weak office because he is indirectly elected without strong popular support in order to make 
discretionary actions.140 In most of the powers, the Federal President has no real influence 
other than formal power on behalf of the Federation and acting as the Federation 
representation. The Federal President has limited powers in practice. Article 58 of the 
GermanBasic Law states that all instructions and orders (except for the appointment and 
dismissal of the Federal Chancellor, the dissolution of the Bundestag under Article 63 and the 
request to the Federal Chancellor or a federal minister to continue the affairs until the 
appointment of a successor under Article 69 (3)), made by the Federal President require the 
counter‐signature of the Federal Chancellor or the competent federal minister for the validity. 
On the other hand, Heringa and Kiiver mention two presidential powers which stand out in the 
Federal President; firstly, the Federal President may, and in fact can, refuse to sign legislation 
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that in his view violates the Basic Law when he promulgates bills adopted on the federal 
legislative process; while he may not veto legislation for political reasons; and secondly, the 
formal power to dissolve the Bundestag.141 
The Federal President is indirectly elected by the Federal Convention 
(Bundesversammlung which consists of the members of the Bundestag and an equal number of 
members who are elected by the parliaments of the States on the basis of proportional 
representation.142 An absolute majority vote is required. Within the term of office, the Federal 
President can be impeached. Article 61 section (1) stipulates that the Bundestag or the 
Bundesrat (at least a quarter of the members of the Bundestag or a quarter of the votes of the 
Bundesrat for a motion to impeach and a majority of two‐thirds of the members of the 
Bundestag or two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat for the decision to impeach) may 
impeach the Federal President for an intentional violation of the Basic Law or another federal 
statute before the Federal Constitutional Court. Furthermore, Article 61 section (2) determines 
that the Federal Constitutional Court establishes the prosecution and decides whether the 
Federal President is guilty or not for having committed an intentional violation of the Basic Law 
or another federal statute and may declare the Federal President is removed from the office, 
and thus, may rule that he is prevented from exercising the functions as a Federal President. 
On law-making power, the Federal President has the formal power to certify a bill into 
federal legislation according to Article 82 section (1) the German Basic Law. On the 
appointment power,the Federal President only has formal power to appoint and to dismiss the 
Federal Chancellor. However, he has the power to nominate a candidate for the Federal 
Chancellor. The Federal President also has the formal power to appoint and dismiss federal 
ministers according to Article 64 the German Basic Law. Article 60 Section (1) grants the Federal 
President the power to appoint and dismiss the federal judges, federal civil servants, officers 
and non‐commissioned officers as far as statutory regulation does not provide to the contrary. 
The Federal President has the power to formally dissolve the Bundestag in a conditional 
situation according to Article 63 section (4) and Article 68 section (1) the German Basic Law.  
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On the foreign affairs power, as the head of the state, the Federal President, on behalf 
of the Federation has the treaty power. He represents the Federation in international law. 
According to Article 59 section (1), the Federal President has the power on behalf of the 
Federation to conclude treaties with foreign states and accredits and receives envoys. However, 
this power does not fully depend on the Federal President but is limited, particularly with 
regard to the treaties which regulate the political relations of the Federation, or which refer to 
objects of federal legislation; for this reason, the treaty power of the Federal President requires 
the consent or participation of the organs competent for such federal legislation in the form of 
a federal statute. Furthermore, for administrative agreements, the regulation regarding the 
federal administration is said to be applied as mutatis mutandis.143 
On the emergency power, the Federal President in a particular situation, referring to 
Article 68, has the power to declare a legislative emergency with the consent of the Bundesrat. 
Furthermore, in terms of the state emergency, according to Article 115a section (1) the German 
Basic Law, it is the power of the Bundestag with the consent from the Bundesrat and on the 
request of the Federal Government, to declarea state of defense. However, the Federal 
President has the authority in accordance with section 3 of the Article to publish the 
pronouncement of the state of defense. Furthermore, section 4 and section 5 of the Article 
emphasize that the Federal President only has the formal power to publish the declaration of 
the state of defense; section 5 of the Article precisely stipulates that if the finding of a state of 
defense has been published and the territory of the Federation is being attacked by force of 
arms, the Federal President may with the consent of the Bundestag make a declaration under 
international law regarding the existence of a state of defense. Contrary to the publication of 
the declaration of the state of defense, if the state of defense is declared to be terminated by 
the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat, the Federal President has the formal power 
to publish the declaration of the state of defense termination.144 
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On the pardoning power, although he may transfer the powers to other authorities145, 
Article 60 of the Germany Basic Law grants the Federal President the pardoning power in 
individual cases on behalf of the Federation.146 The pardoning power of the Federal President is 
as a consequence that he is the symbol of the Federation and formally gives the pardon as a 
personification of the Federation.  
The Federal Government and the executive powers 
The Federal chancellor is the executive who is subject to the parliamentary motion of 
censure. The federal chancellor can be brought down by qualified procedure in Bundestag (the 
lower chamber). Moreover, Chapter VI of the German Basic Law stipulates about the Federal 
Government. Article 62 of the German Basic Law defines the Federal Government as the 
Federal Chancellor (Bundeskanzler) and the federal ministers. According to Article 63 section (1) 
and (2) the German Basic Law, the Federal Chancellor is elected, on the proposal of the Federal 
President, by the Bundestag without debate by a majority vote of the members of the 
Bundestag. Like the Federal Chancellor, the Federal ministers according to Article 64 section (1) 
are appointed and dismissed by the Federal President on the proposal of the Federal 
Chancellor.  
According to Article of 65 the German Basic Law, the Federal Chancellor has the power 
to (1) determine the guidelines of the policy and bear responsibility for that; (2) direct its affairs 
according to rules of procedures as adopted by the Federal Government and approved by the 
Federal President. However, in general, the German Constitution implies that the executive 
powers are mostly exercised by the Federal government. The Federal Chancellor can not 
exercise the powers individually. Accordingly, the Federal government consists of the Federal 
Chancellor and the Federal ministers. 
On the area of law-making power, the Federal Government has the power to introduce 
Bills in the Bundestag according to Article 76 of the German Basic Law. Furthermore, Article 80 
of the German Basic Law, the Federal Government, a federal minister or the State Governments 
has the power to adopt ordinances (Rechtsverordnungen) which require the consent of the 
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Bundesrat. In terms of the appointment power, the Federal Chancellor has the power to 
appoint a federal minister as his deputy according to Article 69 (1) of the German Basic Law. 
The German Basic Law vests the Chief Commander power of armed forces to the Federal 
Chancellor.147 
On the administration power, the Federal Government in particular the Minister of 
Finance has the expenditure power with the supervision of the Bundestag.148 In the end of the 
financial term, if by the end of a fiscal year the budget for the following year has not been 
established by a statute, the Federal Government is empowered, until its entry into force, to 
make all expenditures that are necessary to maintain statutory institutions and to carry out 
statutory measures, to fulfill the legal obligation of the Federation, and to continue 
constructions, acquisitions and other services, or to continue to grant benefits for these 
purposes, to the extent that amounts have already been approved in the budget of a previous 
year.149 Furthermore, the Federal Government has the power to mobilize the funds necessary 
for sustaining operational management up to a maximum of one quarter of the total amount of 
the previous budget by way of a credit.150 
According to Article 84 the German Basic Law, the Federal government has the power to 
issue general administrative regulations with the consent from the Bundesrat. Section (4) of the 
Article authorizes the Federal Government with the power to issue individual instructions in 
particular cases with regard to the execution of the Federal statutes. Section (3) of the Article 
stipulates that the Federal Government has the power to supervise the federal statutes 
execution in accordance with the applicable law by the States and by this purpose, the Federal 
Government has the power to send agents to the highest State authorities also to subordinate 
authorities, with their consent, or if such consent is refused with the consent of the Bundesrat. 
As a result of the supervision, the Federal Government, according to section (4) of the Article 
may request to the Bundesrat that the State has violated the law while it may be challenged 
before the Federal Constitutional Court. 
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On the emergency power, the Federal Government is also empowered with emergency 
power. Article 115f of the German Basic Law strengthened the Federal Government with some 
particular powers in times of state emergency in so far as the circumstances require.  Those 
powers include the power to use the Federal Border Guard throughout the entire territory of 
the Federation and the power to give orders, both to the federal administration and to the 
State governments and, if it considers it to be urgent, to the State authorities and transfer the 
power to members of the State government to be determined by it.151 However, the execution 
of such powers should be notified to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Joint Committee. 
2. South Africa 
The South African Constitution does not explicitly describe the choice of the 
government system. However, according to some provisions, the system of government is 
indicated as a parliamentary system. The Constitution designates a presidency and recognizes 
the President as both the head of the state and the head of government. The powers of the 
President are mostly the same as the President in presidential countries with a president and 
cabinet, and a bi‐cameral legislature and a judiciary including a constitutional court.152 
One of the parliamentary system characters is reflected from the President’s 
appointment. The President is not directly elected but appointed by the parliament (National 
Assembly) from among its members and may be removed by a two‐thirds vote of the National 
Assembly on the grounds of serious violation of Constitution or the Law, serious misconduct or 
inability to perform the function during his office.153 The South Africa Constitution designates a 
Presidency within a parliamentary Constitution. The President is the head of state and the head 
of government but he actually depends on the parliament. The Constitution distinguishes 
between two executive branches, namely: the national executive and the provincial executive. 
The national executive is in the hands of the President; while, the provincial executive is in the 
hands of the Premier.  
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‐ The National Executive 
The South African Constitution distinguishes the executive branch from the national 
executive and the provincial executive. It stipulates that the President as the head of the 
executive is elected from the National Assembly; the President has the power to appoint 
members of the government which are invested with their functions and are accountable 
collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and the performance 
of their functions.154 It reflects that the President and the government rely on the Parliament 
and in general are secured through motions of confidence or no confidence. 
In general, the national executive branch and its powers are stipulated in Chapter 5 of 
the Constitution. Article 83a of the Constitution explicitly admits that the President has 
functions as the head of the State and the head of the national executive. According to the 
Article, the President has some constitutional obligations to uphold, defend, and respect the 
Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Republic and promote the unity of the nation that will 
advance the Republic.155 In order to perform the functions as head of state and head of the 
national executive, the President is said to have powers that are guaranteed in the Constitution 
and the legislation.156 According to Article 42 section (5) of the South African Constitution, the 
President has the power to summon Parliament to an extraordinary sitting at any time to 
conduct special business. Article 84 section (2) of the South African Constitution determines 
that the President is responsible for: 
a. assenting to and signing Bills; 
b. referring a Bill back to the National Assembly for reconsideration of the Bill’s  
c. referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the Bill’s constitutionality; 
d. summoning the National Assembly, the National Council of Provinces or 
e. making any appointments that the Constitution or Legislation requires the President to make, other than 
as head of national executive; 
f. appointing commissions of inquiry 
g. calling a national referendum in terms of an Act of Parliament; 
h. receiving and recognizing foreign diplomatic and consular representatives; 
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i. appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives; 
j. pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or forfeitures and 
k. conferring honours.
157
 
 
The Constitution confirms that the President is the executive authority in Article 85 of 
the South African Constitution. The President as the executive authority here is referred to as 
the one who exercises the executive power together with the other members of the Cabinet. 
The state administrative powers include the following: 
a. powers to implement national legislation except where the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament provides otherwise; 
b. powers to develop and implement national policy; 
c. powers to coordinate the functions of state departments and administrations; 
d. powers to prepare and initiate legislation; 
e. powers to exercise any other executive functions provided for in the Constitution or in 
national legislation. 
On the law-making power, according to the South African Constitution, the President of 
South Africa has the power in the law‐making process. The powers include assenting to and 
signing Bills, referring a Bill back to the National Assembly for reconsideration of the Bill and 
referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the Bill’s constitutionality. Article 79 
(1) states that the President must assent to the bill when the National Assembly passes a 
bill. 158 However, he may refuse to assent to a bill only on the grounds of its 
unconstitutionality.159  In this case, the South African Constitution states that the President may 
refer a bill back to the National Assembly for reconsideration. 160  If the bill after the 
reconsideration has accommodated the President’s concern on the constitutionality, the 
President must assent to and sign the bill or refer the bill to the Constitutional Court for a 
decision about the constitutionality of the bill.161 The President must assent to and sign a bill if 
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the Constitutional Court decides that the bill is constitutional.162 There is no veto power for the 
South African President. The Constitution protects the independence of the Legislature from 
the Executive by providing a check on the presidential power to block the passage of 
legislation.163 
On the Cabinet and other appointment power, according to Article 91, the President 
has the power over the Cabinet. Article 91 section (1) points out that the President has the 
power to appoint the Deputy President (who will assist the President in the administration of 
the functions of government) and Ministers, assign the Deputy President and Ministers’ 
powers, and dismiss them. In terms of the Deputy President’s appointment, the President 
performs his power by selecting the candidate from among the members of the National 
Assembly.164 In exercising the minister appointment power, the President selects any number 
from among the members of the Assembly; and no more than two Ministers from outside the 
Assembly.165 Article 91 section (4) also clarifies that the President has the power to appoint a 
member of the Cabinet to be the leader of government business in the National Assembly.166As 
a result of the Presidential appointment power, the Deputy President and Ministers are 
responsible for the executive powers and functions assigned by the President; however, they 
are collectively and individually accountable to the Parliament.167 
In order to assist the powers and functions of the Minister in the Cabinet, Article 93 
gives the President the power to appoint and dismiss any number of Deputy Ministers from 
among the members of the National Assembly and no more than two Deputy Ministers from 
outside the Assembly; on the other hand, they will be responsible to the Parliament.168 
Moreover, Annex B of the Constitution sets out in more detail on the Cabinet appointment by 
the President. As stated in the Constitution, the Cabinet of South Africa consists of the 
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President, the Executive Deputy Presidents and ministers as determined in Article 91.169 The 
executive deputy President is designated by the President among the members of the 
Assembly.170 On the other hand, the cabinet appointment and the President’s power over the 
cabinet are based on the procedures as determined by Article 91 section 8 – section 15. 
The Constitution of South Africa allows the President to establish deputy ministerial 
posts.171 The procedures of the deputy ministerial appointment are set in Article 93 section 2 – 
3.172 The Deputy of ministers has the duties to exercise and perform on behalf of the relevant 
minister any of the powers and functions assigned to that Minister in terms of legislation and 
subject to the directions of the President.173 Meanwhile, the President has the power over the 
deputy minister and can take any action during the deputy minister’s absent.174 The ministers 
are accountable individually to the President and to the National Assembly for the 
administration of their portfolio.175 However, according to Article 102, the National assembly 
has the power to pass a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet but not including the President. 
In this situation, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.176By a vote supported by a 
majority of its members, the National Assembly may pass a motion of no confidence in the 
President, and the President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy Ministers 
must resign.177 
On the other appointment power, the President, as the head of the National executive 
has the power to appoint the Judiciary officers. According to Article 174 section (3), the 
President has the power to appoint the Chief of Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice after 
consulting the Judicial Service Commission and the leaders of parties represented in the 
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National Assembly; and appoint the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal.178 
Moreover, section 4 of the Article states that the President after consulting the Chief 
Justice and the leader of parties represented in the National Assembly has the power to 
appoint other judges of the Constitutional Court.179 In general, the President has the power to 
appoint the judges of all other courts with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.180 In 
any special situation of a judge’s absence, the President has the power, with the 
recommendation of the Cabinet approval by the Chief of Justice, to appoint a woman or a man 
to be a judge of the Constitutional Court.181 The Constitution clarifies that the President has the 
formal power of judicial removal by adopting a resolution calling for a judge to be removed.182 
On the other issues of appointment power, the President also has the power, upon the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission, to suspend a judge who is guilty of gross 
incompetence or guilty of gross misconduct and an in‐capacity to act.183The President, as the 
head of the national executive, may have the power to appoint some of the members of the 
Judicial Service Commission.  According to Article 178 section 1f, the President appoints two 
members of the Judicial Service Commission from practising advocates nominated from within 
the advocate profession to represent the profession as a whole and after consulting the leaders 
of all the parties in the National Assembly, four members of Judiciary service commission.184 
Another appointment power of the President as the national executive is to appoint the 
prosecuting authority.185 
Article 193 the South African Constitution grants formal power to the President to 
appoint, based on the recommendation of the National Assembly, the public protector, the 
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auditor‐general and the member of the South African Human Rights Commission, the 
Commission for Gender Equality, and the Electoral Commission. 186  On the other hand, 
according to Article 194 section 3, the President may suspend a person from office at any time 
after the start of the proceedings; the President also has the power to remove a person from 
office upon adoption by the Assembly of a resolution calling for that person’s removal.187 On 
the other removal powers, Article 196 states that the President has the power to remove the 
relevant member of the public service commission upon the adoption by the Assembly of a 
resolution calling for the removal or written notification by the Premier that the provincial 
legislature has adopted a resolution calling for that commissioner’s removal.188 
Besides some of the executive appointment powers mentioned above, the President as 
the national executive also has the power to appoint the financial and fiscal commission and 
remove a member from office on the grounds of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence. The 
Premier, as the provincial executive, is also involved in the appointment process.189 The 
appointment power of the President is also covered in the area of the appointment of the 
National Commissioner of the police service, to control and manage the police service.190 
On the foreign affairs and treaty power, Chapter 14, Article 231 section (1) of the South 
African Constitution stipulates that the National executive, the President, has the power to 
negotiate and sign all international agreements.191 However, some particular treaties bind the 
Republic only after it has been approved by a resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council of Provinces.192 Some treaties do not require either ratification or accession, 
and are entered into force by the President and bind the Republic without approval by the 
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National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces must be tabled in the Assembly and 
the Council within a reasonable time.193 
On the special power of state intelligence, the Constitution also explicitly specifies the 
President’s power over the intelligence service. According to Article 209, the President has the 
power to establish the intelligence service other than any intelligence division of the defense 
force or police service by terms of national legislation.194 The President’s power over the 
intelligence service includes those items which are mentioned in Section 2 of the Article, 
namely: to appoint the head of each intelligence service, assume political responsibility for the 
control and direction of any of those services, designate a member of the Cabinet to assume 
the responsibility.195 Furthermore, Article 201 of the South Africa Constitution sets out that the 
President has the power to coordinate and monitor any intelligence division of the defense 
including police service.196 The Constitution ensures that the National legislation regulates the 
powers and functions of the intelligence service.  
On a special power, the President has the power to proclaim that the Constitution 
comes into effect according to Article 243.197 While in particular affairs, the President has the 
power to transfer the functions and assign temporary functions. The transfer of functions can 
be made by the President, by proclamation, to a member of the Cabinet in terms of the 
administration of any legislation entrusted to another member or any power or function 
entrusted by legislation to another member.198 In terms of the temporary assignment of 
functions, the President may have the power to assign to a Cabinet member any power or 
function of another member who is absent from office or is unable to exercise that power or 
perform that function.199 The President has the power to proclaim the assignment of functions 
of a Cabinet member that assign power or function to be exercised or performed by a member 
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of a provincial Executive Council or a Municipal Council; by such proclamation, the assignment 
will take into effect.200 
On the administration power, the President as the national executive has the power to 
intervene in the provincial administration by taking any appropriate steps to ensure the 
fulfillment of an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation as stipulated in 
Article 100 the South Africa Constitution. According to the Article, the President may perform 
such a power by (1) issuing a directive to the provincial executive and describing the extent of 
the failure to fullfil its obligations and stating any steps required to meet its obligations; (2) 
assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that province to the extent necessary to 
maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards for the 
rendering of a service, maintain economic unity, maintain national security, or prevent that 
province from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial to the interests of another province 
or to the country as whole.201 Furthermore, the intervention of the President as the national 
executive should be submitted in the form of a written notification to the National Council of 
Provinces within 14 days after the intervention started. Article 101 implies that the President 
has the power to make executive decisions in the form of legislation, proclamation, regulation 
and other instruments of subordinate legislation that can have legal consequences.202 
In terms of the state emergency, the South African Constitution states that the 
declaration of state emergency is by an act of parliament.203 However, Article 203 on the state 
of national defense stipulates that the President has the power to declare a state of national 
defense and must inform parliament promptly and in appropriate detail.204 While on the 
military power, the President of South Africa, as the head of the national executive holds the 
power as Commander in Chief of the defense force and has the power to appoint the military 
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command of the defense force.205 Furthermore, the President has the power to direct the 
Command of the defense force.206 
Article 201 Section (2) clarifies that only the President, as the head of the national 
executive has the power to employ the defense force in cooperation with the police service, in 
defense of the Republic and in fulfillment of an international obligation.207 However, the 
President must inform the Parliament about the reasons for the employment of the defense 
force, any place where the force is being employed, the number of people involved, and the 
period for which the force is expected to be employed.208 If the Parliament does not sit during 
the first seven days after the defense force is employed as envisaged, the President must 
provide the information required to the appropriate oversight committee.209 
In addition, the South African Constitution provides a check to the executive power of 
the President in Annex B on Government of National Unity of National section 84 Sub‐Section 
(3) thatbefore executing the power, the President must consult the Executive Deputy President 
on the specific issues as follows: 
a. the development and execution of the policies of the national government; 
b. all matters relating to the management of the Cabinet and the performance of Cabinet business; 
c. the assignment of functions to the Executive Deputy Presidents; 
d. any appointment under the Constitution or any legislation including the appointment of ambassadors or 
other diplomatic representative; 
e. appointment of commissions of inquiry; 
f. calling a referendum; 
g. the implementation of pardoning power; pardoning or reprieving offenders.
210
 
 
c. Executive powers:experiences from the presidential Constitutions (presidential 
system: a separation of power between the executive and the legislative) 
1. US 
The US Constitution reflects a classic model for a presidential system; in which, the 
executive and legislature are selected independently.211 There are some points that can be 
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noted from the US presidential system according to Ken Newton, namely: 1. The President has 
veto power and can veto legislation, on the contrary, the legislature (Congress) can override the 
veto by a majority of two‐thirds in both houses; 2. The President is head of the armed forces, 
but only Congress can declare war; 3. The President makes political appointments, but they can 
be rejected by the Senate; 4. Congress cannot remove the president, and the president cannot 
dissolve Congress.212Moreover, the Constitution allows the Congress to impeach a President 
from office. The Congress also has the power to make and enact Laws and the President is 
responsible to execute Laws. The President is ultimately dependent on the Congress as the 
Legislature. 213 To this extent, the presidential system in the US allows the president to have an 
independent branch but the Constitution gives some substantial‐checked powers to the 
president. 
However, the US President not only has constitutional powers and delegated powers 
but also gets executive powers from many sources. There are still numerous institutional 
resources that may be the justification of broad ranges of power for the executive. According to 
the US practice, the tendency shows that the President can always expand the power through 
the mechanism of spending and budget control. The US President may also control the 
legislation process and thus, it will indirectly make the President the key institution in the 
legislation process. The existence of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) may 
contribute to the dominant power of the President to take control through the procedure over 
the entire executive branch; in particular on the area of the spending, budget process, 
legislation process before submitted to the Congress: 
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“In particular, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) serves as a potential instrument of 
presidential control over federal spending and hence a mechanism through which the White House has 
greatly expanded its power. In addition to its power over the federal budget process, the OMB has the 
capacity to analyze and approve all legislative proposals, not only budgetary requests, emanating from all 
federal agencies before being submitted to Congress. This procedure, now a matter of routine, greatly 
enhances the president’s control over the entire executive branch. All legislation emanating from the 
White House as well as all executive orders also go through the OMB. Thus, through one White House 
agency, the president has the means to exert major influence over the flow of money as well as the shape 
and content of national legislation”.
214
 
 
Another mechanism that may contribute to the expansion of the executive power of the 
US President is the mechanism of regulatory review: 
“..that presidents have used to increase their power and reach is the process of regulatory review, 
through which presidents have sought to seize control of rule‐making by the agencies of the executive 
branch implementation”.
215
 
 
Meanwhile, the US Congress discretion in delegating to administrative agencies may also 
contribute to the expansion of the executive power; in practice, the President can always have 
full power to order the agencies: 
“President Clinton believed the president had full authority to order agencies of the executive branch to 
adopt such rules as the president thought appropriate. During the course of his presidency, Clinton issued 
107 directives to administrators ordering them to propose specific rules and regulations. In some 
instances, the language of the rule to be proposed was drafted by the White House staff; in other cases, 
the president asserted a priority but left it to the agency to draft the precise language of the proposal. 
President George W. Bush continued the Clinton‐era practice of issuing presidential directives to agencies 
to spur them to issue new rules and regulations. In January 2009, President Obama affirmed the 
importance of regulatory review but said his administration would review the process to make certain 
that federal agency guidance by the president would be fair and would involve public participation”.
216
 
 
In the US, the executive power also has the power that comes from the people that may 
affect the President’s capacity to govern on the basis of popularity as well as a consequence 
that the executive is an institution.217 However, the powers of the President do not always 
make the US President the decision maker. The right to override the veto power of the 
president puts the Congress as the final decision maker; on the other hand, the senate has the 
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last word in terms of cabinet and other major executive appointments; similar also for the 
treaty power, and the Presidential military power as the commander in chief.218 
Donald S. Lutz argued that the President does not hold real power instead of the 
legislature; the President is dependent to the legislature in terms of the power performance, 
and he clarified that the President may depend on the legislature in terms of conducting war, 
fund approval for the use of force, and other funds for executive agents and agencies; Donald S. 
Lutz reflected his argument by describing the US presidential model: 
“..war to make this power meaningful, and only Congress can appropriate funds to give the commander in 
chief a fighting force. In addition, Congress can impeach the president, investigate executive functions and 
actions, create and abolish executive agents and agencies, and set or alter executive branch salaries. The 
president can pardon on hisown, but he is left out of the amendment process completely. The president 
cannot affect the sitting of Congress through prorogue or calling sessions. If the electoral, college fails to 
select a president, Congress shall select one. If the president and vice president die, are removed, or are 
incapacitated, Congress determines who shall be the executive currently the Speaker of the House. No 
other elected president in the world has so many legislative checks and restrictions placed upon him. Even 
most symbolic presidents can prorogue or call the legislature into session”.
219
 
 
Constitutionally, the US executive branch mainly derives from Article II the US Constitution.It 
implies that the US President is only vested with the core power for an executive branch, 
namely: the military power, the pardoning power, the treaty power, the appointment power, 
the state administrative power and the power to faithfully execute the Laws. According to the 
text of the US Constitution, the US President very much depends on the Senate and/or the 
Congress. He has a little or almost has no independent power since all the power is authorized 
by the Senate and/or the Congress. The Constitution empowers the Congress with some 
powers mentioned in detail in Article I Section 8 of the US Constitution.220 
Section 2 of the Article sets the constitutional basis for the Military, Cabinet, Pardon, 
and Appointment power for the President. Paragraph 1 Section 2 of Article II of the US 
Constitution attaches the military power to the President as the Commander in Chief of the US 
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of several States.221 On the law-making 
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power, the US President’s law‐making power includes the legislative powers of the executive in 
some area of legislative process. The US Constitution gives the veto power and legislative 
initiation power to the President.222The veto power for saying “no” to legislative proposals is 
limited by the US Constitution which Congress can over‐ride.223 The veto is merely just a written 
objection and the Congress may over‐ride it.224 At this point, the legislative power is absolutely 
attached in both houses of Congress, while the formal power to sign the bill belongs to the 
President. To this extent, the veto power empowers the President and assigns the President 
with strong bargaining power. But, it does not mean that the President has dominated the 
legislative power since Congress has the power to over‐ride it. However, in practice, the fear 
that veto power will be the most powerful tool for modern presidents is greater than the 
modern role of the President in initiating legislation.225 
In addition to the law‐making power, the executive is also given the power to make 
other laws, the executive order, in relation to the state administration affairs. Such laws usually 
have specific and technical characters. They are hierarchically under the legislation. Commonly, 
the executive order is a regulation issued by the president and simply as a normal tool for the 
state management, as the rules in setting procedures, commanding, and other functional 
responsibilities. 226  In practice, the executive order had been significant and sometimes 
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controversial in US history since it is the instrument for the US President to set a substantive 
policy.227 
On the appointment power, the Constitution vests the appointment power in the US 
President. The functionalist perspective views that the President has the ability to identify and 
verify a suitable individual to fill vacancies.228 According to the Constitution, the US President 
has the power to appoint and nominate ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, 
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States.229 The US Constitution 
restrains the appointment power of the US President by setting checks and balances from the 
Senate and Congress. On the other hand, the House of Representatives, even though it has no 
direct roles on the appointment, may indirectly check abuses of the appointment power.230 
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For certain appointment powers, the Constitution vests the power to the Senate to 
check and balance the President by giving advice and consent; however, the Constitution 
implies nothing about the qualification and it leaves it individually to the President and the 
Senate.On the other appointment power, the Congress as a whole has the role to set 
qualification by Law as a check over the President.231 According to the Constitution, the 
appointment of the Ambassador, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the US (or the principal officers) can only be made by and with 
the advice and consent from the Senate; while the Congress will prescribe by Law such 
appointment of inferior officers to be independently exercised by the President.232 The US 
appointment clause in the US Constitution implies two distinct appointments that may be 
exercised by the President; the first is the “ confirmation appointment”, the appointment of 
principal officers (Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme 
Court, and all other Officers of the US whose appointments are not provided for and which 
should be established by Law) in which the President has the power to nominate by and with 
advice and consent from the Senate; and the second is “the vested appointment” for the 
appointment of lower ranking officers which the Congress may by Law vest the appointment in 
the President alone, in the Court of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.233 At this point, the 
appointment power of the President for certain officials namely Ambassador, other public 
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the US is a shared 
power since the President has to share the power with the Senate and depends on the Senate’s 
advice and consent. 
On Paragraph 3 Section 2 of the Article II the US Constitution, the Constitution gives 
independent appointment power during the legislature’s recess.234 However, although it seems 
that the appointment power of the US President during the recess is an independent power; it 
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does not mean that the power is without checks and balances.235 The US practices show that 
the exercise of appointment power during the recess usually generates some controversies and 
conflicts between the executive and legislative.236 It is frequently used extensively by the US 
President.237 On the other hand, there are some excuses given to affirm the recess appointment 
power of the President including the argument that the President has to prevent executive 
paralysis, and administrative inefficiency, and has to ensure the functioning of the 
government. 238  Functionalism allows a degree of flexibility to accommodate modern 
governance:  
“The functionalist defense of expanded use of the recess appointments power tends to emphasize 
flexibility and equity. Functionalists’ arguments focus mainly on the changing character and size of the 
federal government, as well as on a modern political system that is wrought with deadlocks and 
delays”.
239
 
 
The appointment power of the President coincides with the power of removal. The argument to 
vest both powers is mainly grounded on the ability of the President to control the policy 
executed by his subordinates.240 
As the US government is a presidential system, the President has the power to appoint 
ministers in order to exercise the state administration. The ministers together are the cabinet 
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of the state. The Cabinet has no constitutional status and is not responsible to the parliament; 
however, the Cabinet is also a part of the popular support.241 
On the foreign affairs power, the diplomatic power of the President is given on the 
basis that the President is the head of the state and the representative of the state. However, 
practice shows that the power is exercised by the consent of the US Senate. The US President 
diplomatic powers not only include the treaty power but expand beyond all the areas of state 
diplomacy including determination of the state attitudes against other states and the 
international community, the power to make executive agreements or other commitments 
between two states to arrange any affairs below the policy and such agreement does not need 
the consent of the US Senate.242 
The US President makes treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. It 
has the meaning that the treaty power is in the hands of the US President, upon advice of the 
Senate before negotiation, where in the end the President makes the treaty to which the 
Senate had consented.243 The treaty clause on the US Constitution clearly provides the 
mechanism for Senate consent since it implies a two‐thirds Senate majority for the consent. 
Moreover, according to the Federalist No. 75, Hamilton argued that treaty making power 
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should be shared between the legislative and executive branches since its nature is neither 
wholly executive nor wholly legislative.244 However, in more recent US practice, the President 
as the treaty and international agreement’s exclusive negotiator has been undermined even 
more by recent trade legislation, which caused Congress to offer the President a fast track 
legislative procedure for implementing trade agreements with other nations.245 
On the administrative power, the US President is the chief of the executive 
departments, establishing the state administration.246 Accordingly, the President may have the 
power to require the opinion of all the executive departments. Section 3 of Article II of the US 
Constitution confirms that the President has the power to faithfully execute the Laws.247 
Moreover, the administrative power of the US President also refers to the power to control his 
subordinates’ departments, establish independent agencies, appointment and removal 
assigned by the Constitution. The President also has the power to control all the state agencies 
decisions, oversee the implementation of Laws, and as a consequence, the President has 
administrative responsibilities.248 In the area of the US state administration, the President may 
issue a regulation to give orders to state officials. In the US experience, the Congress gives the 
delegation powers to the President as the executive, in case the Congress itself cannot directly 
step in on the area of state administration while it is urgent for Congress to take action.249 
According to experience, the US Presidents usually expand their administrative power by 
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enhancing the power of the executive office, increasing the White House control over the 
federal bureaucracy, expanding the role of executive orders and other instruments of direct 
presidential governance, and using the signing statement to negate congressional actions to 
which they object: 
“the White House “administrative strategies” to expand the administrative power have given presidents a 
capacity to achieve their programmatic and policy goals even when they are unable to secure 
congressional approval. Indeed, some recent presidents have been able to accomplish quite a bit without 
much congressional, partisan, or even public support. The Executive Office of the President has grown 
from six administrative assistants in 1939 to today’s 400 employees working directly for the president in 
the White House office along with some 1,400 individuals staffing the divisions of the Executive Office. 
The creation and growth of the White House staff gives the president an enormously enhanced capacity 
to gather information, plan programs and strategies, communicate with constituencies, and exercise 
supervision over the executive branch. The staff multiplies the president’s eyes, ears, and arms, becoming 
a critical instrument of presidential power”.
250
 
 
On the emergency power, the US President is vested with the emergency power. The 
emergency power is related to the constitutional statutes of the President as the Commander 
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United State and of the Militia of several states. It is 
usually expanded by the ground of Article 1 Section 9 (which is actually under the Legislative 
Branch), which constitutionally allows the exercise of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
be suspended in certain cases of rebellion or invasion affecting public safety.251 The text of the 
Constitution does not give any definition about the state of emergency. Bruce Ackerman 
proposes some alternatives to set a framework for the emergency powers, of which one of the 
proposals is considered on the basis that the state of emergency enables the government to 
take extraordinary measures in its life‐and‐death struggle for survival.252 
On the Military power, the US President is the Commander in chief. The idea of 
granting the US President as the commander in chief is because the President who is also 
running the government administration and also has the access will take any command and 
action in time of emergency: 
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“The president’s position as commander in chief was also designed for a republic of notables. The 
Founders expected the same group who ran the civilian government to take command of the army at 
moments of crisis.
253
 
 
On the other hand, the use of military forces is actually in the hand of Congress. Although the 
President is the Commander in chief, constitutionally, the President is required to get approval 
from Congress and the Congress has the final decision on the use of force authorization: 
“The position of commander in chief (the power of the president as commander of the national military 
and the state national guardian units when called into service) makes the president the highest military 
authority in the executive branch. Final authority over military matters rests with Congress, which may 
direct the commander in chief as it chooses.”
254
 
 
When the use of military force requires the Congress approval, the US practices show that 
approval from the Congress is frequently often waived by the US President. The practice shows 
that the experiences from President Truman to President Bush had shown that the exercise of 
the use of force and presidential military power was exercised without requiring Congress 
approval and declaration of war.255 The President could exercise the military power unilaterally 
and the Congress may generally pass a resolution in order to affirm the military and war power 
of the President. Practically speaking, in the US president’s military power, the pattern for 
future congressional‐executive relations in the military realm is based on the experience when 
Congress passed a resolution approving the presidential action after the President launched the 
military force. This may contradict the Constitution which orders the president to get the 
authorization of Congress before mobilizing the use of military force in any situation either 
abroad or when the US is under serious internal threat. There are still debatable issues about 
the US President’s military power. However, according to the US Constitution text, the real 
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military power actually belongs to the Congress. Without Congress authorization, if the US 
President exercises military power unilaterally, the use of military force must be revoked. Some 
practices show that some of the US Presidents had over‐ridden Congress authorization and 
claimed that the exercise of mobilizing military forces is part of the constitutional duties and so, 
it is the inherent power of the President to protect the nation; even finally the Congress 
affirmed and passed a resolution approving the President’s use of force.256 
The roles of the US President as the Commander in Chief of the Navy, Army and Air 
Force have the meaning that the US President has the right to take any action including the use 
of military force. Since then, the US President has the highest command over the military force. 
As the highest of the command, the US President may be also considered as someone who 
knows exactly the best solution and the decision maker over the situation that is threatening 
the state. However, the role of the Congress is important as the branch which has the power to 
check whether the Presidential action abused power. Most importantly, the Congress approval 
and the Congress budgetary power are very crucial for financing military operations. 
On the pardoning power, the US President’s pardoning power includes the power to 
grant reprieves, pardons, and amnesties against the convicted person except in the cases of 
impeachment. The power is commonly exercised on behalf of the President individually as a 
consequence of his role as the head of the state.257 The US President’s pardoning power is 
inherently flexible; allowing the President to grant limited or conditional pardons; however, the 
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practices have shown that such pardoning power has been widely exercised by some of the US 
presidents.258 Although it is widely exercised and being constitutionally unrestricted, the US 
President pardoning power is actually not the power without checks and balances from other 
branches. Although in the US the Congress has no direct control over the pardoning power, it 
could amend the Constitution to restrict the President’s authority to extend the pardoning 
power, and the Court may strike down pardons which may have unconstitutional conditions.259 
The constitutional amendment is one fundamental way of eliminating pardons, placing the 
power in another hand (the legislature), limiting through the requirement of approval by other 
government bodies (Supreme Court or constitutional court), or setting conditions or 
qualifications for pardons.260 As the US does not have a constitutional court, the Supreme Court 
has a significant role to establish constitutional boundaries of pardoning power; however, in 
practice, judicial challenges over the pardoning power are commonly serving to expand rather 
than to limit the use and scope of pardoning power.261 According to research, some of the US 
Presidents have controversially used the pardoning power.262 The most controversial use of 
pardoning power came from President Ford who granted a pardon to Richard Nixon in the 
Watergate scandal case, President Clinton who used his last day in office to pardon both his 
half‐brother and a wealthy donor’s tax‐evading husband, and President Bush who commuted 
Lewis Scooter Libby’s prison sentence in the case of leaking the name of a CIA agent.263 
2. The Philippines 
The present Constitution of the Philippines is the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of 
the Philippines that was approved by the 1986 Constitutional Commission on October 12, 1986; 
presented to President Corazon C. Aquino on October 15, 1986; ratified on February 2, 1987 by 
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plebiscite; proclaimed in force on February 11, 1987.264  The enforcement of the 1987 
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines has marked the return of the presidential system 
of the 1935 Constitution with the presidential powers substantially clipped and a re‐installed 
and strengthened bi‐cameral legislature.265 The Philippines President is the head of the 
executive branch of the government heading the Cabinet and all executive departments.266 The 
President holds the executive powers.  
On the law-making power, according to the Constitution, the Philippines President has 
the key role in the legislative process. Article VI Section 27 (1) stipulates that the President has 
the power to approve or veto bills.267 Furthermore, Section 27 (2) emphasizes that the 
President’s veto power of any particular items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill should 
not affect the other items which he does not object to.268 During, her administration, President 
Arroyo in 2006 used the law‐making power, issuing presidential decrees to declare a state of 
emergency and direct the Armed Forces of the Philippines (she also issued a General Order 
commanding the armed forces of the Philippines to coordinate with the Philippines National 
Police to raid the “opposition” newspapers, confiscated news stories, documents, and even 
arrested an opposition legislator and denied him contact with his relatives during his detention 
and attempted to arrest five others. In other areas, the executive power had been exercised to 
issue the executive order to unilaterally reorganize government agencies without regard for 
functional objectives or the constitutional independence of other institutions (without prior 
legislative sanction and such executive orders were unreviewable by the Court). Not only that, 
the power to issue the executive order also had been used to invoke executive privilege, as an 
effort to shield her from checks and other oversight mechanisms in the case of a controversial 
government procurement contract. On the next presidential term, the President successor, 
President Aquino used the law‐making power for issuing an executive order to block the path of 
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a former President (who was then sitting in the legislature); the President Aquino issued the 
executive order to remove all of the President Arroyo’s appointees. In terms of the law‐making 
power, the Constitution actually has provided a mechanism to review the validity of any kind of 
legal products involving the President.269 In case the President is seriously ill, such power may 
be discharged by the members of the Cabinet.270 
On the appointment power, the Philippines President has the appointment power. 
According to Article VII Section 16, the President has the power to nominate and appoint the 
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, officers of the 
armed forces, and other officers whose appointments are constitutionally vested in the 
President including the members of the Supreme Court.271 However, the power is exercised 
with the consent from the Commission on Appointments for the executive officers appointment 
or according to the list from the Judicial and Bar Council in terms of the appointment of the 
Supreme Court’s members. It means that actually the President has formal appointment power 
but only relatively has real appointment power since the power is exercised by the consent 
from the Commission or according to the Council. Important conditions are mentioned in the 
Constitution with regard to the presidential appointment power. According to Section 15 of the 
Article, the President is permitted to exercise the appointment power except during two 
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the presidential term.272 
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During the restrictive period, the President may only be permitted to exercise the power for 
temporary appointments for the special conditions of public safety. The appointments by the 
President during the permitted period of appointment may be extended by the President in 
office; on the other hand the successor President in office may revoke appointments made by 
former Presidents.273 In Philippines experience, the appointment power has been potentially 
used to give more benefits to the administration. The President had used the appointment 
power to appoint key public officers with the purpose to counterbalance the executive power. 
In practice, the President frequently exerted considerable influence over some independent 
agencies due to the vast and largely unchecked reach of the appointment power. The President 
appointed several independent officers, including the Monetary Board (which has authority to 
give recommendations on foreign loans) and the commission on audit (which has constitutional 
authority to audit the revenue, receipts, and expenditures of government); all the 
appointments actually are subject to the commission on appointments confirmation; but the 
confirmation is of little significance because the President can issue interim appointments 
pending the confirmation. That is why all the commissions of appointments are dominated by 
the President’s relatives or allies sitting in Congress. The Philippines had experience of 
controversial appointments during the President Arroyo administration. President Arroyo used 
the appointment power to fill many significant positions during the constitutional restrictive 
period of appointment; such appointments allegedly gave benefit to her allies. 274  The 
controversial appointments (the public called them “midnight appointments”) included the 
appointment of 169 positions in the government owned and controlled corporations, and some 
positions in government agencies: 
“Outgoing President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has been churning out "midnight" appointments on a daily 
basis, all backdated before the constitutional ban on appointments during an election period. From March 
1 to March 9 alone, Arroyo supposedly appointed 169 people to positions in Government‐Owned and ‐
Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) in 10 government agencies, including those under the Office of the 
President (OP). The ban on appointments to executive positions started on March 10. All in all, Arroyo 
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appointed 250 persons via midnight appointments, a government source, who provided the documents, 
said.
275
 
The appointments were constitutionally controversial since they contravened Section 15 of 
Article VII. The public believed that the appointments were unconstitutional because the 
appointments were made during the restriction period that Section 15 of Article VII of the 
Constitution prescribed. It should be for two months immediately before the next presidential 
elections and up to the end of her term except for appointments which were temporary; 
President Arroyo should not perform the appointment power. The successor President, 
President Aquino, responded to such controversial appointments with revocation and 
invalidated some of the appointments.276 
The Philippines Constitution grants a vice president in the same term of office as the 
President and permits the vice president to be appointed (without any confirmation) as a 
member of the cabinet.277 The Constitution also provides a comprehensive explanation about 
the anticipative position of a Vice President. Section 7 of the Article specifies the situation when 
the Vice President constitutionally acts as the President. According to the Section, the Vice 
President may act as the President in the situation if the President elected failed, if the 
President should not have been chosen, or if the President died or was permanently 
disabled.278 Furthermore, the Constitution clarifies that the Vice President will succeed as the 
President in the case where the President in office is dead, permanently unable to hold the 
powers, removed from the office, or resigned.279 Only in the case that the Vice President’s 
office is vacant during the term of office, the President has the power to nominate a Vice 
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President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives.280 
However, the appointment should be confirmed by a majority voting in Congress.  
On the foreign affairs power, the President on behalf of the Philippines has the power 
(with limitations by laws) to make contracts or guarantee foreign loans with the consent from 
the Monetary Board and must be reported to the Congress.281 
Moreover, with regard to the treaty power, the Phillippines President has treaty power with the 
consent from at least two‐third of the Senate.282 According to the provision, the President can 
only exercise the power to make a treaty or any kinds of international agreement with the 
consent of at least two‐thirds of all members of Senate. Additionally, according to Article XII, 
the President also has the power to make agreements with foreign‐owned corporations on 
technical or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development, and utilization of 
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.283 In exercising the power, the President does not 
need consent from either Congress or the Senate but the President has to notify the Congress 
all the contracts that have been made within 30 days.  
On the administration power and the budgetary-expenditure powers, the President 
has the power to propose budget expenditure and sources of financing, including receipts from 
existing and proposed revenue measures, according to Article 22.284 The Congress may not 
increase the appropriations recommended by the President for the operation of the 
Government specified in the budget.285 However, the power to issue revenue or tariff bills, bills 
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application and private bills is vested in the 
House of Representatives with the involvement of the Senate to propose any bills for 
amendment.286 The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of Constitutional 
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Commission have the authorization to augment the general appropriations according to their 
respective office from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.287 In practice, 
during the President Arroyo administration in 2008, the budgeting power had been used to 
increase the state budget for some government projects. Most controversially, the power was 
allegedly used for other personal purposes, that is, for supporting the President’s political allies. 
It was also reported that in 2009, the President funded some of her foreign travels with the 
government’s emergency fund. The legislative significance about the spending priorities had 
less impact on actual public spending than might be expected from a review of budget 
documents; the President had claimed a legal right to redirect funds to their favored projects. 
As the head of the executive, the President has the power to direct command and 
control all executive departments and government agencies.288 Some government agencies are 
under the direct command of the President such as the Philippines Council of Film 
Development, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Constitutionally, the President also heads the independent economic 
and planning agency established by the Congress which has the role to recommend to the 
Congress and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for 
national development.289The administrative power of the Philippines President also includes 
Article X section 4. According to Section 4 of the Article, the President of the Philippines has the 
power to exercise general supervision over local government. This is also in accordance with 
the Philippines as a unitary state; and thus, the President has a unitary power performing a 
Unitarian presidential power. For this purpose, the Constitution in section 14 of Article X also 
empowers the President to specify power related to the administration of local government.290 
Under section 16 of the Article, the President has the power to exercise general supervision 
over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.291 
                                                           
287
Id. Article VI Section 25 (5) the Philippines Constitution.  
288
Id. Article VII Section 17 the Philippines Constitution: The President shall have control of all the executive 
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. 
289Id. Article XII Section 9 the Philippines Constitution. 
290
Id. Article X Section 14 the Philippines Constitution.  
291
Id. Article X Section 16L the Philippines Constitution 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
87 
 
On the military power, the President of the Philippines is the Commander in Chief of 
the Philippines Armed Forces according to Article 7 Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution. 
Accordingly, the President has the power to call out the armed forces to prevent or suppress 
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. At this point, the use of such power may also be against 
the private armies, paramilitary forces, civilian home defense forces and other armed groups 
which are not recognized by the authority and the Constitution as mentioned in Article XII 
Section 24.292 Practically, President Aquino used his military power as Commander in chief to 
command the Philippines armed forces to take any action against conflict in Zamboanga by the 
MILF rebels.293 
On the emergency powers, as the Commander in Chief, the Constitution grants the 
President with the emergency power permitting the President to take any action for public 
safety including suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declare martial law in 
any part or the whole part of the Philippines.294 Although the President seems to be granted a 
unilateral emergency power in time of state emergency, the Constitution also provides the 
mechanism of check and balance from the Congress and the Court against the presidential 
emergency power. Still according to Section 18, the Congress has the power to extend or 
suspend the proclamation of a state emergency in the interests of public safety; on the other 
hand, the Court has the power to review any appropriate proceeding filed by citizens with 
respect to the declaration of a state emergency.295 Furthermore, some measures may be taken 
during a state emergency including those mentioned in Article XII Section 17 – 19.296 The 
President, for the necessity or emergency, may certify the immediate enactment of the bill.297 
On the war power, the real war power is vested in the Congress. According to Article VI 
Section 23, by a vote of two‐thirds of both Senate and House of Representative, Congress has 
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the power to declare war.298 The Congress by law also has the power to authorize the President 
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy.299 The 
Congress has the power to pass the bill.300 
On the pardoning power, the President has the pardoning power to grant reprieves, 
commutations, pardons, remit fines and forfeitures according to Article VII Section 19.301 
However, the power can only be exercised after conviction by the final judgment and does not 
apply to impeachment cases. The exercise of the presidential pardoning power in particular of 
granting an amnesty should be performed with the support of a majority of all the members of 
the Congress.  
The President and the Vice President are directly elected by the people according to 
Article VII Section 4 paragraph 1. Accordingly, the voting system is based on the simple majority 
vote where a candidate with the highest votes is elected as the President. However, in case 
there are two or more candidates having the same votes, there will be an election by Congress. 
The voting system in the second round is also a simple majority vote by both Houses of the 
Congress separately.302 In the presidential election, the Court has a role as the sole judge for 
the qualification of the President or Vice‐President and any issues related to the election. 
Section 11 of the Article emphasizes the right of the Vice President during the written 
declaration from the Congress (the Senate and the House of Representative) on the disability of 
the President to carry out the power and duties. In this situation, the President’s executive 
power and duties will be diverted to the Vice President; and accordingly, the Vice President will 
have the executive power during the process of impeachment.303 
The Philippines Constitution has provision in anticipating abuse of power by the 
President in any case of affiliation and relatives. Section 13 of the Article clarifies the 
prohibition and attitudes of the President, Vice President, and other executive officers during 
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their office.304 On the Presidential Impeachment, the Philippines Constitution clarifies that the 
President may be removed from office on particular criminal grounds.305 According to section 7‐ 
9 of Article VII, the President may be removed on the grounds of inability during his office, 
death, illness, permanent disability, resignation. According to Article XI on the accountability of 
public officers section 2, the President may be subject to be removed from office on 
impeachment for and on conviction of culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, 
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.306 A series of mechanisms 
according to Article XI Section 3–8 are constitutionally taken as the impeachment process for 
the President.307 According to the Article, the House of Representative has the power to initiate 
the impeachment process. The process will democratically involve the Senate and Supreme 
Court and end up by the Congress promulgation of the presidential impeachment. In this case, 
the House of Representatives may have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of 
impeachment.308 
d. Executive power in a hybrid system of government 
 
1. France: Executive power under the Fifth Republic Constitution 
The French Constitution (the Fifth Republic Constitution) is the Constitution of 4 
October 1958 as amended by constitutional statute 2008‐724 of 23 July 2008. 309  The 
Constitution establishes a dual executive, the President and Prime Minister. It requires the 
President and the Prime Minister to share some of the executive power. In some areas, the 
Constitution requires the exercise of executive power to be shared; at this point, both the 
President and the Prime Minister have the right to veto. Such mutual veto sometimes may 
trigger conflict and deadlocks.310 For many important acts, such as appointments and the 
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promulgation of laws, the President should give mutual counter‐signatures, while on the other 
important power such as the military power of Commander in chief and foreign policy, the 
President has to exercise the power with reference to the Prime Minister and national 
Assembly.311 For such as a fundamental act like constitutional amendment, the President, on 
the recommendation of the Prime Minister and Members of Parliament has the right to 
initiateamendments to the Constitution.312 
Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright observed that though both president and prime 
minister wield powers according to political circumstances, their powers reside mainly in the 
constitutional text.313 The Constitution provides both President and Prime Minister with equally 
strong and significant power and makes it possible to be exercised individually. It places the 
President as the final decision maker and the dominant figure in some of the executive power; 
on the other hand, it gives the Prime Minister dominance in the Government and the 
Parliament. It is assumed that such as foreign affairs and defense power are to be mostly 
exercised independently by the President.314 
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‐ The President of the Republic under the Constitution of the Fifth Republic 
The Fifth Republic Constitution empowers the President with limited numbers and 
scope of discretionary powers.315 Some of the Presidential powers have to be exercised with 
reference to the Prime Minister’s or National Assembly’s counter‐signature. During the 
Presidential term of office, the French President is shielded with the immunity given by the 
Constitution.316 
According to Article 5 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the President of the 
Republic has several symbolic powers as the guarantor of national independence, territorial 
integrity and (by his arbitration) the proper functioning of the public authorities as well as the 
continuity of the State, and observance of treaties. Furthermore, according to Article 64, he 
also acts as the guarantor of the independence of the Judicial Authority.317 As a consequence, 
according to Article 65 of the Fifth Republic Constitution, the French President presides over 
the High Judiciary Council. 
The French President is considered to have control over the government. The President 
has some powers that can directly affect the government, such as, the power to determine the 
size and shape of the government; the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister, the 
power to intervene directly in the choice of individual ministers, and the power to determine 
the political balance of the government.318 Moreover, the President is the chief of the nation’s 
policy makers since in practice, the President has access to intervene in the policy making 
procedure at all stages.319 
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Article 11 paragraph 1 the Constitution of the Fifth Republic stipulates that the 
President of the Republic has the power to submit a referendum concerningany government 
bills, in particular issues of the organization of public authorities, reforms relating to the 
economic, social or environmental policy of the nation and the public services which contribute 
to it; the power to propose the authorization of the ratification of a treaty which, while not 
being contrary to the Constitution, would have an effect on the functioning of the institution.320 
In practice, the power to call a referendum has some political purposes such as establishing a 
direct line of communication between president and the people, reinforcing the unity of the 
governmental coalition, and dividing the political opposition.321 
On the law-making power, the President of the Republic has the important role. He has 
the power according to Article 10 of the Fifth Republic Constitution to promulgate statute and 
ask the parliament to deliberate a newStatute or certain provisions.322 He has no veto power 
but has a real indirect role in the legislative process.323 Moreover, the President has the right to 
refer any bills, Institutional Acts, Rules of Procedure of the Houses of Parliament (Article 61) to 
the Constitutional Council for their conformity to the Constitution. 
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On the appointment power, Article 8 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic stipulates 
that the French President has the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister. He also has 
the power to appoint other members of the Government, as well as, terminate their functions. 
Following up, according to Article 9 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the President of 
the Republic has the power to preside over the Council of Ministers. According to Article 13, the 
President has the appointment power of some civil and military posts of the state.324 According 
to the Article, the appointment is made by an Institutional Act and should be exercised after 
public consultation with the relevant standing committee in each House, and the President is 
bound by the votes in each committee. In practice, Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright observed 
that the appointment power of the President is exercised in a wide range of other public sector 
posts.325 Furthermore, the President has the appointment power of the three members of the 
Constitutional Council.326 
On the foreign affairs and treaty power, the President has significant power in the 
foreign policy making and European affairs.327Article 14 indicates the diplomacy power of the 
President including the power to accredit ambassadors and envoys with extraordinary foreign 
power and vice versa.328 On the treaty power, the President has the power to negotiate and 
ratify treaties.329 However, it does not mean that the treaty power of the President is exercised 
as unchecked and unbalanced power. According to Article 53, there are certain treaties or 
international agreements that must be ratified or approved only by an Act of Parliament.330 The 
Constitutional Council, according to Article 54 also may have a role on the treaty process. It may 
determine that an international undertaking contains a clause contrary to the Constitution and 
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the authorization to ratify or approve the international undertaking involved may be given after 
the Constitution is amended.331 
On the military power, the President has the power as the Commander in Chief and the 
power to preside over the higher national defence councils and committees.332 In terms of the 
emergency power, the Constitution states that the President has to share the power with the 
Prime Minister. Article 16 determines the state of emergency as situations where the 
institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the 
fulfillment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat; and the 
situation where the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted.333 
In such an emergency situation, the President has the emergency power to take measures but 
only after formal consultation with the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Houses of 
Parliament, and the Constitutional Council. To an extent, Article 16 of the Constitution indicates 
that the emergency power of the President is not a unilateral power that the President can 
exercise independently. Furthermore, the Article also indicates that there is term limit of the 
emergency power application. It orders that after thirty days of operation of the emergency 
power, the President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty Members of 
the National Assembly or sixty Senators, may refer to the Constitutional Council to decide 
whether or not the emergency situation should be renewed. 
On the pardoning power, the French President has the power to grant individual 
pardons.334 
‐ Prime Minister and the Government 
Title III of the Fifth Republic Constitution is the constitutional basis for the French 
government. In general, the Constitution implies that the Prime Minister is a significant figure in 
the government affairs and enjoys significant executive power.  Andrew Knapp and Vincent 
Wright observed that some of the French Prime Minister’s power can be exercised 
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independently under the President’s intervention and support from a loyal parliamentary 
majority; however, some power such as appointment and defense power have to be shared 
with the President.335As the Prime Minister is the actual director of the Government, he 
automatically enjoys the whole government powers. Article 20 of the Constitution declares that 
the government has the power to determine and conduct the policy of the Nation, and has the 
power, at its disposal, over the administration of the civil service and the armed forces.336 
However, some articles specifically express the Prime Minister’s power exclusively. Article 21 of 
the Fifth Republic Constitution implies that the Prime Minister has the power to direct the 
actions of the Government. It specifies that the Prime Minister has some powers in the 
following areas: 
‐ National defense 
‐ The implementation of legislation 
‐ Regulation making 
‐ Civil and military appointment 
‐ Power delegation to Ministers 
‐ Military affairs (represent for the President of the Republic as chairman of the councils and committees of 
higher national defense 
‐ (in exceptional cases), represent for him as chairman of a meeting of the Council of Minister for a specific 
agenda.
337
 
The Prime Minister has the power to propose the appointment and to recommend the 
termination of the members of the Government to the President.338 Moreover, the Prime 
Minister also has the power to require an extra‐ordinary session of parliament for a specific 
agenda.339 
On the law-making power, Article 39 of the Fifth Republic Constitution confirms that 
the Prime Minister has the right to initiate legislation.340 In some of constitutional articles, the 
Prime Minister has significant power in law‐making. Article 61 allows the Prime Minister to 
refer the Institutional Acts, the Private Members’ Bills, and the Rule of Procedures of the 
Houses of Parliament, before their promulgation, to the Constitutional Council for their 
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conformity with the Constitution.341 On the treaty power, the Prime Minister has the right to 
refer any treaty and International agreement to the Constitutional Council on its conformity to 
the Constitution before it is ratified or approved.342 
Article 49 constitutes some other significant powers of the Prime Minister. According to 
the Article, the Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, has the power to 
ask the National Assembly for a vote of no‐confidence against the government concerning the 
issue of government’s program or possibly a general policy statement.343 
Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright argued that the Prime Minister, as the head of 
government, may also dominate the parliamentary activities which may be done by requesting 
delegated legislation or the procedure of the blocked vote; he also can control the complex 
procedure to deal with legislative dead lock in the parliament: 
“It is the prime minister, as head of the government, who wields the battery of constitutional provisions 
designed to curb the activities of parliament: the request for delegated legislation under Article 38, for 
example, or the procedure of the vote bloqué under Article 44, under which parliament may be obliged to 
vote on the government’s version of a bill. It is the prime minister, finally, who controls the complex 
procedure under which bills are shuttled between the two houses of parliament (National Assembly and 
Senate) for successive readings before an agreed version (or failing that, the Assembly’s version) is 
passed”.
344
 
 
With regard to war power, Article 35 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic implies that the 
Parliament holds the real power to authorize war. On the other hand, it lays down the other 
power to decide the mobilization of armed forces on the purpose of international intervention 
to the Government.345 
2. Poland  
The Polish semi‐presidential system is regulated under the Polish Constitution 1997.The 
Polish 1997 Constitution recognizes a dual executive and places the Polish President as part 
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ofthe dual executive.346 Generally, according to the Constitution, the executive power is jointly 
conferred upon the President and the Council of Ministers.347 
The Polish President 
The Polish President constitutionally performs duties as the head of the state and is not 
inherently strong, but constitutional practices can make him a powerful figure.348 The Polish 
President is elected in universal, equal, directelections conducted by secret ballot.349 According 
to Article 145, the President may be held accountable before the Tribunal of State for an 
infringement of the Constitution or Statute, or for commission of an offence.350 
Certain symbolic powers are given to the Polish President in Article 126 of the Poland 
Constitution. The powers include the power as the supreme representative of the Republic of 
Poland and the power as the guarantor of the continuity of State authority, the power to 
ensure the observance of the Constitution, and the power to safeguard the sovereignty and 
security of the State as well as the inviolability of its territory.351 
The President may have the power to recall a minister in whom a vote of no confidence 
has been passed by the Sejm.352 The President also has the power to affect changes in the 
composition of the Council of Minister on the application of Prime Minister.353 The Prime 
Minister has to submit the resignation of the Council of Ministers in certain situations.354 
On the law-making power, Article 142 determines that the President has the power to 
issue regulations and executive orders as well as the power to issue decisions within the scope 
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of the discharge of his other authorities.355 Furthermore, except for certain issues that are 
stipulated in Article 144 section 3,356 according to Article 144 of the Polish Constitution, the 
President has the power to issue Official Acts to exercise his constitutional and statutory 
authority.357 The Official Acts of the President have to be validated by the Prime Minister’s 
signature.358 
On the appointment power, according to the Constitution, the President has the power 
to nominate a Prime Minister and appoint a Prime Minister together with other members of a 
Council of Ministers and accept the oaths of office of members of such newly appointed Council 
of Ministers.359 The President assists by a Presidential Chancellery. He has the power to 
establish the statute of the Presidential Chancellery including to appoint and dismiss its 
Chief.360 
On the foreign affairs power, the Polish President, as the representative of the state in 
foreign affairs, according to Article 133 section 1 of the Polish Constitution, has the power to 
ratify and renounce international agreements, appoint and recall the pleni‐potentiary 
representatives of the Republic of Poland to other states and to international organization, to 
receive the Letters of Credence and recall of diplomatic representatives of other states and 
international organizations accredited to him.361 Moreover, section 2 of the Article allows the 
President, before ratifying an international agreement, to refer to the Constitutional Court and 
request it to adjudicate upon the conformity of the international agreement to the 
Constitution.362 In general, with regard to foreign policy power, the Constitution requires the 
President to cooperate with the Prime Minister and the appropriate minister.363 
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On the military power, the Polish President has the military power as the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.364 Furthermore, the Constitution 
also specifies the power of the President as the Supreme Commander into two different 
situations: the power in times of peace and the power in a period of war. According to Article 
134 section 2, in times of peace, the Polish President has the power of command over the 
Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defence.365 In times of war, the President has 
the power to appoint the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime 
Minister.366 At the administrative level, the President as the Supreme Commander has the 
power to appoint the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of branches of the Armed 
Forces for a specified period of time.367 He has also the power to confer military ranks on the 
request of the Minister of National Defence and as specified by statute.368 On the national 
security issues, the National Security Council is the advisory organ to the President of Poland 
Republic.369 On the special issue of a direct external threat to the State, at the request of the 
Prime Minister, the President has the power to order a general or partial mobilization and 
deployment of the Armed Forces in defence of the state.370 
On the civic power, the Polish President has the power to grant Polish citizenship and has the 
power to give consent for renunciation of Polish citizenship.371 
On the pardoning power, as the head of the state, the President of Poland has the 
power to confer orders and decorations.372 With regard to the pardoning power, according to 
Article 139, the President has the power to grant pardon which may not be extended to 
individuals convicted by the Tribunal of State.373On the cabinet council, According to Article 
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141, the President may have the power, on particular matters, to convene the Cabinet Council 
and to preside over the Council of Ministers debates.374 
The Council of Ministers, the Prime Minister, and Government Administration 
The 1997 Polish Constitution confirms that the Council of Ministers and the Prime 
Minister are the dominant and central part of the executive.375Article 146 clarifies that the 
Council of Ministers conducts the internal and foreign affairs.376 It consists of the Prime 
Minister as the President of the Council of Ministers and ministers;377 and may also include the 
Deputy Prime Minister who may be appointed as the vice president of the Council of 
Ministers.378 It also has the duty to manage the government administration.379 Furthermore, 
Article 146 section 4 specifies the duties of the Council of Ministers, which are mainly to 
perform government affairs.380 As Poland recognizes a dual executive, the Constitution clarifies 
the Prime Minister’s power. According to the Polish Constitution, the powers of the Prime 
minister are specified in Article 148. 381  The Prime Minister has also the power to 
allocategovernment administration tasks to the ministers.382 He has the power to request to 
revoke a regulation or order of a minister.383 In general, the Prime Minister has the power of 
control over the body of civil servants.384 The Prime Minister, within 14 days after his 
appointment, has to submit a program of activity of the Council of Ministers to the Sejm.385 
The Polish Constitution does clarify that the member of the Council of Ministers is 
accountable to the Tribunal of State for an infringement of the Constitution or Statutes.386 The 
motion may be passed by the President or at least 115 Deputies.387 
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2.3. Closing remarks  
There is a general feature of the constitutions in terms of the Executive and its 
powers.388 They recognise the Executive as one of the constitutional branches which has the 
power to execute the Laws and the power of the state administration. All the constitutions 
under different systems provide checks and balances systems among three branches. There are 
similarities among the three models of constitutions in terms of preventing abuse of power by 
the Executive. However, In terms of the actual executive powers, there is a degree of difference 
among countries depending on different systemsof government in terms on how the powers 
are given. From the comparisons of the 6 Constitutions, some of following points may be 
considered by Indonesia in order to improve the executive powers389: 
1. Most of the 6 Constitutions have been set in more modern and up to date terminology, 
such as the German Constitution that uses modern terms of state defence instead of 
using the war terms, and the South African Constitution that uses modern terms of state 
of national defence to replace the term of war power. The French Constitution, on the 
other hand, has set a modern frameworkof a fixed definition for the state emergency. It 
definesthe emergency as the situation where the institution of the Republic, the 
independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its 
international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the 
proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted.The French 
Constitution has even more modern ideas in adopting a specific issue of international 
intervention which has been developed by International law. 
2. Most of the 6 Constitutions give more clarity, such as the South African Constitution that 
gives more clarity about the President as the Commander in Chief. It also provides the 
determination of the scopes of the administrative power of the President as the 
national executive in its Article 85. On the other hand, the French Constitution 
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providesclarity of the role of the President and the scope of a treaty. It gives the 
President of the Republic the power to negotiate and ratify treaties. The Constitution 
also provides the scopes of treaties namely the peace treaties, trade agreements, 
treaties or agreements relating to international organizations, those committing the 
finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, 
those relating to the status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or 
acquiring of territory; those treaties may be ratified or approved only by an Act of 
Parliament. 
3. Most of the 6 Constitutions provide a mechanism of checks and balances to prevent 
abuse of power, for example, the Polish Constitution sets a mechanism for the President 
to refer to the constitutional tribunal for adjudication upon a bill’s conformity to the 
Constitution; and based on the Constitutional tribunal’s judgement, the President may 
refuse to sign the bill. It also sets a mechanism for the President to refer to the 
Constitutional tribunal before the ratification of an international agreement to 
adjudicate upon its conformity to the Constitution. 
4. Most of the 6 Constitutions provide special powers that are relevant to the state and to 
the Executive; for example, the South African Constitution sets an article for the 
presidential power on the specific issue of the state intelligence service. On the other 
hand, the Polish Constitution also empowers the President with the consent from the 
Senate for a special power to call a referendum which gives the possibility for the 
President to invoke a referendum, in respect of matters of particular importance to the 
State. 
5. Most of the 6 Constitutions provide a clear limitation to the Executive power, such as 
the US constitution which provides a firm limitation that the President may have 
pardoning power except for impeachment cases. On the other hand, the Philippines 
Constitution also makes the limitation for the pardoning power. It clearly says that 
except in cases of impeachment, the President has pardoning powers, including the 
power to grant reprieves, commutation, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, 
after conviction by final judgment. 
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Table 2.3 Features of three government systems 
Constitution: Systems of 
government 
Parliamentary 
Constitution 
Presidential 
Constitution 
Mixed Constitution Other Constitution 
Features  
Head of State 
 Appointment 
 Removal  
● 
(direct-indirect 
elected) 
● 
(direct elected) 
● 
(direct elected) 
● 
(direct elected/indirect 
elected) 
Head of Government ● 
(indirect elected) 
● 
(direct elected) 
● 
(direct elected) 
● 
(direct/indirect elected) 
Relationship executive-
legislative 
Fusion of executive-
legislative 
Separation of executive-
legislative 
Fusion of executive-
legislative 
Separation executive-
legislative 
Executive branch Prime minister President President-prime 
minister 
President/prime 
minister/cabinet 
Government formation Mutual Dependent to 
parliament 
Coalition government  
Mutual Independent 
from legislative 
Non-coalition/coalition 
government 
Mutual Dependent to 
the parliament and to 
elected President 
 
 
Table 2.4 Summary of general characteristic of three models of government systems 
Models of system of government 
Parliamentary system 
 Separation of head of state and head of government 
 The executive branch: Prime minister and the cabinet – collective executive branch 
 Head of executive: the Prime minister; can be changed anytime 
 Relationship executive-legislative: Fusion of executive and legislative (mutual dependent) 
 Government depends on and is responsible to the parliament 
 Appointment of head of the executive branch: indirectly by parliament   
 Removal: the executive, the prime minister can be brought down, subject to a political reason of vote no confidence 
during term office 
 To  exist, government must enjoy the support of a parliamentary majority 
 The government is formed by the parliament; coalition government is established during and after  the election 
 Single legitimacy (direct election for parliament) 
 Cabinet character: depend on the parliament and party’s minded 
 Relationship between head of executive (Prime Minister) and the Cabinet: Horizontal (Collegial) 
 Ministerial responsibility: collectively and individually (both) to the parliament  
Presidential system 
 Fusion of head of state and head of government  
 The executive branch: President and the cabinet (single executive) 
 The head of executive branch: President; constitutionally fixed term office 
 Relationship executive-legislative: Separation of executive and legislative (mutual independent) 
 To  exist, government does not need support from legislative majority 
 Appointment of head of the executive branch: directly by the people 
 Removal: the President, the executive cannot be politically subject of vote of confidence during term office; but subject 
to impeachment on the criminal grounds 
 The government is formed by the President; the formation of coalition government is unnecessary and relatively small 
 The government is independently exist and responsible to the President; the President can unilaterally replace the 
government either partially or completely 
 Direct presidential election mechanism 
 Flexibility of the ministerial  composition depends on the President; rigidity of the ministerial because the parliament 
has no power to change the ministerial 
 Dual legitimacy (legislature direct election and presidential direct election) 
 Cabinet character: Strong and independent minded member (professional) 
 Relationship between head of executive (President) and the Cabinet: Vertical (supervisory) 
 Ministerial responsibility: individually to the President  
Mixed system 
 The executive: President and Prime minister (dual executive – power sharing) – a multiply executive branch 
 To  exist, government depend on both on a legislative majority assembly and on elected president (dual responsibility 
and mutual dependent) 
 The government can be removed during term office by either the assembly or the directly elected President 
 The President can dissolve the assembly and call early elections 
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 Direct presidential election mechanism 
 Indirect elected of head of government  by the President applied in combination with assembly confidence 
 Dual legitimacy (Presidential direct election and legislative direct election) + indirect election of prime minister 
 Ministerial responsibility: collectively and individually to the parliament and to the elected President 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
 
105 
 
President 
(Executive) 
Head of 
state 
Parliament 
(Legislature) 
People  
(Direct election) 
Prime 
Minister 
(Executive) 
 
Parliament 
Scheme 2: Government Systems 
 
 
 
 
        Head of State 
 
 
 
     Election   
     Mutual dependence 
         Responsible  
 
Parliamentary system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mixed system-intermediate system-hybrid system 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mutual                   independence 
       Presidential system 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Parliamentary Constitutions: 
Germany 
Weak executive power: President-weak, Chancellor-weak 
 
South Africa 
Strong executive power: the President-considerable powers but could be brought down by the Parliament vote of no-confidence 
 
Presidential constitutions: 
US 
Limited executive power: President-shared powers, strong legitimacy 
 
The Philippines 
Strong executive power: President-strong powers, strong legitimacy 
 
Mixed constitutions: 
France: dual executive powers between the President and the Prime Minister 
Poland: dual executive powers between the President and the Prime Minister 
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Chapter 3 
The Development of Executive Power in Indonesian 
Constitutional History 
This Chapter describes how the executive powers evolved in Indonesian constitutional 
history before the current Amended Indonesian Constitution. In this chapter, the development 
of the executive powers in Indonesia will be described in a chronological sequence of 
government regimes. The chapter is structured as follows. First, it will briefly introduce the 
sequence of constitutional regimes in Indonesia. Second, it will recount the executive powers 
under the period of the Indonesian constitution from the post‐Dutch colonial period to 
Indonesian independence. Next, it will discuss a short experience of executive powers under 
the Indonesian parliamentary system when the Constitution of the KRIS (the Constitution of 
Federal Republic Indonesia) was enforced in 1949 in Indonesia. Following the discussion of the 
temporary Indonesian Constitution 1950, the chapter will address the problems of the return of 
the Indonesian presidential system with its implications for the executive powers. Moreover, it 
will also describe the practices of the executive powers under the period of re‐instatement of 
the 1945 Indonesian Constitution. The final part of this chapter will briefly describe the 
executive powers during the process of the Amended Constitution.  
3.1. Introduction: sequences of Constitution regimes in Indonesia 
Indonesia experimented with Constitutions. The first Constitution (hereafter referred to 
as the UUD 1945) was in force during the period of 18 August 1945 to 27 December 1949. The 
Constitution was drafted the day after Indonesia’s unilateral proclamation of independence and 
entered into force on 18 August 1945. The second Constitution, (hereafter referred to as the 
KRIS Constitution) was a very short‐lived Constitution, enacted from 27 December 1949 to 17 
August 1950. The third Constitution (hereafter referred to as the UUDS 1950) was in force 
temporarily for 9 years from 17 August 1950 to 5 July 1959. The following Constitution entered 
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into force as a result of a Presidential Decree. By the 1959 Presidential Decree, the 1st President 
of Indonesia, Soekarno reinstated the UUD 1945 (the 1st Indonesian Constitution of 18 August 
1945). It was in force from 5 July 1959 to 1999. The Constitution was therefore the longest 
living Constitution and had been enacted under different regimes of Indonesian governments; 
the Old Order (“orde lama”) which was under the 1st Indonesian President Soekarno, the New 
Order (“orde baru”) which was under the authoritarian regime of President Soeharto, and the 
Reformation Era which was under the transition President of BJ. Habibie. During its existence, 
the Constitution was never ratified. Although it was said constitutionally in its provision that the 
MPR (the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat)390 had the power to ratify the Constitution, the 
MPR never did so. 
Under different Constitutions, the executive powers in Indonesia experienced lots of 
turbulence. Those experiences influenced significantly the constitutional systems and state 
practice. The most significant influence was the character of the executive powers. 
3.2. Executive power in Indonesian constitution making (from the post-Dutch 
colonial period to Indonesian independence) 
The development of the executive powers in Indonesia started as the Indonesian 
Constitution was drafted in 1945 (the UUD 1945). It consisted of a preamble, provisions, 
transitional provisions, additional provisions, and general and provisional annotations.391 It had 
embedded the first Indonesian executive powers. The preparation of the draft of the 
Indonesian Constitution started on 29 April 1945 by the Japanese government.392 For this 
                                                           
390The MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) is the People’s Representative Consultative Assembly. The 
members of the MPR were all members of the DPR and other representatives including the provinces 
representatives, military representatives, and minority groups. The MPR was at the time the parliament in 
Indonesia and had strong power including to elect and impeach the President. Currently, the MPR consists of all 
members of the DPR and all members of the DPD (the provinces representatives). 
391
 Annotation to the Constitution was part of the Constitution that had legal consequences. It had content on the 
explanation and the elaboration. It consisted of two parts; the general explanation and the provisions explanation. 
The general explanation explained about the Constitution as a whole; whereas, the provisions explanations were 
about the explanation and elaboration of each of the provisions. 
392
Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang‐Undang Dasar Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945, Buku 1: Latar 
Belakang, Proses dan Hasil Perubahan UUD 1945, Edisi Revisi, Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah 
Konstitusi, 2012: “the Japanese government issued the Declaration of “Gunseikan” of the Japanese army 
commander No. 23 on the establishment of “Dokuritzu Zyunbi Tyoosakai” (in Indonesia: BPUPK (Badan Penyelidik 
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reason the Japanese government established the “BPUPK”. The BPUPK had a special committee 
namely, the committee of the basic law that mainly had special duties to draft the Constitution. 
On 11 July 1945, the Committee made some important decisions on the choice of the Unitary 
state (the Republic of the Unitary), and on the choice that a President in Indonesia is the head 
of the state. According to Provision III of the Transitional Provision of the first Indonesian 
Constitution (the UUD 1945), the first President and his vice President were elected by the PPKI 
(the Committee for the preparation of Indonesian Independence).393 There was no provision 
about a direct mechanism for the presidential election except that the President was indirectly 
elected by the people through the MPR as the Council of People Representatives. The President 
collegially worked with the Vice President, the ministers and the state secretary and was 
responsible to the MPR. According to Provision IV of the first Indonesian Constitution (the UUD 
1945), the President had the power to exercise the MPR’s power394, the DPR’s powers395 and 
the DPA’s powers 396  before their establishment. 397  With all the powers given by the 
Constitution, the Indonesian President constitutionally had exceptionally broad powers. The 
President exercises the three powers of the constitutional institutions (the MPR, the DPR, and 
the DPA). However, in exercising his constitutional powers, the Constitution assigned a national 
committee acting to assist the President, namely the Indonesian Central National Committee or 
“KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat)”. Later on, the KNIP was the embryo of the DPR (the 
“Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat” as the council of people representatives). 
According to the first Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945), the executive power was 
under Chapter III, with the title “the power of the state government”. Article 4 of the 
Constitution stipulated that “the President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan/the Committee on the investigation of the Indonesian Independence).” See further 
on page 19 to 43. 
393
 Provision III of the Transitional provision of the 1
st
 Indonesian Constitution, hereinafter is the “UUD 
1945”(Appendix 1).  
394
The MPR ‘s power were the power to appoint and dismiss the President and the power to make and amend the 
Constitution. 
395
The DPR’s powers were the powers to make laws. 
396
The DPA’s power were the powers to give any advises and considerations to the President. 
397
Provision IV of the Transitional provision of the 1
st
 Indonesian Constitution (the “UUD 1945”) (Appendix 1). 
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government in accordance with the Constitution”. Although the Constitution did not spell out 
explicitly the word “executive powers”, it implied that the President institutionally possessed 
such powers. Furthermore, the following articles determined the power of the President as the 
government of the state.  
According to the first Constitution, the President had various law‐making powers. Article 
5 section 1 of the Constitution confirmed that the President had the legislative power with the 
DPR’s approval.398 The President had to share the legislative power with the DPR (the Council of 
People Representatives). However, the President was the main institution to make laws and the 
DPR was the sharing partner to give the bills approval. Thus, the President was the legislator 
and had the power to make and enforce laws. On the other law‐making areas, Article 5 section 
2 determined that the President also had other legislative powers to make government 
regulations as Legislation directives in order to implement the laws.399 
Moreover, the President, according to the Constitution had the foreign affairs power. 
The foreign affairs powers were determined in Article 11 and Article 13 of the Constitution.400 
The scope of powers included war power, peace power, treaty making powers, and diplomacy 
powers of appointing ambassadors, consuls, and receiving the credentials of foreign 
ambassadors. Article 10 affirmed that the President had the military power of commander in 
chief of the army, the navy and the air force.401 Article 12 gave the President the power to 
declare a state of emergency.402 Furthermore, according to Article 22, the President had the 
power to issue government regulations in lieu of laws in times of state emergency (the 
emergency law). However, such emergency laws had to be consented to by the DPR.403 
As the head of the state, the Constitution gave the President the power to give pardon 
and the power to grant honors. The pardoning powers of the president included giving mercy, 
                                                           
398 Article 5 section (1) the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
399
 Article 5 section (2) the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
400
 Article 11 (Appendix 1),  Article 13 section (1)(Appendix); Article 13 section (2) the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
401
 Article 10 the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
402
Article 12 of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
403
 Article 22 Section (1), Section (2), Section (3) of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
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amnesty, pardon and restoration of rights.404 The President also had the power to grant titles, 
decorations, and other distinctions of honours according to Article 15 of the Constitution.405 As 
the head of the government, the President had the power to preside over the Cabinet. Article 
17 Section 3 of the Constitution gave the President the power to appoint and dismiss the 
ministers. 406  Constitutionally, the ministers were the President’s assistants and were 
responsible to the President.407 The President was granted the power to conduct the state 
administration.408 In order to establish the state administration, the Constitution assigned the 
state budgetary and spending power in the President’s domain. The President had the power to 
make the state budget law.409 The budgeting power was also relevant to the legislative power 
of the President that was mentioned in Article 5 section (1) of the Constitution. In exercising the 
budgetary power, the President had to make the state budgetary Law and must have the DPR’s 
approval. In relevance to that, the Constitution allowed the President to fully exercise spending 
power. However, the Constitution asserted that the President should be accountable for the 
performance of spending power. The accountability of the spending power was verified by the 
State Finance Auditor Council (BPK) and had to be reported to the DPR.410 
While the Transitional Provision Clause IV of the Constitution gave extra power to the 
President to have the MPR’s, the DPR’s, and the DPA’s power411; the additional provision of the 
Constitution authorized the President to take any preparatory steps and execute all the 
                                                           
404
Article 14 of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
405
 Article 15 of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
406Article 17 section (2) of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1).   
407
Article 17 section (1) (Appendix 1), Article 17 section (3) of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
408
It was shown on the original annotation that “concentration of power and responsibility upon the President.  
409
 Chapter VII on State Finance, Article 23 section (1) of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
410
 Article 23 section (5) of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
411
 According to Article 3 the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1); Furthermore, the power of the MPR was also stipulated in 
Article 37 of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1)that the MPR had the power to amend the Constitution. Meanwhile, the 
powers of the DPR according to the UUD 1945 was only providing counterbalance to the performance of the 
executive powers. The DPR had the power to approve a bill to become the law. The member of the DPR had also 
the right to purpose a bill. The DPR had also the power to give any other approval and recommendation to the 
performance of the executive power; for example, the DPR had the power to give approval for the Presidential 
emergency law, approve the declaration of war, the treaty making, the peace making by the President. While the 
DPA according to Article 16 section 2 had the power to propose any suggestion to the President.  
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Constitutional duties. 412  In practice, though the President was the decision maker, the 
Presidential power in that period was not really exercised absolutely by the President. The 
President was assisted by the KNIP (the National Committee).413 
The intention of the framers to establish a limited government was reflected in the 
Constitutional provisions. The Constitution explicitly affirmed in theGeneral Annotations of the 
Constitution that Indonesia adopted the constitutional system with the government based on 
the Constitution and thus, the government,as a whole, had limited powers and could not 
haveabsolute power. The Constitution set down the highest power of the state in the hand of 
the MPR as articulated in the annotation of the Constitution as (Die gezamte staatgewalt lieght 
allein bei der Majelis). The framers personified the MPR as the representatives of the people 
and all at once manifested the sovereignty of the people. The MPR had the main power to 
determine the Constitution and the GBHN (the Outline of the State Policy) as well as to appoint 
the President and the Vice President. In this point, the Constitution implied that the President 
was dependent on the MPR. It was determined that the President had no equal position with 
the MPR, but he was sub ordinate to the MPR. The President was the mandator of the MPR. 
The President had to pursue state policy as outlined by the MPR. As consequence, the President 
was responsible and accountable to the MPR.414 
To sum up, the first Constitution really reflected a parliamentary system. The fact was 
that the President was not directly elected by the people instead through amajority vote in the 
MPR’s session; the constitutional duty of the President was to implement the Guidelines of the 
State policy set by the MPR; and the fact that the President was responsible to the MPR, 
implied that the President was really dependent on the MPR. The President could not 
independently exist without the MPR.  
Unlike the hierarchical relationship between the President and the MPR, the 
relationship between the President and the DPR was constitutionally based on a mutual 
                                                           
412
Additional Provisions of the Constitution imposed that “within six months after the end of the Great East Asia 
War, the President of Indonesia shall take preparatory steps and execute all the provisions of this Constitution.  
413
 Transitional Provision Clause IV of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
414
 Chapter IV of the Annotation to the Constitution of the UUD 1945 on the President is the Chief Executive of the 
State under the MPR. 
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relationship.415 The President did not depend on the DPR; the President was not accountable to 
the DPR. The President had equally the same position as the DPR. The DPR acted as 
counterbalance to the President. The President should obtain the approval of the DPR to make 
laws (Gezetsgebung) and to determine the state budget. Technically, the President had to 
cooperate with the DPR.416 Moreover, the UUD 1945 strongly clarified that the executive 
powers of the President were not unlimited. Chapter VII of the General Annotation of the 
Constitution elaborated that “Although the President as the head of the state is not 
accountable to the DPR, the President is not a dictator since his power is not unlimited”. The 
Chapter clearly implied that the Constitution did not intent to grant absolute powers to the 
President. 
However, the Constitution gave the power to the President to establish a cabinet of 
ministers. According to Chapter VI, the General Annotation of the Constitution, the ministers 
were the President’s assistants. They were not responsible and accountable to the DPR and the 
MPR. It was the President who appointed and dismissed the ministers of the state. Their status 
and position fully depended on the President. They mainly exercised day‐to‐day executive 
powers. The ministers were not just ordinary senior officials. They had a strategic position 
within the state. As the head of a ministerial department, a minister was obliged to have 
competence inspecific areas related to his duties. To this extent, the minister had great 
influence on the Presidential policy making. However, in determining the policy and for the 
purpose of state administration coordination, the ministers had to work in close cooperation 
with one‐another under the leadership of the President. 
The annotation to the constitutional provisions on executive power 
According to the Constitutional Annotation of Chapter III, the President was the chief of 
the executive within the state and had the power to enforce laws by issuing government 
regulations. The Constitution also stressed that the President had the legislative power and 
shared the power with the DPR. Such kind of power sharing was also emphasized in the 
                                                           
415
The Annotation provision of the UUD 1945 (the first Indonesia Constitution). 
416
 Chapter VII of the Constitutional paragraph 2‐4 of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1). 
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constitutional explanation. Furthermore, Chapter VII of the Annotation of the 
Constitutionvested the oversight function in the DPR vis a vis the President. The oversight 
function could be by sharing powers and checking the exercise of the Presidential power. In 
terms of the legislative power, according to the Annotation, the DPR had the power to approve 
all bills made by the President. However, the DPR was also granted the power to initiate the 
bills. Moreover, the DPR had the right to control the budget. The DPR could oversee the 
President and could invoke interpellations, investigations, and question the President’s 
decisions and the government’s policy. On the emergency power, the annotation of the Article 
22 clarified that the President in exercising emergency power should obtain approval from the 
DPR to validate the emergency law. Therefore, all measures and actions taken by the President 
must be justified.417 
In terms of state finance, Chapter VIII Article 23 Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, of the Annotation 
Constitution clarified that the DPR had the power to control the budget by giving approval or 
rejection to the bill of the state budget. The state budget was determined as the state 
expenditure and the state income. The rationality that the DPR should have the power to give 
approval or rejection was because the DPR represented the people.418 On the grounds that the 
people had the right to determine how to collect the revenue and the expenditure, any fields of 
the income in particularly taxes must be determined by law and most importantly approved by 
the DPR. The meaning of the DPR’s approval actually implied that the role of the DPR was the 
key. The DPR had a stronger position than the government on the budget decision.419 If the DPR 
did not approve the state budget law, the government could not exercise the budgetary power. 
Therefore, on the budgeting area, the President was bound by the DPR’s approval. 
The President was granted exclusive and extra‐ordinary powers by the transitional 
provision in the Constitution. The exclusive and extra‐ordinary powers empowered the 
                                                           
417 Article 22 of the constitutional explanation of the UUD 1945 (Appendix 1).  
418
 The rationality of giving the power to the DPR was also in line with the spirit of the sovereignty of the people 
and democracy. 
419
The annotation to the constitutional provision 23 clarified that besides the DPR represented the people and 
whereas the people have the right to determine the state income and expenses, how the government spends the 
money that has been approved by the DPR must also conform to the decision on the budget.  
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President with the MPR’s power, the DPR’s power and all institutional power that had not yet 
been established after the unilateral independence. However, Ismail Suni believed that 
although the President had been granted exclusive powers by the transitional provision, the 
President could not have all the MPR’s power; especially the power to set the Constitution and 
the power to appoint the President and the Vice President.420 On the other hand, the President 
could temporarily restrain the enactment of part of the Constitution only to deal with the 
situation, overcome the perils and restore the situation and to exercise the power to establish 
the MPR and the DPR; but that did not mean that the President could amend the Constitution 
permanently.421 
In general observation of the constitutional text, the first Constitution actually gave 
limited powers to the President as the head of the executive although the President was 
occasionally vested with extra‐ordinary power. The Constitution had explicitly intended that the 
executive powers were mostly shared between the President and the DPR. The President was 
bound by the DPR’s approval in exercising the powers. The dependency and responsibility of 
the President to the MPR and the hierarchical relationship between the President and the MPR 
showed that the Constitution wanted the President to have limitedpower as a state institution. 
In practice, after the appointment of the first Indonesian President and Vice President, 
the President dismissed the PPKI (Preparatory Committee on Indonesia Independence) on 29 
August 1945 and established the KNIP (Indonesian Central National Committee). The 
establishment of the KNIP by the President was stated in Chapter IV of the transitional 
provisions. The KNIP had the duties to assist the President and not independently or collectively 
execute the Laws.422 The President had also appointed the Cabinet which consisted of ministers 
as the President’s assistants.423 Two months after the Constitutional enactment, on 16 October 
1945, the Vice President issued the “Maklumat No. X” (the Vice President Declaration No. X). 
This Vice President Declaration No.X stated that the KNIP, before the establishment of the MPR 
                                                           
420
 Ismail Suni, Pergeseran Kekuasaan Eksekutif, Aksara Baru,  Jakarta, 1986, p. 35 
421
 Id. at p. 35. 
422
Id. at p. 27. In establishing the Committee, the President was assisted by the Vice President. The President had 
appointed 135 members of KNIP, in which the KNIP members were including the members of the dismissed PPKI. 
423
 Id. at p. 28. 
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and the DPR, had the legislative power and together with the President set the GBHN 
(guidelines to the state policy).424 It also decided that since it was in a crucial situation, the KNIP 
should delegate its power to a working committee that was appointed by and responsible to 
the KNIP.425 Ismail Suni observed that since 16 October 1945, the President had to share his 
power set by Article IV the transitional provisions; the power to set the guidelines of the state 
policy (the GBHN) and the power to make Laws with the KNIP.426 On the other hand, the 
President still had the power to supervise the Ministers until it was changed on 11 November 
1945 when the working committee of the KNIP proposed to the President the ministerial 
responsibility to the Parliament (which in this period was the KNIP). Since the working 
Committee’s proposal was approved by the President, the constitutional practice in Indonesia 
was said to be unconstitutional.427 The proposal of ministerial responsibility and the existence 
of the prime minister were not in accordance with the Constitution. However, the approval for 
the ministerial responsibility to the Parliament was given by the Government Declaration 
(Maklumat Pemerintah) on 14 November 1945 whereby the Ministers were the members of 
the Cabinet led by a Prime Minister, Sjahrir, and were not responsible to the President.In 
consequence, as it was observed by Ismail Suni, the executive powers had been shifted from 
the President to the Prime Minister.428 In effect, the power of President Soekarno was reduced 
to that only of figurehead.429 However, the appointment of the Prime minister had been 
                                                           
424
 Id. at p. 28. 
425
 Id. at p. 29: “The powers of the working committee under the KNIP were determined as follows: a. set the 
guidelines of the state policy together with the President, however, the working committee had no right to 
intervene in the government’s daily policy (dagelijks beleid), the President still had the power as the government 
daily maker; b. set the Legislation (concerning all kinds of government affairs) together with the President. 
However, to execute the Laws, it is the power of the government. The government was determined just as the 
President assisted by the minister and other state officials under the President.” 
426
 Id. at p. 29. 
427
 Id. at p. 30: “the arguments that the working committee proposed the Ministerial responsibility to the 
Parliament were not only because the Constitution did not prohibit the ministerial responsibility but also on the 
basis that the ministerial responsibility to the Parliament reflected the people sovereignty. As a consequence of 
the President’s approval to the ministerial responsibility, since 14 November 1945, the Presidential Cabinet was 
changed into the new parliamentary Cabinet with Sutan Sjahrir as the Prime Minister.” 
428
 Id. Ismail Suni (1986), p. 31. 
429
 Colin Brown, a Short History of Indonesia: the Unlikely Nation?, Allen and Unwin, Australia, 2003, p. 163:“It is 
described that “in October–November 1945, the provisional government appointed Sjahrir as Prime Minister—a 
post not mentioned in the recently adopted Constitution—and in effect reduced Sukarno’s status to that of 
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challenged by Tan Malaka, his opponent, and politics were stalemated until President Soekarno 
intervened to reappoint Sjahrir.430 
In January 1948, the government agreed to the Renville agreement.431 As a result, there 
was great division within Republican ranks; many of them were more radical political leaders. 
Both were Muslims and the left wing, claimed that the agreement was a sell‐out to the Dutch; 
they forced the resignation ofthe government which had signed it.432 President Soekarno 
decided to appoint vice president, Hatta as the new prime minister.433 The political and 
economic situation was very difficult at the time, not only because of the government’s tension 
with its opponents, but also as a result of a Communist party rebellion. In December, the Dutch 
launched a second military attack.434 However, in that period, external pressures and the rise of 
rebellion, communism and its guerilla warfare caused the Dutch to change their policy and 
overcome its unprepared military and policy.435As a result of the round table conference, the 
Dutch recognized Indonesian independence. However, that recognition was not given to the 
unitary Republic of Indonesia, but to the Federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia (the 
RIS) which consisted of 16 states. Further, this Round Table Conference caused the 
Parliamentary Constitution of RIS (KRIS 1949) to replace the first Constitution of UUD 1945. 
Thus, the government system in Indonesia changed froma presidential system to a 
parliamentary system. 
Table 3.1 Executive power under the first Indonesian Constitution of UUD 1945 
Executive powers Scopes  Checks and balances  
Foreign affairs powers The power to make peace (Article 11) With the DPR’s approval * 
The power to make treaty between With the DPR’s approval * 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
figurehead. He was still head of state, but no longer head of government, making it more difficult for the Dutch to 
argue that the Republican government was in the hands of former collaborators with the Japanese. Although the 
Prime Ministership changed hands several times during the revolution, this political system was maintained; 
indeed, it was only replaced in 1957 when Sukarno reasserted Presidential authority.” 
430
See: Id. at p. 164‐165. 
431 Under the agreement, the Republic conceded to the Dutch the territories that it had lost in the attack, in return 
for another Dutch promise of eventual independence. 
432
 Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 167. 
433
 Id. at p. 167. 
434
Id. at p. 168. 
435 Id. at p. 169: “They restored Sukarno and Hatta toYogyakarta and began yet another round of negotiations at 
what wascalled the Round Table Conference, which led this time to a formal Dutch recognition of Indonesian 
independence in December 1949.” 
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states (Article 11) 
The diplomacy power of appointing 
the ambassadors and consuls (Article 
13) and receive the ambassadors of 
other states (Article 13) 
 * 
Emergency powers The power to declare state emergency  
(Article 12) 
The conditions and 
consequences caused by the 
state emergency is enacted by 
legislation 
* 
The power to set emergency laws 
(Article 22) 
Approved by the DPR * 
The power to take any measures and 
action promptly and appropriately 
(Article 22 of the annotation to the 
constitutional provisions) 
 
Checked by the DPR 
 
 
** 
Administrativeand 
appointment powers 
The power to appoint and dismiss the 
ministers (Article 17 section 2) 
 * 
The power to grant titles, decoration, 
and other honorary signs (Article 15) 
 * 
The power to propose the state 
budget (23) 
 * 
The power to set the political 
government policy and direct the 
ministers in the state government 
(chapter VII paragraph 3 of the 
general annotation of the 
Constitution) 
 * 
The power to run the state 
administration (Chapter IV of the 
general annotation to the 
Constitution) 
 * 
Law-making powers The power to make Legislation 
(Article 5 section 1) 
With the DPR’s approval * 
 The power to set the government 
regulation to exercise the Legislation 
(Article 5 section 2) 
 * 
Pardoning powers the power to pardon, grant amnesty, 
grant abolition and rehabilitation 
(Article 14) 
 * 
Military powers The power of Commander in chief  of 
the army, the navy, and the air force 
(Article 10) 
 * 
The power to declare war (Article 11) With the DPR’s approval * 
Other powers The power to exercise the MPR’s and 
DPA’s power before its establishment 
(the provision IV of the transitional 
provisions) 
Assisted by the National 
Committee 
* 
The power to organize and establish 
the system as set by the Constitution 
(Article 1 of the additional provision) 
 * 
*the President 
**the President on behalf of the government 
 
3.3. Indonesian executive power under the Constitution of the Republic of 
Indonesia Federalism (the KRIS “Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat”): a short 
experience of executive power under a parliamentary system 
 
‐ The executive under the KRIS Constitution 
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The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia federalism (hereafter referred to as the 
“1949 KRIS”) was only in force during a one year period of 1949 to 1950. It was taken into force 
as a consequence of the Hague round table conference (the Konferensi Meja Bundar) on 23 
August‐ 2 November 1949.436 The agreement was made on Saturday, 29 October 1949 in 
Scheveningen by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia and the delegation of the Federal 
agreement (Bijeenkomst Federaal Overleg). As a result of the agreement, the Republic Federal 
of Indonesia had a Federal Constitution namely the Constitution of the Republic Federal of 
Indonesia (hereafter referred as the KRIS 1949 Constitution). The 1949 KRIS Constitution was in 
accordance with the main purpose of the agreement. It provided the real and unconditional 
transfer of sovereignty from the Kingdom of Nederland to the United States of Indonesia and 
the establishment of the Indonesian government.437 The 1949 KRIS Constitution was drafted by 
representatives from various states and provinces. It had 197 provisions plus an appendix and 
represented a mixture of concepts, principles, and institutions from several constitutional 
sources including the United States of America.438 The President of the Republic Federal 
Indonesia ratified the KRIS Constitution by Presidential Decree No. 48 in 31 January 1950. 
According to the Constitution, Indonesia had 6 main state institutions: the President, the 
ministers, the senate, the people’s representatives (the DPR), the Indonesian Supreme Court, 
                                                           
436
The Conference, which was addressed to resolve the conflict of the Dutch aggression I and II in 1947 and 1948, 
had resulted in 3 main points: the establishment the state of Republic of Indonesia Federal, the transfer of 
sovereignty from the Dutch to the Republic of Federal Indonesia, and the establishment of Uni Republic of Federal 
Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. As a consequence of the conference, the Constitution of KRIS was 
drafted to give constitutional basis to the transformation of the Unitarian state to a federal state. The Constitution 
was drafted on the Conference by the BFO delegation and was entered to force on 27 December 1949. It consists 
of a Preamble of 4 paragraphs, the body of 6 chapters and 197 provisions, and the annex. 
437
Charles Cheney, “The Status of the Republic of Indonesia in International Law”, Colombia Law Review Vol. 49, 
No. 7, November 1949, pp. 955 ‐ 966 965, Colombia Law Review Association, accessed 10/11/2012. “It was 
declared that "sovereignty will be transferred to the Provisional Federal Government of the United States of 
Indonesia which shall function on the basis of a provisional constitution," and that all "powers of the Netherlands 
supreme legislative body, of the Crown and of the Governor‐General, including the title which the Governor‐
General had held in consultation with the Volksraad (People's Council) or the Raad van Nederlands‐Indie (Council 
for the Netherlands Indies) shall be vested in the Provisional Federal Government." It was announced that the 
Provisional Constitution should not contain any provision inconsistent with the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, 
and also that the Charter of Sovereignty should contain provisions”. 
438
Homer G. Angelo, “Transfer of Sovereignty Over Indonesia”, the American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, 
No. 3 (July 1950), pp. 569 – 572, American Society of International Law, Accessed on 10/11/2012, p. 570.  
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and the Council of financial supervision.439 Furthermore, based on Article 68 of the 1949 KRIS 
Constitution, the government of the state consisted of the President and the Ministers acting in 
collaboration.440 The Article implied that the executive power was in the hands of the President 
and the Ministers acting in collaboration. 
According to Article 70 Section 1, the President and the Minister should not run any 
other general positions inside and outside the Federal Republic of Indonesia. They could not 
have dual positions while in office. Furthermore, Section 2 of the Article stipulated that the 
President and the Ministers should not be directly or indirectly involved or to be the 
underwriter of a profit company. Section (3) of the Article also stipulated that they could not 
have any claims against the Republic Federal of Indonesia apart from a general obligation letter. 
According to Section (4) of the Article, the constitutional conditions still bound the President 
and the Ministers three years after their resignation from the office. 
In terms of a state of emergency, all the ministers and the special ministers acted 
together to make any decisions that had the same legal force to replace the Council of 
Ministers’ decisions.441 In general, the Prime Minister (in case of the absence of the Prime 
Minister, will be replaced by the special Minister) conducted and satin the Council of Ministers 
session to discuss the public interest of the Federal Republic of Indonesia.442 The Council of 
Ministers should always notify all the important affairs to the President. The Ministers were 
responsible for all the government policy, both individually and collectively.443 
‐ Presidential duties and power 
Article 69 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution gave the position of the head of state to the 
President. Unlike a head of state in the parliamentary system under the monarchial system, the 
President as the head of State was elected by the state representatives who had the 
                                                           
439
The 1949 KRIS Constitution (excerpted from www.ppid.kpuu.go.id , “Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat”, 
unofficial translated by the author): Chapter III on the state institutions of the Republic Federal of Indonesia (the 
1949 KRIS Constitution)  (Appendix 2). 
440
 Article 68 section 1 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution, Article 68 Section 2 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 
2). 
441
 Article 75 section (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
442
 Article 76 section (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
443
 Article 118 section 2 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
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authorization to come together in agreement on the election of a head of state. In general, the 
main presidential duties were derived from the presidential oath. As the head of state and 
according to the constitutional oath, the President had duties to promote the welfare of the 
Federal Republic of Indonesia, protect and preserve the freedom and rights of all the 
citizens.444According to the constitutional oath, the President also had duties to retain the laws 
and ensure the execution of laws in the Federal Republic of Indonesia. In case of presidential 
absence and in order to fulfill his constitutional duties, the President could order the Prime 
Minister to take over the daily work.445 
The President had the power to order and appoint the Prime minister and the ministers. 
Before taking the office, the ministers were required to take the formal vow before the 
President.446 The appointment and dismissal of the minister was set by Government Decree. 
According to Article 74 section (1) KRIS Constitution, the President with the states 
representatives agreed to appoint a Cabinet Committee consisting of three members to 
establish a cabinet and appoint ministers.447 According to the advice of the Cabinet maker, the 
President appointed the Prime minister from one of the three members of the Cabinet and the 
other two would be appointed as the ministers.448 Furthermore, the President determined 
department ministers and non‐department ministers. The determination should be in line with 
the advice and signed by the three members of the cabinet maker. The Ministers with a 
ministerial department included the Minister of Defense, the Minister of foreign affairs, the 
Minister of Home Affairs, Minister of Finance and economic affairs, and the Prime Minister. 
Besides appointing the ministers, Article 85 section (1) of the KRIS Constitution gave the power 
to the President to appoint the Chief of the Senate according to the advice of the Senate.449 In 
                                                           
444 Article 71 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution of the Federal Republic of Indonesia. 
445
 Article 72 section 1 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
446
 Article 77 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
447
The cabinet maker was appointed by the President and the states representative to give advice to the President 
with regard to the minister appointment. 
448
 Article 74 section (2) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
449
 Article 85 section 1 (Appendix 2) the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
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general, the position of the President according to the KRIS Constitution was fairly strong. 
Article 118 section (1) stipulated that the President had inviolability.  
The President granted honorable decorations based on the Federal Laws. 450 
Furthermore, the President had the power to give pardon, and amnesty after asking the 
Supreme Court’s advice.451As the head of the state, in the field of diplomatic foreign affairs 
power, the Constitution stated that the President formally appointed the Republic Federal of 
Indonesia’s representatives for other states and accepted other states’ representatives for the 
Republic Federal of Indonesia.452Furthermore, Article 182 (1) emphasized that the President 
was the highest commander as Chief in the Republic Federal of Indonesia. In formal procedures 
and according to the Federal Law, the President appoints, promotes and dismisses the officers 
of the state forces.453 
‐ Government454 power 
Chapter IV of the 1949 KRIS Constitution described the state administration and how the 
government’s affairs were run. Article 117 section 2 emphasized that this main duty was 
addressed to the government’s power as the purpose of establishing the state 
administration. 455  Ministers signed Presidential Decrees. 456  In general, under the KRIS 
Constitution, the Prime Minister’s position was indeed enormously strong in the government 
system.457 The President played a small public role throughout 1949 and primarily only in a 
ceremonial capacity.458 
                                                           
450
 Article 126 the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
451
Article 160 the 1949 KRIS Constitution Section (1) (Appendix 2), Article 160 Section (2) (Appendix 2), Article 160 
Section (3) the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
452Article 178 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
453Article 181 (3) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
454
Government is the President and the ministers. 
455
Article 117 (2) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
456
 Article 119 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
457
Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Equinox Publishing, 1
st
 Edition, Jakarta, 
2007, p. 49:“It was not that he towered over his colleagues in the way of leaders who choose men of markedly 
inferior ability as their associates and lieutenants. On the contrary, his ministers were men of a high order of both 
ability and prestige.” 
458
 Id, at p. 50 
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In terms of the law‐making power, the government had the power to make laws 
together with the DPR and the Senate. The government had the power in all areas of the law‐
making power. While on the other hand the President had a significant role in the whole law‐
making process. The proposal of a bill that was proposed by the government was sent through 
presidential message to the DPR.459 On the other hand, the DPR had the right to propose 
Legislation to the government. If the proposal came from the Senate, the President was 
informed and notified by a copy of the proposal.460 The President had significant roles in every 
stage of the legislation making process. The President had roles in the early process of 
proposing the legislation, the joint discussion session, and the validation of the legislation. 
Besides the legislation making process, according to Article 139 the 1949 KRIS Constitution, the 
government had the power to authorize and be responsible for setting the emergency law.461 
However, according to Article 140 section (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution, the Emergency Law 
should be passed to the DPR to be discussed further. If the DPR rejected and did not approve 
the Emergency Law, the Law was no longer valid and had no legal consequences.462 
Furthermore, the Constitution empowered the government to make other laws; namely, 
Directives Law to implement the Legislation.463 By setting the Federal Legislation and the 
government regulation, the government could order state institutions to set further 
arrangements as determined in both Laws and the regulation.464 
‐ The DPR and the Senate check the government power 
The 1949 KRIS Constitution provided a check and balance mechanism for the 
government power. The DPR had the right of interpellation and right of inquiry465 and the rights 
                                                           
459
Article 128 section(1) the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
460
Article 128 section (2) the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). Article 128 Section (3) the KRIS Constitution 
(Appendix 2). 
461Article 139 section (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2), Article 139 Section (2) of the 1949 KRIS 
Constitution (Appendix 2). 
462
Article 140 section (2) of the1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2), Article 140 section (3) of the 1949 KRIS 
Constitution (Appendix 2), Article 140 Section (4) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
463
Article 141 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution Section (1) (Appendix 2), Article 141 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution 
Section (2) (Appendix 2). 
464
Article 142 (1) the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
465
 Article 120 section (1) the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
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to investigate (enquete) according to the federal law.466 On the other hand, according to Article 
120 section (2) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution, the ministers had constitutional duties to counter 
balance the DPR’s measures by giving written or oral explanations.467 However, the DPR could 
not force the Cabinet or Minister to step down from office.468 Besides the DPR, the 1949 KRIS 
Constitution also recognized the Senate. In a special session and important situation 
regardingthe relationship between states or the relationship between a state and the Republic 
Federal of Indonesia, the government should consider the Senate. The government should 
inform it of any decisions except for the Emergency Law.469 
‐ Executive immunity 
The 1949 KRIS Constitution did not give any privileges to particularly the President and 
other state officers and the executive in general. The President and other executive bodies 
could be prosecuted before the Court either during office or after resignation. Article 148 (1) of 
the 1949 KRIS Constitution stipulated that the President, Ministers, Chief and members of the 
Senate, the Chief and the members of the DPR, the Chief, Vice‐Chief and members of the 
Supreme Court, the State Prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Chief and Vice Chief of the State 
Financial Supervisor, the President of the Bank, members of the high council, and other state 
officials as determined by the Federal Law might be prosecuted before the Supreme Court. The 
prosecution could also bestarted after resignation. They could be prosecuted because of 
crimes, official offences, and other violations as determined by the Federal Lawduring their 
office. 
Article 174 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution stipulated that the Government held the 
power of foreign affairs. The President made and validated all the treaties and other 
agreements with other states. The treaty or other agreements were not ratified unless 
approved by the Legislation.470  However, in exercising the power to conclude and make 
treaties and other agreements, the President could only do it with the authorization from the 
                                                           
466
 Article 121 the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
467 Article 120 section (2) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
468
 Article 122 the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
469
Article 123 Section (1) – Section (6) the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
470
Article 175 (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
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Federal Law.471 The executive power on the foreign affairs implied the power to decide the 
state participation in International Organizations.472 According to Article 177 of the 1949 KRIS 
Constitution, the Government undertook to solve the dispute with other states peacefully and 
also decided to ask or accept the International Court or International arbitration’s decision. The 
Article implied that the Government also had the power to influence the decision making 
whether or not to ask, accept, or not accept the International Court or International 
arbitration’s decision.  
The government had the power in terms of the state defence affairs.473 Furthermore, 
the Government had the power to appoint (if necessary) the defence personnel under the 
general commander. The Minister of Defence could be appointed for the position.474 Article 183 
Section (1) stipulated that the government declared war only if it was permitted by the DPR and 
the Senate. In this case, according toSection (2) of the article, the DPR and the Senate decided 
to give permission to declare war by holding a plenary session of the DPR and the Senate 
chaired by the chief of the DPR. On the other fields of the emergency power, Article 184 (1) 
mentioned that the government did hold the emergency power and had the power to declare 
that the state was in a state of war or in a war emergency.475 Further impact that comes as a 
consequence of the emergency declaration is regulated by the Federal Law.476 
Instead of the power that had relevance to the state administration affairs, the 
Constitution implied that the government together with the Constituante had the power to set 
theConstitution. The government in this case also referred to the President.477 After setting the 
Constitution, the government had duties to make sure that the Constitution was implemented 
                                                           
471
 Article 175 (2) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
472
Article 176 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2).  
473
Article 181 (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
474
 Article 181 (2) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution. 
475
Article 184 section (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2). 
476
Article 184 section (2) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2).  
477
Article 186 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2), Article 187 Section (1) of the 1949 KRIS Constitution 
(Appendix 2), Article 187 Section (2),  Article 188 (1), Article189 Section (1) ‐ Section (4) the 1949 KRIS Constitution 
(Appendix 2). 
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and adjusted by the Legislation and other laws.478 In general, the annex of the Republic Federal 
of Indonesia Constitution, Article 51, determined the scope of the executive powers in state 
administration affairs.479 
In practice, the Round Table Conference negotiations came to an agreement that the 
government of RIS recognized all the rights, concessions, and permission which had been 
granted by the colonial Dutch government.480 The negotiation also came to an agreement on 
the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to the new state namely the United States of 
Indonesia (RIS).481 However, the Dutch still influenced not only the area of politics but also all 
                                                           
478
Article 196 of the 1949 KRIS Constitution (Appendix 2).  
479
(a) Regulates the citizenship and residence of Republic Federal of Indonesia; (b) Immigration and emigration; (c) 
general affairs of colonization and transmigration; (d) pardoning: clemency, amnesty, and abolition; (e) the copy 
right, intellectual property rights, and kwekersrecht; (f) public law and civil law; (g) civil law and commercial law, 
on behalf of the social interest; economy, and other civil interest; (h) criminal law; (i) Private law; (j) the 
organization of federal judiciary; (k) land registration; (l) legal‐economic nexus; (m) the compensation as a 
consequence of war; (n) Police and the principle of the state federal administration; the police official education; 
provide and promote the technical and empowerment of the republic federal of Indonesia’s police; measures to 
promote the cooperation of the police; (o) currency, bank, and foreign exchange; (p) tax company; (q) tax 
property; (r) income tax for the special affairs that is determined by the Federal Law; (s) import and export 
including the entry and exit custom and also the determination of the duty; (t) stamp duty; (u) custom; (v) 
government monopoly; (w) the foreign affairs, international relation, international rights and obligation of the 
government, international relation; (x) state defense, including the criminal law and the military law, the judicial 
and the emergency law (declaring war and a war emergency); (y) Institute and science that benefit to the Republic 
Federal of Indonesia; (z) maintenance of the monument and the natural protection that benefit to the Republic 
Federal of Indonesia; (A) collecting data statistic and documents that is important to the Republic Federal of 
Indonesia; (B) the arrangement and social measures that is important to the Republic Federal of Indonesia;(C) 
Guidelines of the state official; (D) education; (E) mass communication; (F) general rules of the import and movie 
industry’s supervision; (G) the general guidelines of the agrarian politic; (H) the endemic diseases; (I) commerce, 
industry, agriculture, keradjinan, pertanian, fishery, farm and economic affairs, and food; (J) the transportation; (K) 
aircraft and metereology; (L) Topography dan hidrography; (M) sea surveillance; (N) the harbor maintenance, river; 
(O) the telecommunication affairs; (P) mining arrangement; (Q) water, electricity, the exploitation of the water 
company. 
 
480
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 171: “..in effect, this meant that the Indonesian government agreed to honor all the 
agreements under which Dutch capital had been able to exploit the resources of Indonesia.” 
481
L.C. Green, “Indonesia, the United Nations and Malaysia”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 6, No. 2, 
Modern Malaysia, Sept, 1965, pp. 71‐86, Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National 
University of Singapore, Accessed: 10/11/2012, p. 73, “It was agreed that The Netherlands would surrender 
sovereignty over the areas not yet governed by the Republic, while the Republic would surrender its own 
'sovereignty'. As a result of this dual surrender a new Federal sovereign would be established, of which the 
Republic would constitute but one part. At the same time, the Netherlands‐Indonesian Union was pro claimed with 
the agreement of the Nationalist leaders. On the day of the transfer of sovereignty, December 27, 1949, the United 
States of Indonesia was recognized by the United Kingdom and most of the members of the Commonwealth. This 
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sectors such as military and economy and treated Indonesia as if it was still under Dutch 
control.482 This situation provoked mixed reactions among the Indonesian politicians. Some 
national leaders thought that the revolution was to be a change of regime, from the Dutch to 
Indonesia with a lot of changes in the details of the basis.483 They thought that the politics and 
government system should reflect Indonesian values and not those of the Dutch. They also had 
provoked the change of the new regime of changing into the presidential system. By this, they 
meant that the all unwanted foreign influence, including the Dutch influence, had to be driven 
out of Indonesia. Besides, in the period of the Constitution of 1949 KRIS there were major 
political issues faced by Indonesia.484 On 17 August 1950, President Soekarno announced the 
rejection of the federal systemand the restoration of the Unitarian Republic of Indonesia.485 As 
a consequence, the temporary Constitution was drawn up and adopted before the Constituante 
(Constituent Assembly) was elected to undertake the task for drafting a permanent 
Constitution. 
Table 3.2 Executive power under the KRIS 1949 Constitution 
Executive 
powers 
Scopes Checks and balances  
Foreign affairs 
power 
 
 
Power of foreign affairs (Article 174)  ** 
Make, conclude, and validate all the treaties and other agreements 
with other states (Article 175) 
with the authorization 
from federal law 
* 
decide joining the international organization (Article 176)  ** 
Undertake to solve the dispute between other states with peaceful 
and also decide to ask or accept the International court or 
international arbitration’s decision (Article 177)  
 ** 
Emergency Hold the emergency power and had the power to declare the state  ** 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
act of recognition was followed the next day by similar action on behalf of the United States, Portugal and 
Formosa. Soviet recognition was delayed until well into January 1950, to be followed by that of Rumania in 
February. Unlike the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia earlier, recognition now was on a de jure basis, and 
as such regarded as irrevocable.” 
482
Id, L. C. Green (1965), p. 73: “Soekarno had been President of the Republic and retained this position in the 
United States, with the Queen of the Netherlands as Head of the Union symbolizing the 'voluntary and lasting 
cooperation between the partners.” 
483
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 173. 
484
See more on: Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 175,..” the first major political issue that Indonesia faced after the 
recognition of its independence was its formal structure, specially, whether it would remain a federal state, with 
power shared between the central and provincial governments, or revert to a unitary format, in which the power 
of the central government was unchallenged.” 
485
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 186:..”Sukarno had never made anybones about the fact that he rejected parliamentary 
democracy, withits competing political parties and its emphasis on reaching decisionsby majority votes. To him, 
this system was inherently divisive, aliento Indonesian political culture and the prime cause of the 
country’spolitical instability. The political parties, in particular, were in hissights. In October 1956, he made a 
speech strongly critical of theparties, and calling for the establishment of a new form of democracy”. 
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power is under the war or under the emergency war (Article 184 section 
1) 
Administrative 
and 
appointment 
power 
grant the honorable sign (Article 126)   
give the pardon, amnesty (Article 160) With the advice from the 
Supreme Court 
* 
to appoint three of the cabinet maker (Article 74)  With the state 
representatives 
* 
to order and appoint the Prime minister and the ministers (Article 
74)  
With the cabinet maker  
to determine the department ministerial minister and the non-
department ministerial minister 
 * 
to appoint the Chief of the Senate (Article 85 section 1)  With the advice of the 
Senate 
* 
the power to order and appoint the prime minister and the 
ministers (Article 77) 
According to the cabinet 
maker 
* 
The power to order the Prime minister to take over the daily work 
(Article 72) 
 * 
to dismiss the ministers   
to determine the department ministerial ministers and the non-
department ministerial ministers (Article  
 * 
to appoint the chief of the senate (Article 85) – according to the 
advice of the senate 
 * 
appoint the Republic federal of Indonesia’s representative for 
other states and accepts other states representative for the 
Republic Federal of Indonesia (Article 178) 
 * 
appoints, promotes and dismiss the officer in the field of state 
defense (Article 181 section 3) 
 * 
give the honorable sign (Article 126) Based on the federal law * 
Law-making 
power 
 
 
the legislative power (Article 127)  
 
Joint power with the DPR 
and the Senat 
** 
validate the legislation  * 
set the government regulation to directive legislation (Article 
141) 
 ** 
Set the emergency law (Article 139 section 1)  ** 
Pardoning 
power 
give pardon, amnesty (Article 160)  after asking the supreme 
court advice 
* 
Military power 
 
 
Power of the state defense affairs (Article 181 section 1)  ** 
To appoint the defense personnel under the general commander/ 
appoint the minister of defense to be in this position (Article 181 
section 2) 
 * 
Declare the war  (Article 183 section 1)  With the permission by 
the DPR and the Senate 
** 
hold the highest power of commander in chief (Article 182 section 
(1)) 
 * 
Other powers Set the Constitution (Article 196)  With the Constituante ** 
*the President 
**the government 
 
3.4. Indonesian executive power under the Temporary Constitution of Republic 
Indonesia (the “UUDS 1950”) 
 
The Temporary Constitution of the UUDS 1950 (hereafter referred to as the UUDS 1950) 
was ratified in Jakarta on 15 August 1950 by the President of the Republic Federal of Indonesia 
(Soekarno), the Prime Minister (Mohammad Hatta), and the minister of justice (Soepomo). It 
was published at the same time by the minister of justice. The text of the temporary 
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Constitution was the 1949 KRIS Constitution text with some additional contents from the UUD 
1945. The legal form of ratification of the temporary Constitution 1950 was Legislation, the 
Republic Federal Legislation No. 7/1950 on the conversion from the 1949 KRIS Constitution to 
the Temporary Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. The significant changes from the 1949 
KRIS Constitution to the Temporary Constitution were mainly about the changes of the State, 
from the Federal State to the Unitarian State. The government system was thought to be a 
parliamentary democracy. Although it was said to be a parliamentary democracy, the text of 
the Constitution did not explicitly say so. Unlike the KRIS Constitution which specified clearly 
that the government was the President and the ministers in Article 68, the temporary 
Constitution 1950 did not explicitly specify thegovernment in any of the provisions. However, 
Chapter II on State institutions, Section 1 on the government (Article 45 – Article 55) recognized 
the position of the President, the Vice President, the cabinet, the Prime minister and the 
ministers. 
According to Article II, the temporary Constitution of the UUDS RI 1950 entered into 
force on 17 August 1950. The Constitution determined that the state institutions consisted of: 
a. the President and the Vice President; b. Ministers; c. the DPR; d. the Supreme Court; e. the 
Financial supervisor Council.486 The President and the Vice President were to be categorized as 
the government of the state based on Article 45. There was no clarification provided about the 
holder of the executive power. However, it was stipulated that the President was the head of 
the state and was assisted by a Vice President.487 
Unlike in the KRIS Constitution which did not recognize the position of a Vice President, 
the temporary Constitution 1950 reintroduced the position of the Vice President without 
including the Emergency Clause (that empowered the President in time of emergency to install 
a presidential cabinet not on the basis of the party strength). This would make possible the 
existence of a non‐parliamentary cabinet.  According to the Article, for the first time, the 
President had the power to appoint the Vice President who was recommended by the DPR. The 
                                                           
486
The UUD 1950 (excerpted from www.reformasihukum.org , unofficial translated by the author), Article 44 of 
theUUDS 1950. 
487
Article 45 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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Vice President, in the case of a presidential resignation, will constitutionally succeed the 
President.488 
The government had its office in the capital city and had the power to decide other 
places in an emergency.489 Before officially holding the position, the President and the vice 
President should make an oath according to their religion before the DPR to: 
‐ Directly and indirectly not give any promise or give something to anyone 
‐ not accept directly and indirectly any promises or gift from anyone 
‐ Promote the welfare of the Republic of Indonesia, protect and preserve the freedom, general and 
particular rights of the residents of the state 
‐ Faithfully execute the Constitution and maintain all the laws in the Republic of Indonesia, faithfully fulfill 
all the duties that are inherently imposed as the consequences of the office of the head of the state.
490
 
 
In running the state government, the President had the power to establish the 
ministries.491The procedures of the ministry establishment were mentioned in Article 51 of the 
Constitution as follows: 
1. The President appoints a person or some person as the Cabinet Maker492 
2. According to the advice of the Cabinet maker, the President appoints a Prime Minister 
and other Ministers 
3. According to the Cabinet committee’s (for appointing the ministers) advice, the 
President decides the ministers who have the duties to preside over a Ministry. The 
President may appoint ministers who do not need to lead a Ministry 
4. The Presidential decision to appoint the Ministers was signed by the Cabinet Maker 
5. The appointment and the dismissal of the Ministers office term and the resignation of 
the Cabinet was realized by the Presidential Decree 
 
It was constitutionally confirmed that the ministers are responsible to parliament either 
individually or collectively.493 However, in contrast with the UUD 1945 Constitution, the 
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Article 48 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
489 Article 46 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
490
 Article 47 of the UUDS 1950. 
491
Article 50 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
492
 According to Herbert Feith (Op. Cit, Herbert Feith, p. 147): “the form One measure of a formateur's power was 
the extent to which he was able to bring together a cabinet by compromises on policies and interests rather than 
by compromises between personal cliques whose demands were often not capable of being translated into a self ‐
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Article 83 section 2 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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ministers were not responsible to the President but to the legislative assembly.494 Furthermore, 
Article 52 clarified that the ministers by forming a council of ministers headed by the Prime 
Minister were responsible to discuss public and state interests in a joint discussion and should 
inform the President of all important affairs. 495  The government policies were set by 
presidential decree which had to be signed by the minister or the minister in the area of the 
policy.496 With regard to government affairs, the cabinet was given enormous power.497 The 
ministers could act broadly.498 Besides establishing and appointing the ministers, the President 
had the power to appoint the chief, vice chief, members of the Supreme Court499 and in the 
area of the council of finance.500 
In performing their duties, the President and the Vice President were constitutionally 
inviolable.501 Although the President was inviolable and was said in Article 84 to have the right 
to dissolve the House of Representatives by a presidential decree, the dissolution was only 
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Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 95. “The Republic's cabinet was responsible to its legislative assembly, this on the basis 
not of the Republic's written constitutionof August 1945, but of a convention dating back to November 1945.” 
495
 Article 52 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
496
Article 85 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3).   
497
 Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 96, “In one respect the cabinet was given enormous power: the constitution prepared 
by the joint committee provided, as the RUSI constitution had, for the possibility of emergency laws which could 
be made by the government alone and would be valid until such time as they were specifically counter‐manded by 
parliament. In other respects, however, the new constitution was tilted in parliament's favour. Parliament was 
placed in the position of being able to force the resignation of a cabinet or of individual ministers. On the other 
hand, the power of the cabinet to dissolve parliament was less clearly specified.” 
498
Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 147, “Cabinet members may have been in a weak position to effect the broad 
economic and social policies to which they were formally committed. But when their role is looked at without 
reference to considerations of long‐term policy, it becomes clear that they were men of great influence. 
Particularly in the new and administratively fluid ministries but in some older ones too, ministers could play a 
virtuoso role, making important decisions without being closely checked by the cabinet as a whole, by the senior 
bureaucrats of their ministry, or by their respective parties. They could issue ministerial regulations on a wide 
range of subjects. Sometimes without anyone outside their ministries knowing that a particular regulation had 
been made or what it involved. They could exercise a broad degree of discretion as regards the distribution of 
funds and the How of patronage. And they had considerable freedom in the matter of appointments and transfers. 
In all these ways they could help not only their parties but also their own group of friends, associates, and 
followers. Thus it mattered a great deal who were the individual occupants of ministerial portfolios.” 
499
Article 79 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
500
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possible if the President was able to conduct an election of the new House of representatives 
within 30 days.502 
In terms of law‐making power, the Constitution implied that the President had 
significant power in the legislation‐making process. It was stipulated in Article 89 that “the 
legislative power was held by the President (the government) jointly with the DPR.”The 
President (the government) had the power to propose abill of legislation through presidential 
message to the DPR. On the other hand, the DPR had also the power to propose legislation to 
the government.503On the President’s bill, the DPR had the right to make changes.504 In further 
stages, whether the DPR accepted or rejected the proposal of legislation, the DPR should notify 
the President.505 If the process continued, the proposal would be sent to the President and 
validated by the President (the government).506 During the process, if the proposal of the 
legislation was not accepted by the DPR, the government could withdraw it.507 
The legislation had the function to order state institutions and to regulate certain 
subjects.508 It was also an important instrument for the government in running the state 
administration. Article 113 stipulated that the budget of the state expenses and the state 
income can only be decided by legislation. The bill for the state budgetary legislation was 
proposed by the government to the DPR.509 The proposal of the legislation indicated that the 
calculation of the budget should be validated by the Council of the Financial Supervisor and in 
the end the government in spending the money should be responsible to the DPR.510 Besides 
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 Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 96, “It was said in Article 84' of the Constitution that "the President has the right to 
dissolve the House of Representatives," but also, in the next sentence, that "the Presidential Decree announcing 
such dissolution shall also order the election of the new House of Representatives within 30 days." Thus it 
appeared, at least to one major school of constitutional interpretation, that dissolution was possible only in 
situations where it was feasible to elect a new House within 30 days.” 
503
Article 90 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
504
Article 91 UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3).  
505
Article 92 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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Article 93 the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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Article 94 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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Article 99 section 1 UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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Article 114 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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Article 116 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3).  
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being a tool to legitimise the state budget, the legislation was the instrument for the 
government to impose taxes and customs.511 
Other presidential law‐making power could be determined by Article 96. According to 
the Article, the government had the power to set Emergency Laws.512 During the next DPR’s 
session, the Emergency Law should be proposed to the DPR. This way, the Emergency Law was 
based upon the proposal of legislation from the government. However, if it was rejected, the 
law would be legally invalid.513 However, the Article did not explicitly specify the presidential 
power in the process. It only generally referred to the government in general.514 
 The President as the head of the state had the right to give honorable 
decorations.515 In other area, still in the role as the head of the state, the President was granted 
the power of pardoning, amnesty, and abolition.516 The power could only be exercised after 
getting advice from the Supreme Court. The Constitution also determined that the government 
held the power in general financial affairs.517 On the other hand, the financial management 
power was constitutionally checked by a financial supervisory council and further, the result 
would be communicated to the DPR.518 In daily state management, the Constitution gave the 
right to the government to make any arrangement for the state’s financial benefit. Article 118 
Section 2 of the UUDS 1950 stipulated that the government had the right according to the laws 
to issue the currency and treasury promissory notes. In official daily management, Article 119 
section 1 of the UUDS 1950 clarified that the government had the right to determine the salary 
and other incomes for state officials and members of state institutions according to the laws.  
Chapter V of the Constitution determined the constitutional basis for the foreign affairs 
power of the President and the government in general. According to Article 120 Section 1 of the 
Constitution, the President had the power to make and ratify treaties and other agreements 
                                                           
511
Article 117 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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 Article 96 section 1 and section 2 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3).  
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Article 97 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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 Article 98 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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Article 87 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3).  
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Article 107 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3). 
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between states.519 Furthermore, Section 2 of the Article emphasized that the President, 
through Legislation, also had the power to decide treaties and other agreements to be 
concluded.520 With regard to state participation in International organizations, Article 121 
stipulated that according to the treaties and other agreements determined by Article 120, the 
government had the power to decide that the Republic of Indonesia shouldenter into an 
international organization. In other diplomatic affairs, Article 122 of the UUDS 1950 
constitutionally empowered the government to undertake any measures in order to peacefully 
resolve a conflict with other states.  In respect to that, the Constitution also provided 
constitutional options for the government to decide whether or not to ask for or accept the 
International Court or International arbitration. In term of international relations, the UUDS 
1950 gave the president the power to appoint the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia 
to other states and to accept other states representatives to the Republic of Indonesia.521 
With regard to the state defense, Article 126 section 1 of the UUDS 1950 stated that the 
government held the state defense affairs. Under the Constitution, in time of war, the President 
had the power as commander in chief. In general conditions, the President held the highest 
power of the Army of the Republic of Indonesia.522 The same as in the KRIS Constitution, the 
UUDS 1950 granted the President the power to declare war. However, this power could only be 
exercised with the permission of the DPR.523 In other situations of emergency, unlike the KRIS 
Constitution that explicitly mentioned that the government had the power to deal with the 
emergency situation, the UUDS 1950 indicated that the President had the power to declare that 
the Republic of Indonesia or part of the state territory was inan emergency situation.524 The 
declaration of the state emergency could be made with the assumption that the state security, 
public interest and international security in general was threatened by a dangerous situation. 
‐ Executive immunity 
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The similarity between the KRIS Constitution and the UUDS 1950 could also be seen 
from the presidential immunity’s provision. Article 106 Section 1 explicitly expressed that the 
President in office could be prosecuted before the first and the highest Supreme Court. The 
prosecution could also be started after the resignation of the President. The grounds of the 
prosecution could be crimes and other violations that had been committed by the President 
during his office.525 
‐ Check and balance against the presidential power under the UUDS 1950 
The Constitution recognized the DPR in Article 56 as the state institution representing all 
the Indonesians. Article 69 Section 1 stipulated that the DPR has the right of interpellation and 
right to question; each of the members had the right to do so. According to Article 70, the DPR 
had also the right to investigate (enquete right). In return, it was clearly stated that the 
ministers had the constitutional duty to give the DPR all written and unwritten explanations 
which were required by the DPR.526 However, the explanationshould not be contradictory to 
the public interest of the state. In case that the explanation contradicted the public and state 
interest, the ministers had the right to ignore the DPR inquiry. Unlike other Constitutions, the 
UUDS 1950 gave the power to the President to dissolve the DPR.527 
In practice, the temporary Constitution of 1950 had replaced the parliamentary 
Constitution of KRIS 1949. Although the text of the Temporary Constitution was imported from 
the KRIS Constitution, the text gave a different power to the President. In general, the power of 
the President was not really strong. Since it was said that the system was parliamentary 
democracy, the President was said to be only a figurehead position. Article 52 implied that the 
ministers in the Ministerial council led by the Prime Minister had an important position in state 
administration.528 
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Article 85 stipulated that all the Presidential Decrees including those regarding the 
performance of the Presidential military powers should be counter‐signed by the ministers.529 
The Article limited the presidential power for only formal powers concerning the appointment. 
With regard to the formal appointment, the President only acted formally and in accordance 
with the recommendation of the Cabinet Committee (a committee to establish the cabinet and 
appoint ministers) and the recommendation of the House of Representatives (on the 
appointment of the vice president). However, in practice, the position of President Soekarno 
during the period was stronger because of the support from the army commander and vice 
versa the President used his influence for the army organization.530 0n the other hand, the 
cabinet did not really gain much support from the army.531 The relationship between the 
President and the cabinet could be seen in two perspectives. One perspective, though the 
President did not have direct power to establish the Cabinet instead of through the Cabinet 
maker, the President could still use his influence since the makers were appointed and 
associated with the President.532 Another perspective was that the Cabinet had a kind of 
mutual relation to the President in fact the existence of the Cabinet was greatly supported by 
the President.533 During the period of the Wilopo Cabinet, the Presidential dissolution power 
had been challenged by the situation of parliament and cabinet deadlock; however, it did not 
happen and was ended by a new Cabinet.534 
                                                           
529
 Article 85 of the UUDS 1950 (Appendix 3).  
530
 Herbert Feith, Op. Cit, p. 250, “Many of the personnel changes which the army leaders had effectedin 1951 and 
the first half of 1952 had clearly lessened his influence within the army, and on at least one occasion in 1952 he 
had intervened against the army leaders' personnel policy by refusing to sign a decree.  
531Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 172, “in the months of January, February, and March 1951 Prime Minister Natsir 
obtained considerable support from the army leaders in his covert struggle with the President. It was an early 
manifestation of what was to become a characteristic situation of the politics of our period, the situation where 
the two chief extra parliamentary centers of power, the President and the army, were pulling the contenders in 
the cabinet‐parliament arena in opposite directions. But, whether because of the army leaders' disinclination to 
use their influence too openly‐perhaps the result of internal army divisionor because of a reluctance on Natsir's 
part to allow them to enter too far into civilian and constitutional politics, army support was not forthcoming on a 
scale sufficient to counter‐balance the pressures exerted by the President.” 
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Herbert Feith, Op. Cit.,214, “Both of the formateurs were long‐time associates of the President, and most of the 
principal figures in the cabinet, men such as Suwirjo, Iskaq, and Subardjo, had likewise long been tied to Soekarno 
as associates or supporters. 
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Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 214. 
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As the issues at the time were about economic issues and capitalism, the Government 
had control over the economy and finance. During that period of 1950, Indonesia was suffering 
a deteriorating economic situation. To overcome the situation, the Government mostly used 
their power to reduce the number of people on the public payroll, raise efficiency and reduce 
the drain on the national budget, even though, it was unsuccessful. The Prime Minister at the 
time dominantly tried to overcome the government affairs. The crisis came from not only the 
economic situation but also from the territorial sovereignty dispute. For example, the territorial 
dispute issues of Irian Jaya. In this case, the Prime Minister had the role to politically negotiate. 
At the time, Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo had a great influence in particular in foreign 
affairs. He initiated the establishment of the Asia‐Africa bloc, the non‐alliance states 
movement. On the other hand, in the spirit of revolution, President Soekarno introduced 
“guided democracy”.535 
During the period of 1956‐1957, after the election of 1955 and as a consequence of the 
election result (on the issues of the geographical division and the resignation of Vice President 
Hatta in 1956), a group of regional military commanders in Sumatera and Sulawesi seized 
power from the local civilian administrations appointed by Jakarta and set up their own 
administration.536 This situation called President Soekarno to declare a state of martial law 
across Indonesia.537 However, the effort taken had failed to overcome the rebels.538 This 
situation compelled President Soekarno to authorize the army to take military action.  
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Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 190 – 191: “..the guided democracy was a system of government in which the 
parliament was to play a relatively small role, as were most political parties, with the increasingly important 
exception of the Communist party. It was a system that saw the Indonesian army consolidate its position as a 
major political force. ” 
536
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 187. 
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Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 188. 
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See more: Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 188:“On 15 February 1958, the establishment of the Revolutionary 
government of the Republic of Indonesia (the PRRI: the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) was 
proclaimed in West Sumatra. Two days later, the rebels from Sulawesi also joined the PRRI. They were not seeking 
separation from Indonesia but rather its reform. The situation provoked President Soekarno to authorize General 
Nasution (Army Commander) to take military action and resulted with victory for the central government. The 
victory strengthened the President Soekarno’s position and brought him the opportunity to move forcefully 
against his opponents. In 1960, Soekarno had banned two of the political parties as his opponents (the Masjumi 
and the Indonesian Socialist Party), which had expressed the strongest opposition to his proposal for a 
reorganization of the Indonesia political system. 
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The executive power during the period was also challenged by foreign policy issues, 
particularly the effort to get International recognition for Indonesia. On the one hand, the 
president had to deal with the politics of nationalization of company affairs within the 
Indonesia territory by expelling foreign influence in domestic businesses.539 On the other hand, 
the presidential diplomatic power was challenged by the war with the West Irian territory.540 
In general, according to the constitutional practices during this period, the power and 
the role of the President were merely within the scopes of nominal power rather than real 
power. However, there were many influences on state affairs by the President on the basis that 
the President was not only the symbol of the state but also a revolutionary leader. The situation 
sometimes provoked clashes between the President and the Cabinet.541 In the period ofthe 
Wilopo cabinet, the President indicated his reluctance to work with the cabinet.542 
During the period, the situation was even more complicated since the Konstituante (the 
Constituent Assembly), established by the first election on 1955 had unsuccessfully drafted 
apermanent Constitution for Indonesia. This situation provoked Soekarno to formally propose 
the re‐instatement of the first Constitution of 1945. Since the presidential proposal to re‐adopt 
the Constitution was never agreed by the Konstituante, this situation prompted President 
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Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p.191:“President Soekarno had decided to announce that Indonesia follow a new course 
of action in trying to recover the territory, putting direct pressure on the Dutch by a campaign against Dutch 
business interests in Indonesia. As a consequence, the major Dutch businesses were taken over in most instances 
by their employees, although all eventually came under government or military control. Dutch nationals were 
subjected to public harassment, and most were finally expelled from Indonesia. Mass rallies and parades were held 
in cities, towns, and villages across Indonesia, demanding that the Dutch get out of the territory.” 
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Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 318:“At the same time the cabinets did not engage in dramatic foreign policy activities 
or attempt to evoke excited responses at home to their roles in the international arena. In handling the Irian 
question, they did their best, within the limits of their relationship to President Soekarno, to discourage agitational 
support of the claim.” 
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 See more on Herbert Feith, Op. Cit.,  p. 217. 
542Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 244 – 245, “The President had certain personal reasons to feel antagonistic toward the 
Wilopo cabinet. The cabinet contained a number of the men with whom he had come into conflict in the period of 
the Natsir cabinet, and it indicated as soon as it had taken office that it would insist, as the Natsir cabinet had (and 
the Sukiman cabinet had not ), on a sharp limitation of the President's prerogatives. The matter came to the fore at 
the very beginning of the Wilopo cabinet's period of office when the cabinet obliged the President to cancel 
arrangements made by him and the ex‐Foreign Minister, Subardjo, for a presidential visit to Italy.” 
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Soekarno to issue the unilateral presidential decree on the re‐instatement of the first 
Constitution of the UUD 1945.543 
Constitutionally, according to Article 134 of the temporary Constitution of UUDS 1950, 
the Konstituante together with the President would promptly set the Constitution. The 
Constitution was expected to replace the temporary Constitution of UUDS 1950. First after the 
1955 general election for the Konstituante’s members, on 10 November 1956, President 
Soekarno opened the first session of Konstitutante in Bandung. Since then, there were serious 
debates in drafting the state principles within the Konstituante. This situation led to a deadlock. 
On 19 February 1959, the Cabinet Djuanda took the position to decide the government 
mandate to re‐instate the Constitution of UUD 1945. The mandate was stated in the 
Government Decree of 19 February 1959 with the argument that the debate within the 
Konstituante had a significant influence on the people and had potentially created conflict 
caused by the deadlock. On behalf of the government (the administration), President Soekarno 
delivered the president and government’s recommendation to re‐instate the Constitution of 
UUD 1945 on 22 April 1959. There were three points made by the President: 1. the re‐
instatement of the Constitution of UUD 1945; 2. the re‐instatement of the Constitution 
procedure; 3. the consolidation of the functional faction into the DPR. It was stated by the 
President that the Constitution of UUD 1945 was a democratic Constitution and reflected the 
identity of the nation. At this point, President Soekarno also introduced guided democracy, 
which was determined as a suitable democracy that should be adopted by Indonesia. It was 
based on the key principle of deliberation and wisdom. The President accordingly would 
appoint capable person as his assistants. However, the President and his assistants were 
responsible to the MPR. The presidential and government recommendation did not work at all 
since there were still debates within the Konstituante in the deal to re‐instate the Constitution 
of UUD 1945. This deadlock had provoked President Soekarno to issue a presidential decree to 
impose the re‐instatement of the Constitution of the UUD 1945. The grounds of the Presidential 
Decree were mostly because the Konstituante did not respond to the Presidential and 
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government mandate to re‐instate the Constitution of UUD 1945; On the other hand, the 
Konstituante had been considered to fail in performing their duty to set the new Constitution. 
To this extent, the President assumed that such constitutional problems would significantly 
impact the state emergency. On the main basis of protecting of the state and the people, 
President Soekarno delivered the Presidential Decree to re‐instate the Constitution of UUD 
1945, dismiss the Konstituante, and thus, dismiss the temporary Constitution of the UUDS 
1950. Furthermore, the President also set the establishment of the temporary MPR and the 
temporary DPA.  
Table 3.3 Executive power under the UUDS 1950 Constitution 
Executive 
powers 
Scopes Check and 
balance 
 
 
 
Foreign affairs 
power 
 
 
make and ratify treaty and other agreements between other states (Article 
120 section 1) 
 * 
decide the treaties and other agreements to be concluded (Article 120 
section 2) 
 * 
enter into the international organization (Article 121) 
 
 ** 
undertake any measures in order to peacefully resolve the conflict 
between other states (Article 122)  
 ** 
make an option whether or not asking or accepting the International Court 
or International arbitration (Article 122) 
 ** 
appoint the representative of the Republic of Indonesia for other states 
and accepts other states representative for the Republic of Indonesia 
(Article 123) 
 * 
Emergency 
power 
 
declare that the Republic of Indonesia or part of the state territory is 
under emergency (Article 129 section 1) 
 * 
Administrative 
and 
appointment 
power 
The power to make government policies through the presidential decision 
(Article 85) 
 ** 
The power to appoint the chief, vice chief, and members of Supreme Court 
(Article 79) 
 * 
The power to manage the state income by issuing the bilyet and promise 
(Article 118 section 2) 
 ** 
The power to determine the salary and other incomes for state officials 
and members of the state institution (Article 119 section 1) 
 ** 
The power to give honorable sign (Article 87)- according to the laws  * 
The power to establish the ministerial (Article 51)  * 
Appoints and dismisses the army officers (Article 127 section 3)  * 
The power of the general affairs of the financial (Article 111 section 1)  ** 
Law-making 
power 
 
 
The power to propose the state budget legislation (Article 116)  ** 
The power to propose the bill of legislation  ** 
The legislative making power (Article 140) Joint approval with 
the DPR 
** 
The power to set emergency law (Article 96)  ** 
The power to make government rules (Article 98)   ** 
The power to propose the tax and custom legislation (Article 117)  ** 
Pardoning 
power 
The power of pardoning, give amnesty, abolition (Article 107) by the advice of 
supreme court 
 
* 
Military power 
 
 
The power against the state defense affairs (Article 126 section 1)- 
government 
 ** 
Declare the war (Article 128)  with the DPR 
approval 
* 
The power of commander in chief in time of war (Article 127 section 2)  * 
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Highest commander of army in general situation (Article 127 section 1) 
 
 * 
Other powers Dissolve the DPR (Article 84) 
 
 * 
Declare the dissolution and order to set the new DPR’s election within 30 
days (Article 84) 
 
 * 
*the President 
**the government  
 
3.5. The Indonesian Constitution under the UUD 1945 (the period of reinstatement 
of the UUD 1945 after the temporary Constitution of 1950)   
  
e. Executive power under the UUD 1945: Soekarno administration (1959 – 1968) 
Textually, the executive power under the Constitution of UUD 1945 that was re‐instated 
by President Soekarno with the Presidential decree 1959 was the same as the executive powers 
in the Constitution of UUD 1945 that was enacted after the unilateral independence 
proclamation. However, during Soekarno’s administration, the executive powers had been 
exercised unlawfully. Many constitutional violations were made by President Soekarno. The 
President used the power to appoint the Chairman of the MPRS, the Chairman of the DPRGR, 
the Vice Chairman of the DPA and the Chairman of the Council of National drafting committee 
as the main first vice minister.544 On the other hand, the Vice chairman of MPRS and the vice 
chairman of DPRGR were appointed as ministers.545 Another constitutional violation could be 
seen in the Decree of MPRS III/1963 concerning the presidential appointment for long‐life 
tenure. These constitutional violations provoked a constitutional crisis in terms of the 
presidential leadership.  
In practice, it was observed that President Soekarno was the sole interpreter of the 
revolution; he used his power to deal with the revolution era.546 The President had a strong 
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 The MPRS was the temporary MPR (the People Representative Assembly), the DPRGR was established by the 
President since the DPR (as a result of the first election 1955) did not approve the government’s proposal on state 
budget. To this extent, the President established a new DPR which was named as DPRGR (the mutual aid of Council 
of people representative). All the members of the DPRGR were appointed by the President. The President also set 
all the rules with regard to the DPRGR.  
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Ismail Suni, Op. Cit., p. 204‐205. 
546
L.C. Green, Op. Cit., p. 71 “Soekarno calls for an abandonment of the rule of law at home when it appears that 
legal principles may hinder the personal ambitions of one who regards himself as the personification of a 
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influence on the Army.547 In this period, the presidential power also dealt with the rebellion 
movement. In 1962, the President used his emergency power to declare the end of martial law 
as the rebel leader of DI/TII, Kartasuwirjo had been captured and the end of the West Irian 
campaign had deprived the army of their intention to maintain martial law.548 
Another constitutional crisis was also caused by political tension especially after the 
Indonesian Communist Party insurgency. In this period, Indonesia suffered from political and 
economic devastation, but President Soekarno ignored the political and economic crisis but was 
concernedby the conflict between Indonesia‐Malaysia. As the tension was getting worse, the 
people demanded that President Soekarno overcome the conflicts and the crises. However, 
because of the political tension, the President was in a difficult position to determine the 
solutions. In general, Herbert Feith stated that during this period, the presidential power was 
dominantly agitational politics and characterized to be more progressive.549 Still according to 
Soekarno’s concept of guided democracy, a democracy with leadership, President Soekarno 
revived the idea of the establishment of a new National Planning Board.550 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
revolution, and therefore of his people. It was also supported by the announcement from the Chairman of the 
Indonesian Supreme Court that the law may be broken if the interest of the revolution demanded.” 
547
Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., President Soekarno, the Army and the Communists: the Triangle Changes Shape, Asian 
Survey, Vol. 4, No. 8 (August, 1964), University of California, pp. 969 – 980, Accessed on 10/11/2012, p. 969: “On 
June 23, 1962, Major‐General Achmad Yani replaced General A. H. Nasution as Chief of Staff of the army, with 
Nasution assuming the new position of Chief of Staff of the armed services, as well as remaining Deputy First 
Minister for Defense and National Security. This represented a major increase in President Soekarno's influence 
within the army”. 
548
Id. at p. 971. 
549
Id. at p. 978: “the President's power has always rested in large part on agitational skills and his moves to the left 
in the last two years can be explained partly as a requirement for the maintenance of agitational politics: forced to 
choose between economic stabilization and an ongoing struggle against neocolonialist Malaysia, he chose the 
latter, alienated the West and so had to align himself with the Communists. It may well be that Soekarno's actions 
in the last two years have been as much role‐determining as role‐determined, that he has been secure enough in 
his position in this recent period to be able to fashion policies partly on the basis of his ideas and attitudes about 
the future. It is often said that the President is deeply concerned with the question of how history will regard him. 
He certainly has considerable admiration for Communist regimes. And he is a man with a progressive and 
profoundly historicist view of history, consequently, a man who is likely to be unhappy about the possibility of 
being succeeded by any regime which he would see as reactionary.” 
550
Justus M. van der Kroef, “Guided Democracy in Indonesia”, Far Eastern Survey Vol. 26 No. 8 (August 1957), pp. 
113 – 124, Institute of Pasific Relations, accessed 02/11/2012, p. 115, “At that time the President also revived an 
earlier idea: the establishment of a new National Planning Board, to supersede the present National Planning 
Bureau, which has no "over all planning function."  
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In general practice, the executive powers used by President Soekarno also had to deal 
with the lack of international awareness specifically on the Indonesian position against the cold 
war. 551 On a domestic level, crisis still came from the issue of the Indonesian territory in 
particular Irian Jaya.552 In other International issues, President Soekarno used the power to 
make a foreign affairs policy in confronting the Federation of Malaysia.553 He continued to set a 
diplomatic foreign policy against Malaysia and proclaimed the Indonesian position against the 
establishment of the Federation of Malaysia.554 The confrontation provoked Soekarno to use 
his power to show the commitment of anti‐colonialism and anti‐communism to the 
International community.555 However, it changed as President Soekarno had his new doctrine 
about Indonesia’s position in the world.556 In the other issues of international relations, still 
relevant to the Malaysian issue, President Soekarno used his power to withdraw from the UN in 
1964.557 President Soekarno even issued foreign policy to break off the link with some 
International organizations. 558  Soekarno also employed his executive power to express 
                                                           
551
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 192:“Under Sukarno, there seemed to Washington to be a real likelihood thatIndonesia 
would throw in its lot with the communists, especiallyand most dangerouslywith China, with potentially 
disastrousconsequences for American strategy in Asia. Sukarno thus had to bediverted from the communists, to be 
shown that he had more to gainfrom friendly relations with Washington than with Beijing.” 
552
Id. at p. 193, ..”with his new approach to the Irian Jaya issue, Soekarno had given the people the sense that they 
were participating in a great crusade against colonialism; a crusade not just national but also international in its 
reach. The campaign was also important in cementing the unity of the Indonesian nation, so recently under 
challenge in Sumatera and Sulawesi. Virtually no identifiable group in the community opposed it: communists, 
Muslims, military leaders and politicians of all persuasions participated in the struggle. The contrast with the 
divisive politics of the parliamentary democracy period was striking.” 
553
Id. at p. 193‐194. 
554
Id.,“in January 1963, Foreign Minister Subandrio announced Indonesia’s opposition to the plan, proclaiming: 
“The President has decided that henceforth we shall pursue a policy of confrontation against Malaya . . . we have 
always been pursuing a confrontation policy against colonialism and imperialism in all its manifestations. It is 
unfortunate that Malaya, too, has lent itself to become tools of colonialism and imperialism. That is why we are 
compelled to adopt a policy of confrontation.” 
555
 L.C.Green, Op. Cit., p. 77. 
556
Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 974. 
557
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 195, “At the end of 1964, Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the United Nations in 
protest at Malaysia’s election to a seat onthe Security Council. By the time the first major blow fell against the 
Sukarno regime in 1965, despite having been in progress for two yearsthe ‘crush Malaysia’ campaign was to all 
intents and purposes stymied”. 
558
M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since c.1200, 3
rd
 Edition, Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. 338, In 
August 1965 Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from remaining links with the capitalist world (International Monetary 
Fund, Interpol, World Bank). When Lee Kuan Yew tearfully announced Singapore’s separation from Malaysia on 9 
August, Sukarno viewed this as confirmation of the righteousness of confrontation. But Singapore’s separation also 
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Indonesia’s position on issues such as colonialism and imperialism and other issues related 
toAmerican’s foreign policy and its interest to regional Asia.559 It implied that the presidential 
foreign affairs powers were used to indirectly secure the position of the President.560 On the 
treaty making power, the presidential power was exercised in accordance with the domestic 
policy on “friendly Chinese policy” that the President Soekarno had for ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia.561 The regime of Soekarno administration came to an end as not only the conflict 
between the two political forces of army and Communist Party (PKI: Partai Komunis Indonesia) 
had risen but also from the guided democracy which he campaigned for and further resulted in 
the banning  of the Communist Party in Indonesia.562 The conflict was marked by the 30 
September movement of such a scenario of a coup d’etat and rendered what was called the 
transitional authority from the Soekarno administration to the Soeharto era.563 
f. Executive power under UUD 1945: Soeharto administration (1968 – 1998) 
In 1968, the transitional period of regime from the Soekarno to Soeharto administration 
was virtually complete by a mandate in which president Soekarno gave temporary authority to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
removed most of the basis for the army leaders’ fears of Malaysia and increased their inclination to end 
confrontation. 
559
Timothy P. Maga, “The New Frontier vs Guided Democracy: JFK, Sukarno, and Indonesia, 1961 – 1963”, 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, Leadership and Crisis Management(WINTER 1990), pp. 91‐102, 
Published by: Wiley‐Blackwell on behalf of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress, 
Accessed: 02/11/2012, p. 100.  
560
Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 979, “President Soekarno is probably restrained from making moves in the direction of 
Cuba‐like dependence on the Communist countries by fear that such moves could alarm powerful elements in the 
Indonesian army and add to their willingness to support some sort of coup against him”. 
561
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 196: “Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population experienced decidedly mixed fortunes 
during the guided democracy period. Sukarno himself was not anti‐Chinese. Indeed, in a country where anti‐
Chinese outbursts from national leaders were distressingly commonplace, he stands out as having supported full 
membership of the Indonesian national community for citizens of ethnic Chinese descent. And the increasingly 
close relations between Indonesia and China, especially in the 1960s, meant that, at least at the public political 
level, being of ethnic Chinese descent was not a handicap. A Dual Nationality Treaty had been negotiated between 
China and Indonesia in 1955, the object of which was to resolve once and for all the question of the nationality of 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.” 
562Colin Brown: Op. Cit., p. 198, “the end for the Soekarno regime came in the mid‐1960s, largely as a result of the 
rising conflict between the two political forces which apart from Soekarno himself had gained most from guided 
democracy: the communists and the military. 
563
Id, Other troops seized control of the centre of Jakarta and broadcast a statement in the name of what they 
termed the ‘30th September Movement’, saying that they had acted to protect the President from a coup d’état 
being planned by right‐wing generals in the pay of the CIA. 
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Soeharto.564 The new administration led by Soeharto was called the “New Order” era. Under 
the Constitution of UUD 1945, the Soeharto administration campaigned to implement the 
Constitution genuinely and consequently. The focus of the executive powers was addressed to 
set the achievement of political and economic stability, and further the economic development 
by its major broad policy objectives.565 In many issues, President Soeharto used the executive 
power under the Constitution as a tool to create his own political system and secured his 
political office. Even so, Soeharto had the same belief as Soekarno that Indonesia should have 
its own political system.566 With regard to the foreign affairs power, Soeharto used his power 
through his foreign policy which was rather different from that of Soekarno’s.567 Unlike 
Soekarno’s foreign affairs power that had already been used to raise international recognition 
of Indonesia’s position as a state; the Soeharto’s foreign affairs power aimed at promoting 
Indonesia in the regional forum. Not only regionally, Soeharto also expanded his foreign policy 
byestablishing a good diplomatic relationship with all states.568 He had also a significant policy 
                                                           
564
 It was called “SUPERSEMAR” of Surat Perintah 11 Maret, the mandate from President Soekarno to Soeharto to 
exercise temporary authority in Soekarno’s name on 11 March 1966. Further on, Soeharto became the President 
replaced Soekarno in 1967. 
565Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 200. 
566
Id. at p. 204, “While in political terms Suharto may have differed from Sukarno on many issues, one thing they 
shared was the belief that western political systems would not work in Indonesia. Suharto set out to create hisown 
political system, which maintained a fine balance between allowing a degree of public debate on political issues 
and at the same time ensuring that his government’s control over political power was not threatened.” 
567
Id. at p. 208, Sukarno’s foreign policy had been activist and global in itsscope and, in the later years of guided 
democracy, increasingly aligned with China. Sukarno saw himself as a world figure, the leader of Southeast 
Asia.Suharto’s foreign policy was much less visible, and regionally rather than globally directed. Suharto 
government ended confrontation with Malaysia. It also froze diplomatic relations with China, alleging that Beijing 
had supported the PKI’s coup attempt. Relations with China were not normalized until August 1990. In 1967 
Indonesia joined with Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines to form the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam subsquently joined the group.There is little doubt 
that most Indonesian politicians saw their country as the natural leader of ASEAN; nonetheless, the government 
went out of its way on most issues to avoid the appearance of dominating the association. 
568M. C. Ricklefs, Op. Cit., p. 391: In 1989 he made a state visit to the USSR, already teetering on the brink of 
collapse. What he saw presumably enhanced his determination to avoid similar events in Indonesia. He also 
normalized Indonesia’s relations with China that year. He and Chinese Premier Li Peng exchanged visits in 1990 
and Jakarta received the first Palestinian ambassador to Jakarta, all steps enhancing Indonesia’s standing in the 
Non‐Aligned Movement. In September 1991 Indonesia was elected to the Movement’s presidency and the 
following year its summit meeting was held in Jakarta. 
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to stopforeign financial aid from other states.569 During Soeharto’s administration, Soeharto 
intervened in the independence of the Central Bank by directly steering its policy.570 Later on, 
the policy induced the scandal (known as “BLBI571 scandal”).572 On other fields of the political 
system, President Soeharto used his power to intervene in political parties by simplifying the 
political parties and merging the Islamic political parties into one party of PPP.573 Since then, 
there have only been three political parties in Indonesia, the PPP, Golkar, and PDI. This was 
done as an effort to consequently confirm the commitment of non‐sectarianism and to 
genuinely implement “Pancasila”, as the basic of the state. Furthermore, as he had a military 
background in his whole career, Soeharto was fully supported by the military (army police 
namely ABRI/ Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia/Republic Indonesia Armed forces).574 To 
                                                           
569 Id. at p. 396, In early 1992 the Dutch government, which chaired the IGGIconsortium, made it clear that it 
thought aid to Indonesia should be linked toan improved human rights performance. Soeharto’s response 
reflected hisestimation of his own and his nation’s standing. He thereby effectively abolished the group that had 
channeled aid to Jakarta for 25 years.  
570
 Kevin O’Rourke, Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post Soeharto Indonesia, Allen&Unwin, 2002, p. 49, “The 
minister of finance, Mar’ie Muhammad visited parliament to fulfill a summons for testimony. Parliament had 
always been a rubber‐stamp body, but occasionally it would exert its constitutional privilege to question policy‐
makers—particularly when those policy‐makers had fallen out of favor with Cendana. On this occasion Muhammad 
was questioned about rumors that BI had been quietly lending out large sums over the past two months—in 
contravention of its own tight monetary policy. In particular, parliamentarians questioned whether it was true, as 
they had ‘heard’, that BI had disbursed some Rp8 trillion (or around $2.4 billion at prevailing exchange rates) to 
five large banks. Muhammad refused to answer. In a cabinet meeting on 3 September1997, Soeharto instructed 
the minister of finance Mar’ie Muhammad and the chief of bank central, Djiwandono to lend central bank funds to 
such cash‐strapped banks, lest they default on their depositors. 
571
 The BLBI was a scheme from the Indonesia Bank to give liquidity aid to 48 banks in Indonesia as a result of 
banks in Indonesia suffered from liquidity problems in 1998. The Scheme was given in accordance to the 
Indonesia‐IMF agreement to overcome the economic crisis. However, the scheme was indicated as diverted and 
blown up as a scandal. The scandal had indicated the involvement of some state officers which led to the 
corruption. 
572
Id. at p. 60, “the instructions that Soeharto issued to BI on 27 Decemberwere sent by letter through State 
Secretary Moerdiono. The letter wasmarked confidential, but a parliamentary investigation later discoveredthat 
copies were leaked to certain bankers.” 
573
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 202, “In 1973, Suharto took explicit action against the four Muslim political parties then 
still in existence, including the long‐standing Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia and the Nahdatul Ulama. These four 
parties were required to amalgamate in the United Development Party, the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), 
which was, however, denied the right to use Islamic symbols or even to call itself an Islamicparty: its philosophical 
base was to be the Pancasila with its non‐sectarian commitment to belief in one supreme god.” 
574
M.C. Ricklefs, Op. Cit., p. 372, The central pillar of the Soeharto regime was the military, known in Indonesia as 
ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia). ABRI consisted of four 
services: army, navy, airforce and police. Soeharto brought to the Presidency an understanding of military 
personnel and politics which he employed throughout his time.  
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this extent, the simplification of the political party was also mainly to undermine potential non‐
military opponents and control Golkar as a dominant political party which supported him.575 
Moreover, his intervention to one of Golkar’s party rivalswhom he assumed to be serious 
political challenges for his position was implicated through violence. An attack had been 
launched on one of political parties headquarter (the PDI’s) by the Soeharto regime.576 
During the administration, there were many cases of communal and religious conflicts. 
To overcome conflicts, Soeharto used his military power by mobilizing military forces. The 
executive powers during Soeharto’s administration also faced challenges on particular issues of 
state territory and separatism. The territorial issues came from the East Timor integration. In 
1975, under Soeharto’s administration, there was a military operation called “Seroja 
operation”. The military operation invaded East Timor in order to integrate East Timor under 
Indonesia rule. Eventually, in 1976 the loss of Fretellin as the political party that ruled in East 
Timor and support from the International community ended with the East Timor integration. 
During the invasion, it was believed that many human rights violations had occurred. Soeharto‘s 
administration was accused of responsibility for human rights violations during the Seroja 
military operation. Also, Soeharto used his power to deal with separatism in Aceh. Conflict 
against the issue of the Aceh Independence movement by GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) 
provoked Soeharto to mute the separatism movement. Soeharto proclaimed Aceh to be a 
Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer/DOM), proclaimed that part of the state (the 
province of Aceh) was under a state emergency, enforced the emergency/special law and gave 
a broad mandate to the Army.577 In economic development, Soeharto used the constitutional 
economic provision of Article 33 UUD 1945 to stir the economic sectors such as investment, 
production, taxes, mining, commercial agriculture, and other sectors.578 In many economic 
sectors, Soeharto used his powers widely to not only boost the Indonesia economy but also 
                                                           
575
Id. at p. 397: “Soeharto sought tighter control of Golkar and to undermine potential non‐military opponents.” 
576
Kevin O’Rourke, Op. Cit., p. 1, “Raid PDI Headquarters” That simple command, issued by President Soeharto to 
his security forces in July 1996, triggered the extraordinary political power struggle that would consume Indonesia 
for years to come.” 
577
Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 218. 
578
 Article 33 of the UUD 1945 had been interpreted that all sectors that ….was dominated by the government. 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
 
147 
 
abused his power to benefit his family and his cronies.579 In brief, the executive powers had 
been misused during the Soeharto administration. It had mostly led to some serious corruption 
cases in Indonesia. It weakened all the institutions under his administration. In practice, it was 
known that Soeharto had dominated all institutions. As the President, he controlled all state 
institutions and all state sectors.580 In January 1998, there was a great financial crisis followed 
by government collapse in Indonesia. Such a situation caused a constitutional crisis.581 Soeharto 
tried to maintain his position by creating a new Cabinet.582 
g. Executive power under the UUD 1945 (the Habibie administration) (1998 – 1999) 
The period of the Constitution of the UUD 1945 entered a new phase after the fall of the 
Soeharto administration. After the resignation of Soeharto, Vice President, Habibie, succeeded 
Soeharto as the Indonesian President. The executive power during the Habibie administration 
was still under the Constitution of UUD 1945 and was mainly used to support the reformation 
agenda in an interregnum. Unlike during the Soekarno administration and the Soeharto 
administration, during the Habibie administration, the executive powers were mainly used as a 
tool to appease the Indonesian people for a political change and new arrangements in all 
sectors.583 Habibie used his presidential pardoning power to grant amnesty and abolition for all 
                                                           
579Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 218‐222. 
580
Id. at p. 224: The primary reason for this was that the government, and specificallythe President, had a major 
hand in deciding who would sit in Parliament, both through the control of the electoral process and through the 
President’s right to nominate half the members of the Upper House and,with the military, 20 per cent of the 
members of the Lower House. The press was no independent watchdog over government either.” 
581
M.C., Ricklefs, Op. Cit., p. 405, “In January 1998 Soeharto announced an absurd budget which depended upon 
the plummeting Rupiah having the value it had six months before. He received phone calls from Bill Clinton in 
Washington, Helmut Kohl in Bonn and Hashimoto Ryutaro in Tokyo, and a visit from Singapore’s Goh Chok Tong, all 
urging him to accept IMF reform proposals. On 15 January he seemed to do so, but in fact more conflict followed, 
with the IMF eventually threatening to withhold loans unless Soeharto adopted realistic reforms.” 
582
Id. at p. 407, “He then announced that he would oversee a period of reform and step down after fresh elections 
were held. But no proposal which kept him asPresident was credible either domestically or overseas. His attempt 
to createa reform cabinet collapsed on 20 May when 14 ministers with responsibilityfor economic and financial 
affairs refused to serve under him.” 
583Colin Brown, Op. Cit., p. 231, “In taking on the Presidency Habibie was confronted with a Herculean task: to keep 
one step ahead of the reformist movement which had led the charge against Suharto, his former boss and political 
sponsor, and which was now demanding radical changes in the way in which Indonesia was run. For a while, 
against all the odds, it seemed that he might just be able to pull it off.His first few months as President saw the 
implementation of a raft of important policy initiatives, including the freeing of political prisoners, the almost 
complete removal of political censorship of the press, the lifting of restrictions on the formation of political parties 
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political prisoners prosecuted during Soeharto’s administration.584 In all sectors, though Habibie 
was not really successful, Habibie used his presidential power to appease public demands to 
redress the state stability that was shattered by corruption, improve law enforcement, and 
reveal human rights violations during Soeharto’s administration. Habibie used his power to 
terminate the state of emergency in Aceh including the abolishment of the application of the 
military operation and the emergency law that had been applied during the 
Soehartoadministration.585 One of the remarkable issues during Habibie’s administration was 
the decision for a referendum to decide the East Timor independence or integration. However, 
there were also some human rights violation issues in which Habibie was strongly presumed to 
be a person who was responsible for the violations during the referendum in East Timor. This 
was because he was the president at that period, and constitutionally, he was the Commander 
in chief mobilizing the Indonesian military action with such terror, violence, and actions of the 
troops under the Indonesian military. On the basis that he was the Commander in chief, fingers 
were pointed that he knew all the actions addressed to undermine the referendum. With 
regard to the military relationship, Habibie fully relied on mutual dependence with the military 
forces.586 During Habibie’s administration also, the ABRI (as the military forces in Indonesia) was 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and trade unions and, the most important developments of all, planning for the holding of free general elections, 
which took place on 7 June 1999, and for a referendum on independence in East Timor, held on 30 August 1999.” 
584
 M.C. Ricklefs, Op. Cit., p. 414, ‘”Habibie began releasing political prisoners within weeks of becoming President, 
a vital step in the direction of both openness and reconciliation. Among them were regional separatists and elderly 
ex‐PKI figures held for over thirty years. Amnesties were granted to H. Mohammad Sanusi and others arrested 
after the Tanjung Priok incident of 1984, including (post‐humously) Hartono Dharsono.” 
585Steven Drakeley, Op. Cit., p. 171, Habibie ended the Military Operations Area (DOM) in Aceh and ordered the 
withdrawal of combat units, signaling his intention to pursue dialogue and reform in order to redress Acehnese 
grievances. But the most he was prepared to offer was autonomy within the parameters of his proposed national 
decentralization measures. 
586
 Marcus Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post‐Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and 
Institutional Resistance, the East‐West Center, Washington, 2006, p. 10‐11, “The new president relied on support 
from the armed forces to stabilize his rule, fend off societal challenges to his legitimacy, and prevent individual 
officers from undermining the reformist policies of his administration. The armed forces, on the other hand, 
needed the good will of the president, given his constitutional powers to appoint senior military leaders, distribute 
resources, and set the political agenda.This mutual dependence produced important policy compromises as far as 
military reform was concerned. Most important, the military was granted the right to formulate its own reform 
agenda. In return, however, the armed forces had to pledge their support for Habibie and refrain from interfering 
with the process of political reform. This trade‐off was reflected in a number of political events throughout the 
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separated from the Police.Under the appointment power, Habibie established his cabinet and 
tried to dismiss Soeharto’s cronies. 587 
h. Abdulrahman Wahid administration (1999 – 2001) 
After one year of his administration, Habibie’s administration conducted a presidential 
election. The result of the election was Abdulrahman Wahid administration with his vice 
president, Megawati. Still under the Constitution of UUD 1945, Wahid used his presidential 
power to fulfill his promise of establishing ministries on behalf of political pluralism and political 
ally. With regard to the foreign affairs power, Wahid had a controversial vision to use his power 
to make commercial relations with Israel, which raised criticism from many Indonesian Islamic 
activists.588 On the issue of Aceh, Wahid used his power to open peace negotiations with the 
Aceh Independence movement (GAM). However, the situation in Aceh was even worse since 
the GAM proclaimed its independence on 4 December 2000 on the 24th GAM’s anniversary. 
Wahid persuaded Aceh about the referendum; however, the referendum was defined 
differently from Habibie’s referendum on East Timor. Wahid proposed a referendum for Aceh 
to use the Shariah Islam (Islamic law) applied in Aceh and gavespecial autonomy to the 
administration of Aceh as a special province under Indonesia. The initiative for a peaceful 
dialogue with GAM was taken by Wahid in Geneva on 12 May 2000. The dialogue had 
generated an agreement that aimed to arrange a temporary halt to hostilities to allow the two 
parties some breathing space in which to seek some more permanent resolution of their 
dispute. Further on, Wahid allowed the enforcement of Shariah Islam in Aceh. Other crucial 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
second half of 1998. First, Habibie demanded in July 1998 that Wiranto assist in the election of his candidate for 
the chairmanship of Golkar, the former government party of the New Order.”  
587
Michael Malley, “the 7
th
 Development Cabinet: Loyal to a Fault?, Indonesia”, No. 65 (April, 1998), pp. 155 – 178, 
Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University, accessed: 02/11/2012, p.177, B. J. Habibie announced 
the formation of the Development and Reform Cabinet on May 22, just a day after he acceded to the presidency. 
The composition of the new cabinet reflects Habibie's own interests less than the exigencies of Soeharto's rapid 
exit. Major changes to the cabinet include: the replacement of ministers most closely linked to Suharto, including 
Bob Hasan, Tutut, Fuad Bawazier, and Subiakto Tjakwerdaya; the first appointment of non‐Golkar political party 
members since the 1970s; removal of the central bank governor from the cabinet to enhance Bank Indonesia's 
independence; and the recreation of the two state minister portfolios Soeharto had entrusted to coordinating 
ministers. Of the thirty‐seven officials with cabinet rank, sixteen were not members of Soeharto's last cabinet. 
Despite these changes, the views of cabinet ministers matter less to Indonesian politics now than under Soeharto, 
since the momentum for political changes comes almost entirely from outside the government. 
588
 Muhaimin Iskandar, Gus Dur yang Saya Kenal: Catatan Transisi Demokrasi Kita, LKis, Yogyakarta, 2004, p. 14‐18 
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issues during Wahid’s administration were the separatism movement in Irian Jaya (the OPM) 
and some multi ethnic‐religious conflicts in Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan. For these 
reasons, during his administration, Wahid had enforced a state of emergency in some of the 
affected provinces. As one of the reform agenda was eradicating corruption, Wahid had 
dedicated his executive power to make efforts on the corruption eradication progress.589 
Ironically, in July, 23 2001, alleged corruption in the financial scandal of the Sultan 
Brunei Darussalam funds for Aceh, and his weaknesses in leading his cabinet, the MPR brought 
him down. Wahid refused to fulfill his obligation to deliver his accountability speech before 
theMPR.590 Wahid resisted and issued a presidential decree to freeze the MPR.591 However, it 
had been ignored and the MPR came to the decision of Wahid’s impeachment.592 
During his administration, Wahid faced challenges from the DPR while performing his 
presidential power.593 Not only often troubled with his policy in which he was always 
confronted by the DPR, Wahid was also troubled by the army. It was because Wahid came as a 
civilian to lead the military.594 Wahid even used his power to try to reduce the military influence 
within his office by appointing a non‐military minister of defense (Matori Abdul Djalil) and tried 
                                                           
589
Kevin O’Rourke, Op. Cit., p. 363:“The president established various anti‐corruption commissions, sacked the 
Wiranto‐era police chief and appointed credible figures to head the state oil and power monopolies, but these 
were only piecemeal steps. Wahid never presented a coherent strategy for comprehensive legal system reform 
which was a requisite for a sustainable economic recovery.” 
590
 Id. at p. 407, “When the MPR convened on Monday morning to hear his speech of accountability, he failed to 
appear. Wahid’s absence simplified the MPR’s task. In the afternoon, the assembly convened to vote on a measure 
that would reject the undelivered accountability speech; revoke Wahid’s mandate; and install Vice‐President 
Megawati as president, effective at once.” 
591
 Steven Drakeley, The History of Indonesia, Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2005, p.159, “Ironically also in his 
last months and weeks, Wahid explored a number of desperate and undemocratic measures to cling to power such 
as suspending parliament and declaring a state of emergency with army support (which the army refused to give).” 
592
M.C. Ricklefs, Op. Cit., p. 421, “He attempted to suspend the nation’s parliamentary institutions by decree to 
prevent this outcome, but no one paid any attention. The MPRgathered in a special session, removed 
Abdurrahman and installed MegawatiSukarnoputri as the nation’s fifth President, to serve until the next 
generalelections scheduled for 2004”. 
593
Steven Drakeley, Op. Cit., p. 156, “Wahid could rely on only around 10 percent of the votes in parliament and so 
experienced great difficulty securing parliamentary approval of his program. These problems were not solely a 
natural consequence of the balance of power within DPR.” 
594
Id. at p. 157, “the biggest problem for Wahid was the army. It had begun the post‐Soeharto era internally 
divided and unsure how much reform of itself and of the Indonesian political system it should allow. It was also 
rattled by the abrupt exposure of its unpopularity and consequently had difficulty gauging just how far it needed to 
retreat. By the time Wahid became president, however, the army had regained much of its composure and 
coherence.” 
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to make a radical reform within the military institution.595 On other issues of economics, Wahid 
used his power to intervene in state enterprises.596 
3.6. Executive powers under 1st, 2nd and 3rd Amendment of the UUD 1945 
Executive power under the UUD 1945: Megawati administration (2001 – 2004) 
Weatherbee characterizes the Megawati administration as merely about policy drift and 
bureaucratic stasis and only focused on personal political power and status that was confirmed 
by greatness ceremony.597 One important agenda in the Megawati administration was the 
continuation of the fourth Constitutional amendment process. The exercise of the executive 
powers during Megawati’s administration was mostly for continuing and accelerating the 
reforms agenda and retaining her power and position as the Indonesian president. Megawati 
established her Cabinet mainly supposed to be different from the Cabinet during previous 
administrations and with more professional and competent characters.598 However, under her 
leadership, the cabinet was lacking coordination.599 On the other hand, Megawati was able to 
gain support from the military.600 
                                                           
595
Marcus Mietzner, Op. Cit., p. 20: “In the first months of his administration, Wahid “took a series of measures to 
exert civilian control over the military and rein in the Army”. Compensating key army officers like Wiranto, 
Yudhoyono, and Gumelar with cabinet posts, Wahid removed them from command positions and elegantly ended 
their military careers. He also appointed a widely respected civilian academic as minister of defense (the first since 
the early 1950s), disbanded amilitary‐coordinated security agency notorious for its political surveillance activities, 
and abolished the socio‐political offices at the Ministry of the Interior, a traditional military stronghold. Wahid, it 
appeared, was determined to initiate a radical process of military reform and enforce civilian supremacy over the 
political realm.The replacement of several army generals who had risen to prominence under Suharto’s rule aimed 
at the very break with the New Order military that Habibie had not achieved. Wahid had identified Wiranto as the 
major obstacle to further military reform and consequently moved to destroy the latter’s patronage network 
spread throughout the TNI hierarchy. In this context, he asked his personal confidant, Matori Abdul Djalil, the 
chairman of the NU‐affiliated PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), to come up with a list of 
military officers who could be expected to take the lead in revamping TNI’s institutional structures.” 
596
Id. at p. 27, Wahid intervened in legal proceedings and in the internal affairs of state enterprises, apparently in 
order to promote the political and economic interests of his major financial patrons. Moreover, he appeared 
increasingly erratic, threatening to arrest his political adversaries and producing headlines with controversial 
statements and policies on an almost daily basis. 
597
 Donald E. Weatherbee, “Indonesia: Political Drift and State Decay”, The Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring 
2002, Vol. IX, Issue 1, p. 25 
598
Steven Drakeley, Op. Cit., p. 161:“Weighted toward competent and respected reform‐oriented technocrats 
rather than "political" appointments, it seemed to be a cabinet that would not be held hostage to the special 
interest groups that had hindered progress during the Habibie and Wahid administrations.” 
599
Id. at p. 162:“Megawati lacked genuine commitment to reform seemed borne out by the experiences of the 
reform‐minded cabinet ministers as they battled to effect change without the political backing needed to 
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As for appointments, Megawati used her power to appoint a state attorney general 
whose main duties were to deal with corruption issues, though it raised cynical views.601 During 
her administration, Megawati continued the agenda to deal with the issue of Aceh. She 
facilitated the peace agreement; however, the agreement collapsed and later on, she used her 
emergency powers to declare an Aceh emergency and enforced the emergency law in the 
territory.602 
3.7. A democratic era of executive powers under the Amended Constitution: the 
President SBY administration (the 1st, 2004 – 2009 and the 2nd term office, 
2009 – 2014) 
 
President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) was the first President who was directly 
elected by the people and the first incumbent President who took office for two periods 
according to the limitation of the presidential term in the Amended Constitution. His first term 
in office was 2004 – 2009 and his second term was 2009 – 2014. During both terms in office, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
overcome resistance. Criticisms were also made of the lack of coordination among the various ministries and the 
lack of drive and leadership emanating from the top. While vice president, Megawati had remained glumly silent 
and inactive, keeping her political distance from Wahid lest she be tarnished by his failings. As president, she finally 
had the opportunity to pursue the noble political objectives she always intimated she had. It soon became 
apparent, however, that what many had long suspected was indeed the case. Her political silence and quietude 
had not been "Javanese" reticence hinting at strength and purity of purpose and unsuspected abilities. Instead, 
Megawati's "stillness" had merely obscured herweaknesses.” 
600
Id. at p. 163: “Unlike Wahid, she was not inclined to pursue the difficult issue of reforming the army and 
recasting the army‐civilian relationship. In exchange for unobtrusive political support, her administration was 
content to allow the army to run its "own" affairs. Megawati was (in practice) also in broad sympathy with the 
army's hard‐line attitude toward separatists. As expected, therefore, Megawati did not experience the lack of 
cooperation that Wahid had from the army in dealing with security problems." 
601
Id. at p. 161: “Megawati appointed M. A. Rachman, a senior career bureaucrat from within the department. 
More cynical political observers concluded that Megawati wanted somebody who could be relied upon to pursue 
only those prosecutions for corruption and humanrights abuses that met with her approval. According to this view, 
Rachman's appointment would mean that those members of the elite closely associated with PDI‐P, Megawati, 
and her businessman‐ politician husband, Taufik Kiemas, would be immune from prosecution. It would also mean 
that other powerful and wealthy individuals could avoid justice unless it suited Megawati's administration to 
prevent them from doing so.” 
602
Marcus Mietzner, Op. Cit., p. 39:“throughout 2002 and early 2003, Megawati allowed her coordinating minister 
for political and security affairs, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to seek a peaceful settlement of the Aceh problem 
through negotiations. The efforts resulted in a “cessation of hostilities agreement” in December 2002, but most 
civilian politicians and the armed forces were unwilling to endorse it. The military was widely suspected of 
sabotaging the peace deal by engineering attacks on monitors of the cease‐fire, and in May 2003 the agreement 
collapsed. Unanimously supported by Parliament and the vast majority of the public, Megawati declared martial 
law and launched one of the largest military campaigns in Indonesian history.” 
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President SBY employed executive powers under the Amended Constitution which will be 
discussed in the following chapter. However, in general, the character of the executive powers 
during the SBY’s administration was relatively weak. It was not only because of the vagueness 
and ambiguity of the Amended Constitution but also because President SBY’s administration 
was backed by weak coalition parties in the government. For example on the appointment of 
ministers, President SBY was restricted by the grand coalition parties which made it difficult for 
the President to exercise his prerogative right in nominating and appointing the ministers.603 
The situation was more like there were political compromises on the Cabinet appointment and 
the President had to accommodate the different interests of each party in the coalition 
government.604  While in general, President SBY was much more active inforeign affairs to raise 
the role of Indonesia internationally.605 However, during the second term of his administration, 
President SBY had to deal with controversies such as Bank Century and the institutional 
scandals concerning the KPK (anti‐corruption commission) and the National Police.606 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
603
See: Aly Yusuf, “Evaluasi Pemerintahan SBY – KALLA, Policy Assessment”, Juni 2005, The Indonesian Institute, 
www.theindonesianinstitute.com , p. 6 ‐10 : “There was great intervention from the political parties in the “grand 
coalition” supported SBY in the 2004 election.  In general the Cabinet formation during the SBY’s administration 
much more reflected the coalition of parties in the 2014 election rather than the meritocracy and profesionalists.”  
604
Hanta Yuda AR, “Evaluating the First Year of the SBY Administration’s Performance”, The Indonesian Update, 
Volume V, No. 7, the Indonesian Institute, 2010, p. 6: On one side, the loyalty is to the President, but on the other 
side, they remain loyal to the parties. In situation like this, the performance of the cabinet is being hostage by the 
interest of the coalition parties. The government is also being held hostage by transactional coalition through the 
Secretariat of the Joint Coalition Parties. 
605 See: Marcus Mietzner, SBY’s mixed legacy, www.indoupdate.com :President SBY put Indonesia back on the map 
of regional and global powers by leading ASEAN and admiting to the G20. 
606
See more about the scandal of the Bank Century and the institutional controversies between the KPK and the 
National Police on Christian von Luebke, the Politic of Reform: Political Scandals, Elite Resistance, and Presidential 
Leadership in Indonesia, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 1/2010, 79‐94, 
www.CurrentSoutheastAsianAffairs.org. 
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4. Under the UUD 1945 Constitution (after the Presidential Decree 1959), the system of government was a 
presidential system, the executive power was in the hands of the President. The characteristics of the 
executive powers can be not only viewed according to the constitutional text but also reflected from 
the state practices during each different presidential office. As originally the same as the first UUD 1945 
Constitution, the text gave strong and broad executive powers to the President. However, the practices 
shown many unconstitutional power’s performances. The President used the constitutional provision to 
abuse and to manipulate the powers.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. The executive powers in historical timeline of the Presidential office 
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context, the Constitution intended that the power of the executive was controlled by the MPR. 
Moreover, according to the Constitution, the MPR had the power to set the Guidelines of the 
State Policy (GBHN – Garis‐Garis Besar Haluan Negara). It had the meaning that the exercise of 
the executive powers by the President was indeed under the MPR’s authorization. In 
consequence, at the end of the Presidential office, the Constitution required the President to 
deliver an accountability speech about his responsibility for the exercise of executive powers 
during his office. However, in practice, what constituted the Constitutional text was not 
reflected in practice. It was not only because of many unconstitutional events but also because 
most of the state institutional organs including the MPR had not yet been established. In 
addition, the transitional provisions of the Constitution which was drafted just after Indonesia’s 
unilateral declaration of independence, vested the MPR’s, DPR’s, and Advisory body’s power to 
the President. It granted the President with multiple powers including extraordinary powers to 
enact the Constitution and GBHN/ the Guidelines of the State Policy, to make Laws and make 
any recommendations, and to establish a National Committee which would have the role to 
assist the President. Thus, during the period, the exercise of the executive powers reflected a 
hyperactive presidency since the President could act beyond the Constitution. The executive 
powers of the President in this period played out as a dominant power since the President had 
both executive and legislative powers. The first Indonesian President, Soekarno, appeared to 
have participated in all major governmental decisions, including the promulgation of any laws 
or decrees, which required signature from either the President or the Vice President and it was 
Soekarno’s position that the signature was no mere formality but an indication of a presidential 
approval which he had the right to withhold when he disagreed.607 During this period, 
Indonesia also experienced many independent and unilateral executive powers of the 
President. It was noted that more than 3 times, the President had unilaterally exercised 
emergency powers on the grounds of state emergency.608 In general, theexecutive powers were 
                                                           
607
 Id. at p. 43. 
608
Id. at p. 47, from 29 June 1946 to 3 October 1946 as consequence of the prime minister, Sutan Sjahrir’s 
abduction; from 27 June 1947 to 3 July 1947 as consequence of the crucial political situation because of the 
deadlock of the Indonesia‐ Netherlands negotiation; 15 September 1948 to 15 December 1948 as a consequence 
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mostly for revolutionary purposes. Since the Constitution was enacted right after Indonesia’s 
unilateral declaration of independence in 1945, the power of the executive was mainly used not 
only to support Indonesia externally as a state, to bring Indonesia in to the International 
community and raise international awareness, but also internally to restore security and 
maintain the sovereignty and the territory. For such purposes, the first Indonesian President 
had frequently used both his diplomacy powers and military powers. On other areas, the 
emergency powers were mainly used to deal with external threats, threats from other states, 
and to confront internal separatist movements that threatened state sovereignty, legitimate 
government, and territory.However, not more than 3 months after the enactment of the 
Constitution, the system of government practically shifted from a presidential system to a 
parliamentary system. Since then, the executive powers were shifted from the President to the 
Prime Minister, even though the position of the prime minister was not recognized by the 
Constitution. The introduction of a parliamentary system and a prime minister by 
practicesignificantly influenced the executive power. The executive powers were shifted from 
the President to the prime minister, while the President was mainly the head of state. To 
conclude, the Indonesian executive powers under the first Indonesian Constitution were really 
exercised beyond the Constitution. The executive powers grew as dominant and unilateral 
powers without checks and balances. Neither the Legislature nor the Courts could question and 
challenge the use of the executive powers during the period of 1945 ‐1949. 
During the period of 1949 to 1950, Indonesia struggled with the aftermath of the 
influence of the Dutch government. Though Indonesia’s independence had been recognized, 
Indonesia was still under Dutch colonization. One major political issue that Indonesia had to 
deal with was the Dutch idea on Indonesianfederalism. The Federal Constitution, the KRIS, was 
drafted with parliamentary characters. The Constitution determined that the executive power 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
of the power struggle in Madiun. It was stated that the first and the second of the unilateral presidential power 
was exercised by the Presidential Decree (Maklumat President) which stated that the President take over the full 
and unilateral power of the government temporary. The third unilateral presidential power had given to the 
President through Law that made by the Cabinet with the approval from the working committee of KNIP. It legally 
gave the President the full and unilateral power to take any measures and actions and to set the Laws that may 
deviate from the existing law. 
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was vested in the President and the Prime Minister. As the Constitution had parliamentary 
characteristics, the President only had nominal formal executive power while the real executive 
power remained with the Prime Minister. However, the use of executive powers was not really 
significantly remarkable since the Constitution was only enforced forless than 1 year. 
During the next period, Indonesia was under the Temporary Constitution of 1950. 
During the temporary Constitution, the system of the government was actually a parliamentary 
democracy. The Constitution not only recognized a Prime Minister but also reintroduced a Vice 
President. Thus, the Constitution implied that the government consisted of the President (as 
the head of the state), the Vice President (assisted the President), the Prime Minister and the 
Ministers. Under the Temporary Constitution 1950, the executive power still had to struggle 
with anti‐colonization and anti‐imperialism. It still, on the other hand, struggled with 
Indonesian foreign policy in order to deal with challenges of International awareness; in 
particular the Indonesian position as a State in International Communities. In this period, the 
role of the President was still dominant. The use of the executive powers in this period was 
mostly addressed to deal with political instability and economic crises. It had also dealt with the 
effort to restore security within the state and the struggle for the state territory. However, 
although the power of the President was not really strong since he only had nominal/ formal 
powers rather than substantive powers, the President still played a dominant executive figure 
among others. One of the remarkable uses of the power was the use of emergency power. The 
President issued a Presidential Decree to order some fundamental points including the 
dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly and the re‐enactment of the first 1945 Indonesian 
Constitution. 
In the following period, the executive branch was under the re‐instated first Indonesian 
Constitution (UUD 1945). During the period, in most regimes of administration (the Soekarno 
administration, the Soeharto administration, the Habibie administration, the Wahid 
administration, and the Megawati administration), the executive powers were used mostly to 
strengthen the political position of the President. Although the Constitution stipulated that the 
President was under the MPR and was responsible and accountable to it, the President was 
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extremely dominant with the position at the top of a steep hierarchy. In all particular areas the 
ministers as leaders in their area of planning, really depended on their relationship with the 
President. During Soeharto’s administration, the executive powers had been used with wide‐
discretion.  However, the use of the executive powers during the period of the re‐instatement 
of the First Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945) varied according to different presidential 
regimes. Although the Constitution required the President to be responsible and accountable to 
the MPR, the practice during each presidential office showed different experiences. On the 
appointment power, each President had his own discretion to establish and appoint the 
Cabinet. In terms of foreign affairs, each President had specific focuses.In general, the 
characteristicsof the executive powers under the UUD 1945 were strong. In some cases, the 
President was granted full power with limited checks and balances from other institutions. 
There was no significant control of the executive powers. The mechanism of checks and 
balances did not really work. Most of the Presidents within their offices enjoyed wide executive 
powers and employed them frequently. The executive powers were mostly used to secure 
theiroffice position. Lastly, the first and the second regimes of SBY’s administrations may be 
now counted in the historical path. However, since the regimes were under the Amended 
Constitution, the regimes may represent a perfect picture to describe the Indonesian executive 
powers under the Amended Constitution.  
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Chapter 4 
Indonesian Executive Power under the Amended Constitution 
This chapter analyses how the executive power in Indonesia is organised under the 
Amended Constitution. This chapter will build a perspective on how the executive power in 
Indonesia has been changed and evolved as the Constitution has been amended four times 
after the fall of the authoritarian regime and during the rise of the democratic system in 
Indonesia. 
4.1. The Amendment of the Constitution: a Spirit of Constraining the Presidential 
Power in a Constitutional Framework 
The Indonesian Constitution has been changed by a series of constitutional 
amendments. It has been amended four times (1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002) during the 
transition period of the state reformation and after the 1998 fall of the authoritarian regimes of 
the new period (orde baru). The period was marked by the end of the President Soeharto’s 
administration and the beginning ofa more democratic regime of the so‐called“reformasi” in 
1999. After the new government had been installed, the agenda of the amended constitution 
was proposed on the basis of the purpose to weaken the President and limit executive powers. 
The aims of the amendment process were mainly: 
 to curb and reduce Presidential power through the distribution of powers, vertically and horizontally 
 to change the power from centralization to decentralization  
 to increase the role of the DPR to oversee the executive power  
 to change the structure of the MPR from a unicameral system to a bicameral system 
 to restore sovereignty to the people through direct elections 
 to establish the separation of power with a check and balances mechanism within the three branches of 
government 
 to rearrange the judicial system and rule of law  
 to guarantee human rights, state obligations and limitation of power in order to prevent the abuse of 
power.
609 
 
                                                           
609
Mulyosudarmo, Soewoto, Pembaharuan Ketatanegaraan Melalui Perubahan Konstitusi, Asosiasi Pengajar HTN‐
HAM Jatim‐Intrans, Malang, 2004, pp. 40. 
 
EM
BA
RG
OE
D
This chapter is embargoed at request
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
 
301 
 
CHAPTER 5: THE INDONESIAN PRESIDENCY: THE IDEAS AND THE PROPOSAL 
1. Introduction: From President Soekarno to President Jokowi 
This chapter will in particular be concerned with the general conclusions on relevant 
issues in this dissertation and alternative solutions for a constitutional improvement. The 
previous chapters have explored the theory, history, development, and current specific issues 
of Indonesian executive power under different constitutional regimes. It shows in chapter 3 
that the Indonesian executive powers had been performed differently under different 
constitutional regimes. Under the First Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945), the Executive 
emerged as a revolutionary branch with strong anddominant powers to deal with revolutionary 
situations, the struggle for Indonesian independence, and International recognition. After 
experiencing the revolutionary executive powers, Indonesia moved on to the authoritarian 
regime. Under the authoritarian Soeharto regimes, the Indonesian Constitution was used as an 
authoritarian constitution, justifying the dominance of the executive branch and strengthening 
the authoritative executive powers of the President. The fall of the Soeharto administration in 
1998 brought a transitional government under the Habibie administration.883 During his one 
year administration, Habibie made a noteworthy decision which had significant impact on both 
foreign and domestic affairs by giving a referendum to Timor‐Timur.884 He performed a 
unilateral presidential decision on a referendum for Timor Timur which was urgently made after 
an informal consultation with some Ministers and was validated by the MPR’s decision. Another 
new Indonesian President, President Wahid, was elected in 1999 by the parliament (the MPR). 
During the Wahid administration, the process of the Indonesian Amended Constitution was 
started by a special commission of the MPR. President Wahid performed his executive power 
under the First Amendment of the Constitution as he wished and in his own way. Moving on to 
                                                           
883
On May 1998, the massive people and student’s demonstration all over Indonesia and specifically in Jakarta 
successfully brought down the Soeharto’s administration. The demonstration was mainly provoked by the 
monetery crisis in Indonesia. 
884
Merdeka.com, “Benarkah lepasnya Timor‐Timur Karena Kesalahan Habibie?”, Jakarta: June 13 2013, accessed 
online 19/10/2015 at: http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/benarkah‐lepasnya‐timor‐timur‐karena‐
kesalahan‐habibie.html : The Prime Minister John Howard urged Habibie to overcome the situation in Timor 
Timur by giving a referendum. 
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Megawati’s administration, the executive power was partly performed under the III Amended 
Constitution (2001 – 2002) and the IV Amended Constitution (2002 – 2004). During her 
administration, Megawati was more prudent in using the executive powers. After a series of 
constitutional Amendments, the Amended Constitution introduced a new model for the 
Indonesian presidential system. The system was designed to stifle the executive powers of the 
President. The Constitution was made to be more protective of the executive power. The 
checks and balances of the executive power of the President became even more stringent. In 
2004, theadministration turned to President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY) as a result of the 
first democratic direct presidential election according to the Amended Constitution. In the two 
terms of SBY’s office (the first office term was 2004‐2009, the second office term was 2009‐ 
2014), the executive powers have been exercised under the Amended Constitution with some 
vagueness and obscurity of concepts in most of its provisions as has been discussed in chapter 
4. Since 2014, in the new era of the Jokowi administration, the executive powers of the 
President are also performed under the Amended Constitution. However, it is performed in a 
very different style with more pressure from the parliament.  
2. Indonesian presidency and the executive powers: idea for the future executive 
powers in Indonesia 
This section will present ideas for redesigning the Constitution, in particular, to redesign 
the Articles which concern the executive powers. The main issues in this part will be more 
about the future of the Indonesian presidency and what and how the executive powers should 
be given in order to improve the presidency. First, it will be an elaboration of the executive 
powers that should be given to the President, how the President should be given the executive 
powers, and how the mechanism of counter‐balance from other branches should be regulated. 
Second, by combining local and international values, reflecting aspects of the 6 Constitutions 
(the US Constitution, the Philippines Constitution, German Constitution, South African 
Constitution, French Constitution, and Polish Constitution), and imitating some constitutional 
concepts, the proposal on how the executive power of The Indonesian President should be 
given will be drawn. 
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a. A choice of presidency: from a high level of presidential system to an original style 
of presidential system 
A presidential system is still the best choice for Indonesia. Firstly, because it would not 
be easy to switch to other types of government systemsand the process would very 
complicated if the system is changed. The mechanism of changing to a new system will take 
more time to set up and install a new framework, while it would not be easy to adapt to such a 
new mechanism. Secondly, each government system has its advantages and disadvantages. 
After almost two decades, Indonesia has gained benefits from experience of the presidential 
system and has successfully passed through transitional periods of presidential systems. The 
advantages and disadvantages of the system have helped the Indonesian government system 
to develop. However, the system needs improvement in order to encourage its effectiveness. 
According to the development, there are some models of presidential system: the US 
style presidential system, a high level of presidential system (hyper‐presidential system) and a 
low level presidential system (passive‐presidential system).885 It is considered that a hyper‐
presidential system is a presidential system which provides more/strict checks on the 
presidential power, while a passive‐presidential system is a presidential system which provides 
fewer/weak checks on the presidential power. Whilst, an original presidential system is a 
presidential system which is based on the original idea of the US Constitutional framers where 
the President was intended to be an independent branch, a strong institution, but had few 
substantial portions of executive powers, undefined executive power can only be exercised 
with and by the power of other branches.886 However, some states built a presidential system 
                                                           
885
Read: Susan Rose Ackerman, “Hyper‐Presidentialism: Separation of Powers without Checks and Balances in 
Argentina and the Philippines”, 2011, Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 4155, accessed online via 
www.digitlcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/4155 . Susan Rose‐Ackerman used the hyper‐presidential term to 
explain how the presidential system in the Philippines and Argentina is adopted. However, she used the terms 
differently. She determined the term hyper‐presidential as the system where the President has more unilateral 
power. 
886
Eric A Posner and Adrian Vemeule, “Tyrannophobia”, in: Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Constitutional Design, 
Cambridge Universiy Press, 2012, p. 325: “The veto power might be understood just to mean the right to veto 
unconstitutional legislation, not legislation that the president rejected on policy grounds, the commander in chief 
power could refer only to tactical control, not military strategy and foreign policy in general, the power to receive 
ambassadors could refer to a ceremonial role, not the power to recognize states and governments”. 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
 
304 
 
by vesting wide substantial powers and leaving the powers independently to the President. 
While other states proportionally allocated the executive powers to the President, some states 
are simply inspired by a parliamentary system, establishing a presidency by only giving the 
President formal power for the executive affairs. 
According to Indonesian history, Indonesia was established as a republic. The Founding fathers 
established a presidency within the Indonesian government system. Although the Constitution 
does not strictly say that the Indonesian system is a presidential system, in practice, the 
President is the head of state and head of government. Before the Amendment, the Indonesian 
parliament was the key of the government. It could impeach the president and appoint the 
president. 887  Under such a framework, practice became more confusing when conflicts 
happened between the President and the parliament since the Constitution did not provide 
appropriate solutions. At this point, it is important to strongly confirm that a presidential 
system is still a plausible system to be adopted in Indonesia.  
To redesign a more appropriate presidential system for Indonesia, firstly, it is important 
to reflect on US presidential history. Not only because the US Constitution is the world’s first 
written Constitution introducing the presidential system, but also because the US constitutional 
system has historically set the standard on how executive powers could be exercised under a 
presidency. Accordingly, the framers of the US Constitution intended to have an independent 
executive branch assigned to the US President with substantivelimitations of executive powers. 
The framers of the US Constitution gave the US Congress more powers than the powers that 
were attached to the US President. However, the US President was assigned with some powers 
that are relevant to his roles and functions. Although the US President is considered as the key 
point of the government, in exercising the power, the US President has to share his executive 
powers with either the Congress or the Senate.  
The original idea of a presidency has been developed and applied in various ways. In 
practice, the tendency to over limit and put too much limitation to the executive power may 
                                                           
887
 The first Constitution indicated that Indonesia was a parliamentary system. The Constitution assigned the MPR 
as the key where the President was dependent on it, being elected and responsible to the MPR. This is a little bit 
contradictory with what the framers actually wanted for a government system. 
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appear as a phenomenon of weak executive power. Such a tendency indicates hyper‐
presidential (less executive power, more checks and balances) since there are hyperactive 
checks and balances over the executive power and the President as the executive branch. In 
this situation, the executive power is over limited and over controlled. Too much intervention is 
given from other branches; the parliament and the courts. The President is given only formal 
and limited executive powers. The President is conceived to have weak executive power or 
even only artificial executive powers while the real powers are vested in other institutions. In 
such a framework, the executive branch may be the weakest branch among others. On the 
other hand, another presidential model shows the tendency of unilateral executive powers 
which are vested in an independent executive branch. Such a model may appear in a situation 
where passive checks and balances over the executive are exercised. The tendency may 
indicate a passive presidency where the executive power is given broadly with fewer checks 
and balances from other institutions. In a framework where the President is given dominant 
and unilateral executive power, most of the executive powers may be exercised according to 
the personal discretion of the President. The President does not need to seek any authorization 
before he executes the powers and most of the powers are not to be shared with other 
institutions. 
Under the Amended Constitution, the executive powers of Indonesian presidents are 
mostly weak. The Constitution has made an over‐limitation of the executive powers, while, in 
performing the power, the President is not only constrained by the Constitution but also has to 
deal with “political limitations” from parliament. From the period of the First Indonesian 
Constitution to the period of 1998, before the process of the Amendment, Indonesia was 
familiar with a passive‐presidential model. The executive powers of the President were strong 
and dominant. A powerful president exercised the executive powers with very small checks 
from other branches or went even unchecked. As Indonesia has experienced both hyper and 
passive presidentialism, the more plausible plan is to redesign the Indonesian system with an 
original model of presidentialism as in the US. A system which gives proportional checks and 
provides balancing power between three branches (the executive, the legislature, and the 
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judiciary). It may be realized by bringing back the powers of the President. The President must 
be given significant executive powers that are relevant to the duties and roles while 
proportional checks and balances must be performed by the parliament and the courts. A 
proportional framework of checks and balances is that other branches will act proportionally to 
equalize the executive powers. The Legislature would notoverstep constraint and dominate the 
executive powers of the President, but rather be working as a mutual partner. On the other 
hand, the Courts would not intervene but act as truly constitutional interpreters. The President 
should remain the key figure of government, vested with significant executive powers that are 
relevant to his roles and duties. The power of other institutions should be encouraged to be 
more advisory rather than extremely contentious. To strengthen the institutional checks and 
balance from the legislative to the executive, the legislative should not direct the executive but 
be a counterpart to the executive. The President, vice versa, should also be given the power to 
counter‐balance the Legislature. It would also be reasonable to empower the Constitutional 
Court with the power to offer passive advisory opinions, that is, an advisory competence that 
may be given by the Court when any branch requires constitutional advice. In some areas, the 
President should be given real powers. For example in some of appointment powers, the 
President should be given nominal powers, rather than just formal powers, to nominate, select 
and appoint the ministers without any political pressure from others. While in other areas, such 
as the pardoning power, the president should share the power with other branches. This, inter 
alia, is merely to respect the judicial process and not make it too easy for the President to 
contradict the Court’s decisions. On the emergency power, the Constitution should 
accommodate “an extra‐ordinary” situation where the President is mostly expected to 
takeurgent and substantial action by still respecting mutual and equal relations between the 
three branches. By still preserving the “natural conflict” between the executive and the 
legislative, the Constitution must provide a clear framework to solve the conflicts.  
b. Model of checks and balances  of the executive powers for Indonesia 
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In the development of constitutional theory, there are some mechanisms to be applied 
to constrain the executive powers, such as the classic mechanism of checks and balances from 
the Legislature by a real mechanism for control, oversight, and judicial review of the 
Legislature. Moreover, some scholars argue that the mechanisms of impeachment and removal 
are also effective to check one particular type of abuse of power by the executive, namely, 
corruption.888  Meanwhile, some constitutional doctrines, such as executive immunity may be 
relevant to limit executive powers and enhance executive accountability. To be applied 
effectively and in co‐existence with the constitutional system, the Constitution should clarify 
the application of such a doctrine including its limits.  
The executive powers should rely on checks and balances mechanisms, such as 
legislative control, legislative oversight, and other institutional functions. According to Posner 
and Vermeule, the legal checks, either the requirement that the executive should obtain the 
consent of other government officials (legislator) before acting; or the requirement that the 
executive submit to periodic popular elections is the mechanism in order to avoid unchecked 
executive power and prevent dictatorship in the presidency.889 On the other hand, citing from a 
parliamentary system, parliamentary control of the executive is important to anticipate the 
greatexpansion of power in the global modern era.890 However, there are other checks and 
balances that may potentially create gridlock and make it  difficult to pass necessary reforms; 
such as the elaboration of veto gates (bi‐cameralism and a committee system); legislative and 
judicial oversight of executive action; and other checks and balances, all with a view to 
minimizing the risk of executive dictatorship.891 The mechanism of checks and balances to 
                                                           
888
 See: “Checking Executive power: Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective” Edited by Jody C. 
Baumgartner and Naoko Kada, Praeger Publishers, USA, 2003, p. 133. 
889 Eric A.Posner and Adrian Vemeule, Op. Cit., p. 319: The fewer the checks, the more plausible the “dictator” label 
becomes. 
890
Anthony W. Bradley and Cesare Pinelly, Op. Cit., p. 668, In general, parliamentary control of the executive is 
perceived as being particularly needed given the great expansion in the importance of international organizations 
and in government activities connected with the adhesion to supranational organizations. 
891
Eric A.Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Op. Cit., p. 338. 
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check the executive may potentially have a risk of becoming tyranical when it is an independent 
institution such as in the oversight bodies.892 
In common practice of a presidential system, the oversight function of the Legislature is 
more significant when the government is backed‐up by a majority.893 However, the Constitution 
should provide more specific mechanisms to make Legislative branch functions more 
applicable. To make Legislature control more effective, the mechanism of questions and the 
interpellation mechanism can be borrowed and adopted from the mechanism of parliamentary 
control in parliamentary states. Such a mechanism will allow the Legislature to invoke questions 
and interpellation; it may be followed by a short debate and a vote whether the executive’s 
response is acceptable. But however, most importantly, since the system is a presidential 
system, the vote should not end with a vote of no confidence but should end with a Legislature 
recommendation that will oblige the executive to take the recommended actions.  
The following table offers the model of checks and balances of the executive power of the 
Indonesian President: 
Table 5.1 Model for Indonesian executive power   
Powers Models 
 
Mechanism Check and balance 
Law-making powers 
1. Legislative 
power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. On legislative power: 
- The President is not a co-legislator to the DPR 
and has no equal power. The President has no 
power to jointly approve a bill with the DPR, 
instead he only has the right to discuss in a 
joint discussion to give opinion and 
recommendation to the bill (this scenario is 
part of giving the President the opportunity to 
measure to what extent he could execute the 
Laws) 
- It is not a sharing power since the President 
only has residual power from the DPR 
(Parliament). The President only has the rest of 
the whole power. 
- The President only has the power to initiate 
any bills, the power to preview the bill (in a 
joint discussion session), but not the power to 
approve the bill. 
- The President has to legalize and promulgate 
the legislation as a result of the legislative 
process 
 
1. On legislative power: 
- The main legislative power is in the 
hands of the parliament. The DPR has 
the power to approve or reject the bill 
- The bill initiative from the President will 
be considered by the parliament and 
proceed in a legislative process in a joint 
discussion between the President and 
the DPR 
- The President has the veto power and 
the DPR may override the veto power of 
the President with the mechanism of 2/3 
majority of votes 
- Within 4 weeks before it is promulgated, 
by the request from the President or the 
DPR, the Constitutional Court has the 
power to review the constitutionality of 
bill. 
- The Constitutional Court has the power 
to review the constitutionality of Laws. 
 
                                                           
892
Id. at p. 339. 
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Anthony W. Bradley and Cesare Pinelli, Op. Cit., p. 667. 
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2. Sub-ordinate 
Legislation/go
vernment law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Executive law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‐ Giving the legislative powers to the DPR 
respects its nature as the parliament and its 
legislative nature. 
‐ Still give the President the right to intervenein 
(by giving veto) the legislative making process 
as he is the executive who in the end will 
execute the Laws. He has to make sure 
whether he is able to execute the Laws, or 
otherwise, the Laws will never be executed.  
‐ There should be a mechanism for the 
parliament to override the veto of the 
President. 
 
 
2. For sub-ordinate Legislation: 
- The President has the power to execute Laws 
and to make sub-ordinate Legislation for 
implementing the legislation 
- It would not be a shared power but a unilateral 
power; performed only by the President on 
behalf of the government but it does not mean 
without any checks from other branches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. For the executive law: 
- The President has the power to make any 
executive law for use in the executive or state 
administration area and not in general issue 
- It is a unilateral power that the President will 
perform the power alone involving the 
executive branch. The President would not 
need any approval, confirmation, or even 
opinion from other branches 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. For sub-ordinate Legislation: 
- Since sub-ordinate Legislation is 
addressed for guidance to implement the 
legislation made by the parliament, the 
President in issuing such a law should 
have confirmation from the parliament. 
This is for making sure that the direction 
in the sub-ordinate Legislation is already 
consistent with what has been addressed 
by the legislation. Therefore, it will 
minimize the irrelevancy of the 
legislation implementation. 
- On the other hand, the Court may assess 
the legality of sub-ordinate Legislation in 
order to come to an advisory opinion on 
the legality 
 
3. For the executive law: 
- Although it is not a shared power since 
other branches will not be involved in 
the executive law-making process; such 
power can be challenged before the 
Court; finding the Court’s opinion on 
either the constitutionality or the legality 
of the executive law. If the Court comes 
to the conclusion that an executive law is 
illegal, the President should revoke it. 
- The legislature, at this point, can impose 
their right to get clarification from the 
Presidenton enactment of the executive 
law. 
Appointment powers 
1. State officer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Public officer 
 
1. For the appointment power of the state 
officers: 
- The President has the power to nominate, 
select, and formally appoint the state officers 
(such as the Constitutional Court Judges, 
Supreme Court Judges, chief of judicial 
commission, chief of state financial auditor, 
other state officers for state Constitutional 
institutions, and state independent commission 
such as chief of commission of corruption) 
- It is not a shared power 
- It is a formal power of the President to 
ceremonially appoint the state officers. 
- There should be an equal and proportional 
sharing power between the President and 
other branches involved in the appointment 
power 
- The President has the same portion in 
 
1. For the state officers’ appointment: 
- The parliament has the same power to 
nominate and be involved actively in the 
selection process of the state officers 
- The Court (if it is about the judges 
appointment) has also has the power to 
be involved in the selection process  
- Other State Commissions such as the 
Judicial Commission has the power to 
nominate and be involved in the 
selection and appointment process of 
the judges 
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3. Executive 
officer 
 
 
 
 
4. High ranked 
Military 
officers 
 
 
 
 
exercising the appointment power of state 
officer 
 
2. For the power to appoint the public officers: 
- The President has the power to nominate, 
select, and appoint the public officers 
- The appointment power of public officers is a 
real and formal power with check 
- The public officers include the chief of police, 
state prosecutor, etc 
 
3. For  the power to appoint executive officers: 
- The President has the real and formal power to 
appoint executive officers in the area of the 
state administration and other executive 
officers within the executive area are 
established by the President such as the chief 
of state intelligence, police commissioner, state 
ambassador, etc 
 
4. For the power to appoint the high ranking 
military officers: 
- This appointment power is related to the 
power as Commander in Chief 
- The President has the power to nominate, 
select, and appoint the high rank of Military 
officers including the chief of the Indonesian 
army, chief of the Indonesian air force, chief of 
the Indonesian navy, and other high ranking 
military officers) 
- The President needs to notify the parliament 
- The President may ask opinion from other 
institutions but the appointment will be made 
by the President 
 
2. The appointment power for public 
officers would be by the opinion of the 
DPR. However, the decision maker is the 
President. The President must maintain 
the professionalism and reduce political 
interest. 
 
 
3. The parliament has no power to be 
involved in the nomination, selection, 
and appointment process. However, the 
parliament would always oversee the 
performance of all the executive officers 
and employ the overseeing mechanism 
(require clarification, investigate, and 
advise dismissal at anytime to the 
President) 
 
4. For the appointment of high ranked 
military officers the checks and balances 
would be: 
- The nomination and selection will be 
conducted by the President and the 
committee of high ranking military 
officer appointments. 
- After the nomination and selection 
process, the President may ask opinion 
of the parliament 
- The President must notify the 
appointments to the parliament 
 
In general, there should be a Commission of 
appointment which has the power to focus on the 
nomination, selection, and appointment process of 
all officers 
Foreign affairs power 
1. Treaty power 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Diplomacy 
power 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Other Foreign 
policies 
 
 
 
1. Treaty power 
- The President has the power to negotiate and 
conclude treaties and international agreements 
- Certain treaties and international agreements 
would be exercised with the approval from the 
DPR legislature before the ratification 
 
2. The power to issue diplomacy power 
- The President has the power to issue any 
diplomacy policies 
 
 
 
 
3. The power to issue foreign policies 
- The President has the power to issue other 
foreign policies including the decision to access  
international organizations, participation in 
peace keeping operations 
- It is a real and formal power. 
 
1. In the treaty power, the legislature has 
the power to give approval for certain 
treaties and international agreements 
 
 
 
 
2. In the diplomacy power, the legislature 
has the power to oversee the 
implementation of diplomacy power and 
at any time can give an opinion to the 
President 
 
 
3. In the foreign policy power, the 
legislature would have the power to 
oversee the implementation of foreign 
policies and at any time can give opinion 
and advice to the President 
 
War power 
1. The power to 
invoke self- 
defense 
 
 
 
1. War power: 
- The President has the power to invoke self 
defenseaccording to International law; 
however, the war decision should be approved 
by the legislature 
 
1. Power to declarewar 
- The legislature has the power to give 
confirmation to the President 
- The legislature has at any time the right 
to give opinion and advice  
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2. The use of 
force power 
 
- It is the power of the President but the power 
should get approval from the legislature 
 
2. The power to use force 
- The President has the power to use force with 
the approval from the DPR 
- The President has the power to mobilize the 
use of force abroad for the purpose of 
supporting international intervention with 
confirmation from the DPR 
 
 
 
2. The power to use force 
- The DPR has the key power to approve 
or reject the use of force 
- The DPR has the power to confirm the 
use of force abroad for international 
intervention 
Budgetary power 
1. Initiate budget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Expenditure 
power 
 
 
1. The power to initiate a budget: 
- The President has the power to initiate and 
discuss the state budget. However, the 
legislature has the power to approve the state 
budget 
- It is the power with approval from the 
legislature 
- It is not a shared power since the President 
only has the power to discuss and negotiate 
while the approval is made by the DPR 
 
2. Expenditure power: 
- The President has the spending power  
- It is not a shared power since the President 
spends from the approved budget 
- To perform the expenditure power, the 
President does not need any approval, 
confirmation or consideration from the 
legislature 
 
1. The power to initiate budget: 
- The legislature has the power to approve 
the state budget 
- The constitutional court has the power 
to review the state budget and come to 
its opinion and advice 
 
 
 
 
2. Expenditure power: 
- Although the legislature would not be 
confirmed, it can always oversee 
presidential spending  
- The legislature can always at any time 
require the clarification, investigation or 
cut the budget 
- The state auditor has the authority to 
oversee, make report, and audit the 
spending budget 
 
Pardoning power 
1. The power to 
grant pardon 
 
 
 
 
2. The power to 
grant amnesty 
 
 
For the pardoning power: 
1. The President has the power to grant pardon 
and amnesty 
 
 
 
 
2. In giving the pardon, the President shall have 
recommendation and advice from the 
commission on the prerogative of pardon. In 
giving the amnesty, the President shall have 
advice from the DPR. 
 
1. The power to give pardon and amnesty 
should be by and with advice from the 
commission on the prerogative of 
pardon established by the President 
including the Supreme Court, the judicial 
commission, the president’s advisor, 
state prosecutor, the minister of justice 
and human rights 
2. The recommendation and advice from 
the Court is in order to respect the 
judicial process. A unilateral pardoning 
power without the Court’s involvement 
is likely to undermine the court’s 
decisions 
The emergency power 
1. The power to 
decide 
emergency in 
part or the 
whole state 
territories 
 
 
 
 
2. The power to 
take any 
action during 
state 
emergency 
Model for the emergency power would be: 
1. The President has the power to declarea state 
emergency without any approval from other 
branches. In an emergency situation where the 
state under real threat (such as terrorist attack, 
natural disaster, economic collapse, political 
chaos) or military attack that undermine 
national peace and security, the President has 
unilateral power to take any action to 
overcome the situation 
 
2. However, apart from the real threat or military 
attack, the President has the power to take any 
action with the approval from the DPR  
 
 
 
1. There should be an ad-hoc commission 
established by the Parliament to observe 
any measures and actions of the 
President during the state emergency. 
The court has the power to review any 
legal consequences that result from any 
legal measure taken by the President  
 
2. For the emergency law: 
- The legislature can always oversee the 
implementation of the emergency law 
that is enacted in times of emergency 
and always has the power to get 
clarification from the President  
- The legislature can always ask the 
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3. The power to 
issue 
emergency law 
and establish 
ad-hoc 
institution to 
overcome the 
emergency 
situation 
3. The President has the power to issue 
emergency law in a time of state emergency or 
other emergency situation where there is no 
legislation.  
 
4. The President has the power to establish ad-
hoc institutions relevant to the emergency 
situation 
 
President to revoke the emergency law 
after the adoption of the legislation on 
the emergency issue  
- The Court has always the power to 
review the constitutionality and the 
legality of the emergency law and has 
the power to come to the conclusion 
that the emergency law should be 
revoked. 
 
 
Administrative power 
1. The power to 
establish the 
ministerial 
department 
and any other 
extra 
ministerial 
department 
(independent 
department) 
 
 
2. The power to 
control over 
the cabinet 
 
3. The power to 
issue the 
executive law  
4. The power to 
establish 
executive 
commissions, 
agencies, other 
executive 
bodies 
5. The power to 
establish any 
executive 
auxiliary 
bodies or any 
institution 
supporting 
state 
administration 
6. The power to 
supervise the 
local 
government 
and 
autonomous 
provinces 
7. Power to set 
state policy 
and public 
policy 
 
In administrative power: 
1. the establishment of cabinet of ministers 
- The President has the power to establish 
cabinet of ministers according to the 
President’s vision, mission, and programs. 
- The President has the power to establish, set, 
reshuffle, and dissolve a ministerial 
department. 
- The President has the power to nominate, 
select and appoint ministers 
- The President shall notify the establishment of 
ministerial departments and appointment of 
ministers 
 
2. The President has the power to directly lead 
the cabinet and give direct command to the 
ministers 
 
3. The President has the power to issue 
government regulations in order to regulate 
state administration 
4. The President, when it is needed, has the 
power to establish executive commissions, 
agencies, or other executive bodies. The 
President shall notify the Parliament. The 
President has also the power to set, reshuffle, 
or dismiss the executive commissions, 
executive agencies, or other executive bodies 
5. In running the state administration, the 
President for any reason has the power to 
establish executive auxiliary bodies with the 
approval from the legislature 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The President has the power to supervise the 
local government and autonomous province 
government. Such power is as a consequence 
of the presidential Unitarian model 
 
 
 
7. The President has the power to set state policy 
and public policy 
In administrative power: 
1. The legislature has the power of control 
over the budget of the establishment of 
a ministerial department and the 
appointment of ministers. The state 
auditor has the power to audit the 
ministerial budget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The legislature can at anytime have 
oversight by requesting clarification and 
explanation from the minister through 
the President 
3. Supreme court has the power to decide 
the legality of the executive law 
 
4. The legislature has the oversight power. 
the state auditor has the power to audit 
the budget 
 
 
 
 
5. The legislature: Constraint of the budget 
agencies establishment, oversight of the 
agencies’ performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The legislature: oversight function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The legislature: oversight function 
The extraordinary power 
The power to call 
referendum in the 
situation needed 
According to the Indonesian experience with the province 
of Timor-Timur (which is now Timor Leste), the idea of 
giving the President the power to call a referendum would 
have a constitutional basis; so, any action taken as a result 
The power is a dependent power that can only be 
exercised with the approval from both chambers in 
the MPR 
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of the referendum will be easier to be checked by other 
branches 
It will be a sharing power between the president and the 
legislature. To perform the power, the President should 
get approval from the legislature 
The military power 
1. The 
Commander in 
chief of army, 
navy and air 
force 
2. The power to 
maintain 
national peace 
and security 
 
3. The power to 
directly 
command the 
military force 
 
4. The power 
over the 
military 
organization 
For the military power: 
1. The President is the Commander in chief of 
army, navy, and air force. As a result, the  
military organization is under the President 
 
 
2. As the Commander in chief, the President has 
the power and duty to maintain national peace 
and security 
 
3. The President has the power to directly 
command the military force. In commanding 
the military force, except during a military 
operation, the President shall have 
confirmation from the DPR 
 
4. The President has the power of full 
intervention over the military organization 
including the power to reorganize the military 
organization 
 
1. With regard to the Commander chief 
power, the DPR has the oversight power 
to oversee budget of the military 
organization 
 
2. The DPR has the power to check over the 
power of national peace and security by 
law.  
 
3. Confirmation from the DPR is only 
needed when there is no urgent 
situation. However, in some situations 
such as during a military operation, the 
President is permitted to directly 
command military forces without 
confirmationfrom the DPR 
4. The DPR check over the organization by 
the budget 
Accessories power 
 
1. Power to make 
sure that the 
state’s 
compliance to 
the 
International 
obligation that 
Indonesia has 
already a party 
 
2. Power to grant 
honorary titles 
The accessories power is a consequence of the role of the 
President as the head of the state 
1. The President, as the head of the state, 
according to the development of international 
criminal law is the subject to the international 
criminal court. At this point, the constitution 
should provide the anticipation and establish a 
mechanism to avoid and facilitate if there is a 
case regarding international law. The 
Constitution should accommodate such 
international developments 
 
2. The power to grant honorary titles is a 
consequence of the President being the head of 
state. In exercising such power, the President 
has to establish a council of honorary awards 
to give recommendations and opinions 
 
 
1. The legislature has the power to be 
notified about all the foreign policy that 
the president has made 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The legislature has to be notified and has 
the right to clarify, to challenge and to 
give opinion to the President 
 
c. Design constitutional text for future Indonesia executive power  
This section is about the proposal of design for the executive power in Indonesia. With 
the assumption that the government system is a presidential system, the executive power 
would be vested in the hands of the President. The powers include law‐making power, 
budgetary and expenditure power, appointment power, foreign affairs power, administrative 
power, power to invoke self‐defense replacing the classic concept of war power, military 
power, emergency power, pardoning power, accessories and symbolic powers, and extra 
ordinary powers. The allocation of powers should be based on the principles of proportionality 
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and the necessity. In general, proportionality concerns the quantities and substances of the 
power that relates to the role of the President in a presidential system. This is to avoid any 
disproportionate allocation of powersthat may cause the domination of power by one of 
branches. Meanwhile, it is necessary to consider the reasons and priority level of the power 
which is given to the President. There must be a legitimate and reasonable purpose in giving 
the power to the President. 
To this extent, there are three models of the allocation of executive powers that have 
been developed in practice and may be adopted in Indonesia.Model 1 is a shared power. The 
idea is addressed to the power which has widespread impact on the state and public interest; 
while actually the power is not in the area of the executive. Such power must be exercised 
jointly by the President and the DPR. In this model, the executive power is not only enjoyed by 
the President alone but also enjoyed by the DPR. The President equally has the same power 
and role. A shared power is commonly actualized by joint approval; the President and other 
branches produce joint approval. The power would not be exercised if one party does not 
approve. Model 2 is a dependent power. The idea is that the President can exercise executive 
power only when the DPR gives approval. The model would be addressed for thepower that 
potentially may be abused by the President. For example in a diplomacy power, when the 
President has the real power to conduct a special humanitarian mission; the DPR on the other 
hand, has the power of the purse, and therefore, it has the power to decide whether or not the 
mission may be called. The power should then be exercised dependent on the approval of the 
DPR that is expressed in the budget approval. Model 3 is an independent power.894 The idea is 
that the President can exercise executive power independently while on the other hand, other 
branches may check by giving consideration, opinion, advice, or recommendation. However, 
the final decision is independently made by the President. 
                                                           
894
The independent power could be addressed to solve the situation that under the Indonesian Constitution 
(Amended) the President is mostly a weak branch among others. Therefore, to make a balance against other 
dominant branches and to make sure of the president’s survival vis a vis other branches, the independent power is 
assumed to be a plausible solution to maintain a good balance between the Legislative and the President, between 
democracy and efficiency and rule of law. This is also considering that the experiences of presidency the under the 
Amended Constitution as well as in the present situation creates an ineffective president and does too little to spur 
the Legislature into acttion and does too little to balance the powers of the Legislature. 
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On the law‐making power, the President should be given limited substantial powers in 
the legislative process. In order to accommodate the spirit of the 1999 amendment which was 
reducing the president’s power, it would be more rational not to give the President equal 
poweras as the DPR with regard to the approval in a legislative process. However, the President 
still should be given the power to initiate bills; but the framework would not place the 
President as a co‐legislator who has the power to sit in a joint approval session with the DPR. 
The articles of the Constitution may be written as follows: 
“The DPR holds the Legislative power” 
“ All the bills are initiated by the DPR or the President” 
“The DPR has the power to amend, reject, or approve bills” 
“The President or the DPR, before the promulgation, may refer to the Constitutional Court to review its 
constitutionality. 
“The President has the veto power ofa bill” 
“The DPR may override the veto power of the President with 2/3 of the votes cast” 
“The President signs and promulgates the Law” 
 
 
In the legislative process, the President should be still given significant power to initiate bills. 
Furthermore, the President should be given veto power. To counter‐balance the President’s 
veto, the DPR could override the veto. However, the President may veto bills. On the other 
hand, the role of the Court must be strengthened as a counter‐weight. The most important 
thing is that the process should reflect a democratic mechanism on the basis of equality among 
branches. It is rational not to give the President an equal power in joint approval with the DPR 
because the experiences of joint approval commonly raise conflicts between the President and 
legislature. It mostly will generate an ineffectivegovernment. On the other hand, it would take 
longer for the legislative process because of a legislative deadlock. 
Other law‐making power should be vested to the President. To this extent, the President 
would have the authority to make rules and regulations. Those powers are including the power 
to make sub‐ordinate Legislation, the power to make executive law, the power to make 
Presidential law, and the power to make emergency law. The power to make sub‐ordinate 
Legislation is related to the President’s duties to implement the Law. At this point, the sub‐
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ordinate legislation should be based on the Laws. The sub‐ordinate law is mainly about the 
President’s direction and guidance to implement Legislation.  
On the other hand, the presidential law is the law made by the President in order to 
overcome a legal vacuum when there is no Legislation concerning particular issues and it is 
immediately required by the public. The Presidential law is a temporary and ad‐hoc law, has 
time limits and is only enacted within 1 year. If it is needed, after the time limit of 1 year, the 
President has to submit the presidential Law to be jointly discussed as a bill and approved by 
the DPR to become Law. The presidential law is relatively different from the emergency law.  It 
is not as unchecked power since the Constitutional Court has the power to review the 
constitutionality of the law during the enactment. Alternatively, to check and constrain the 
presidential law and in order to compete and overcome the legal vacuum, the DPR may be 
given the power to make ad‐hoc legislation. 
The design for the law‐making power besides the power to initiate bills would be as 
follows: 
“The President has the power to makeexecutive laws and to set rules and regulations in the area of the 
administration” 
“The President has the power to execute laws and to make sub-ordinate legislation. In order to make sub-
ordinate Legislation, the President should get consideration from the DPR” 
 
On the budgetary power, the design for the constitutional provision would be as follows: 
The President has the exclusive power to submit the budget bills to the DPR for its consideration and approval 
After the budget bill has been approved by the DPR, the President has the spending power 
The DPR has the power to oversee the spending of the state budget and ensure the transparency and 
accountability of the expenditure 
 
With regard to the war power, the term war is out of date and does not specifically refer 
to particular cases since nowdays, war is broadly defined, not only covering hostilities between 
states but also encompassing any kinds of threats to the state. The term “use of force”may be 
appropriate in the context of global development and more up to date compared to the term 
“war”.The term “use of force” is based on Article 2(4) UN Charter which requires states to 
refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
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another state.895 Furthermore, Article 51 UN Charter gives states the right to individual self‐
defence and collective self defence. This allows states to use force against armed attack and 
imminent threat. Accordingly, there are some concepts that are relevant to the concept of war, 
namely: the use of force, the armed attack, individual self defence, collective self defence, pre‐
emptive self defence and imminent threat. The German Constitution in Article 115a has used 
the term “state defence” instead of war.896Whereas, the South African Constitution uses the 
words “state of national defence” and attaches the power to declare a state of national defence 
to the President.897To this extent, it would be rational to refer to the German concept of state 
defence and the South African concept that allows the President to have the power to declare a 
state of national defence. 
The power to invoke self defence and call the use of military forces clause would be 
written as follows: 
The President has the power to invoke the state of self defence with approval from the DPR 
The President has the power to invoke the use of force and declare a state of national defence with the approval 
from the DPR 
 
The power to invoke self defence as well as the power of use of force is a shared power 
between the President and the DPR. The purpose to put such power in the hands of the 
President and the DPR is to strengthen and make accountable the President’s decision. The 
DPR’s approval reflects support from the people. The use of force would be the use of military 
force either at home or abroad. It also includes any purposes for humanitarian intervention and 
for peace‐keeping operations.  
In practice, there are different issues faced by the Indonesian President and the US 
President concerning the war power. The US frequently deals with the use of force abroad 
against international armed conflict. In practice, how Obama interpreted the US Constitution 
regarding to war power in his presidential campaign statement of 2007 was better than what 
the facts had shown: 
                                                           
895
Article 2(4) UN Charter. 
896
Article 115a (1) German Constitution and Article 115a (5) German Constitution. 
897
Article 203 of the South African Constitution on State of national defence.  
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“As a presidential candidate in 2007, Obama agreed: “The President does not have power under the 
Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an 
actual or imminent threat to the nation.” Fast forward four years.  In announcing the intervention in 
Libya, Mr. Obama told Congress that he was acting “pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct 
U.S. foreign relations and as commander in chief and chief executive.”
898
 
 
The US practice may not be the case for Indonesia. Whereas the US is familiar with the 
use of military forces abroad for international armed conflicts, Indonesia has never been 
involved in such acts. However, internal armed conflict and other kinds of domestic threat may 
be a potential threat for Indonesia. Nevertheless, in experience, Indonesia has dealt with some 
territorial conflicts that sometimes trigger the use of military force. The fact that Indonesia has 
many islands makes Indonesia familiar with border conflicts and other cases of territorial 
conflict with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, the New Guinea, East Timor, Australia and 
other countries.899 Such a situation may be a threat to Indonesian peace and security. When 
such a situation has to be dealt with, the President is constitutionally responsible to take any 
action including the mobilization and the use of military action abroad in order to preserve the 
territories.  
In the other area, the power as the Commander in chief is strongly associated with the 
use of force, military mobility, and the highest military decision making. As the Commander in 
chief it should be clear that the President has the highest power in military administration and 
military organization. Furthermore, the President would have the power to command the 
military action in the battle field and have the power to direct any military operation authorized 
by the parliament. To formulate a Commander in Chief clause, the South African Constitution 
may provide a good model of a constitutional basis for the military power of the President. 
Article 202 of the South African Constitution does not just stipulate that the President is the 
                                                           
898
Foxnews, Constitution Allows Obama to strike Syria Without Congressional approval, accessed online at: 
http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/08/30/constitution‐allows‐obama‐to‐strike‐syria‐without‐congressional‐
approval/ 
899
Kompas, Indonesia vs Malayasia Fenomena Perbatasan Negara Berdaulat, accessed online at: 
http://hankam.kompasiana.com/2011/04/13/indonesia‐vs‐malaysia‐fenomena‐perbatasan‐negara‐berdaulat‐
355153.html: The territorial conflicts between Indonesia and other countries may happen because of special 
interest (claiming the natural resources or territorial expansion), and people illegally intrudingacross the border. 
The conflicts sometimes also provoke military action in frontier areas.  
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Commander in Chief of the defence forces but also clarifies the consequences of the 
constitutionality of the President’s office as the Commander in Chief.900 The Article clarifies that 
as the Commander in Chief, the President must appoint the Military Commander of the defence 
force. Moreover, the Constitution also clarifies that the President has the power to authorize 
the use of defence force in three circumstances of cooperation with the policeservices, in 
defence of the Republic, or in fulfillment of an international obligation.901 
Furthermore, the power to decide the mobilization of military force abroad for the 
purpose of International intervention should be given to the President. The concept of armed 
forces intervention abroadcould be taken from the French Constitution Article 35.902 In such 
power, the President would have the power to mobilize the armed forces for a particular 
purpose of international intervention. Such power would be an independent power but may be 
confirmed by the DPR. 
The proposal for the Commander in Chief would be as follows: 
The President of the state shall be the Commander in Chief of the military armed forces including the army, navy, 
and the air force. 
As the commander in chief, the President has the power to maintain national peace and security, maintain 
national independence, territorial integrity, and the proper functioning of the public authorities and the 
continuity of the State 
The President has the power to command and mobilize the armed forces 
For the purposes of an international intervention, the President has the power to mobilize the armed forces, by 
and with the approval of the DPR 
 
As terrorism and other internal disturbances are potential threats to Indonesia, it would 
be important to consider the intelligence clause of the South African Constitution to be adopted 
by the Indonesian Constitution.903 The design for the intelligence power for the President would 
be as follows: 
The President has the power to  direct, and control any intelligence services within the legal framework 
established by Law;   
The President has the power to appoint the Chief of the secret intelligence service and other senior members 
 
                                                           
900
Article 202 Command of defence force of the South African Constitution. 
901
Article 201 of the South African Constitution. 
902
Article35 of the French Constitution. 
903
Article 209 of the South African Constitution on the Establishment and control of intelligence services.  
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With regard to the emergency power, the most important thing is setting a firm 
definition that would include the scope ofthe emergency situation. In general, state emergency 
refers to several situations where there is an armed attack such as invasion, aggression, 
rebellion, or non‐armed attack such as terrorism, natural disaster, economic and public order 
chaos that results in real or imminent threat to the national peace and security. At this point, 
any urgent measures and actions are needed to overcome the situation. Furthermore, the 
important thing of the emergency power is about measuring the threat to the national peace 
and security. According to the international law development, the UN Security Council has 
broadly defined the term threat to international peace and security. Similar to the common 
practices, the threat to international peace and security is not only about a military attack but 
also including other threats such as terrorism, economic and political deterioration, natural 
disaster, disease, poverty, human rights abuses, etc.  
With regard to the emergency powers of the President, it would be rational to refer to 
the term of “threat to international peace and security” that the UN Security Council has 
defined. Similar to the threats against International peace and security, the threats against 
national peace and security include armed attacks and non‐armed attacks that potentially put 
the state in chaotic situations, total breakdown of the law and public order, or political and 
economic deterioration. In a modern and democratic era, the emergency power is given in a 
limited term and exercised with control from other institutions on the basis of the rule of law 
and human rights values. The emergency power of the President would be for a limited period 
and could not be prolonged indefinitely for the life of the regime. 
When the attack or other threat is real, and when there is a conflict that should be 
ended, the President would be given a unilateral emergency power and may use his discretion 
to override the administrative and legal framework. In some of tangible threats that are 
relevant to the state and emergency situation, the need for formal approval from the 
parliament wouldinhibit the urgent action. The President at this moment should benefit from 
his position as the Commander in chief and act as the highest authorization to protect the state 
and the people. However, if the attack is imminent and not a potential threat that immediately 
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needs a response, the approval from the legislature must be required. This is intended to obtain 
legitimate action approved by the legislature as representative of the people. 
With regard to the articulation of the emergency power in the Constitution, it is 
important to refer to the power of the President to take any measures according to Article 16 
of the French Constitution as part of the emergency power.904To this extent, the President has 
the emergency power to take any measures in an emergency situation that intimidates state 
independence, the integrity of the state territory, or the fulfillment of international 
commitments under serious and immediate threat, or the situation where the proper functions 
of the constitutional public authorities are interrupted. The power and any measures taken by 
the President should be the subject of consultion with the DPR, the DPD, the Supreme Court, 
the Constitutional Court and other institutions.  
The other significant emergency power that may be given to the President is the power 
to make emergency law. The Law mostly relates to martial law and the power is given as a 
consequence of the President being the Commander in chief.The emergency law is commonly 
issued when the state is under the real armed attack. Similar to the presidential law, the 
emergency law is not power without check. The Court has the power to review the 
constitutionality of the law. 
The design for the emergency power constitutional provision would be as follows: 
The President has the emergency power. 
The emergency power is exercised in circumstances of any attacks or disasters that will undermine the state, and 
political and economic stability. 
The emergency power of the President shall not exceed6 months. This period may only be extended with the 
DPR’s approval. 
In the context of an emergency situation, the President must take all measures necessary.The emergency 
measures taken by the President are put before the DPR for approval 
The Constitutional Court has the power to review the constitutionality of any emergency meaures taken by the 
President 
 
With regard to the responsibility for foreign affairs, the first point should be clarifying 
the scopes of foreign affairs. It is also to clarify in which area the President is needsto be given 
the substantive power and in what area the President is given the formal power which should 
                                                           
904
Article 16 the French Constitution. 
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be shared by other institutions. To clarify the foreign affairs (especially that has significant and 
relevant impact to the people and state as a whole), the scope of power should also be clearly 
mentioned in the Constitution. This is because such power may be potentially abused while the 
negative impact and disadvantage can endanger people as awhole and the existence of the 
state. It is also important to classify certain powers, such as the power to conclude an 
important and substantive treaty, into powers that should be shared along with the DPR.  In 
general, the foreign affairs powers should include the treaty power, the diplomatic power, and 
the foreign policy making power. 
On the treaty power, it is important to distinguish between treaty and international 
agreements according to their impact and scope. For this purpose, the concept of the treaties 
classification according to Article 53 of the French Constitution provides an example of clarity of 
the classification. According to the Article, there are 3 sorts of treaties: peace treaties, trade 
agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international organizations.905 Moreover, those 
three sorts of treaty should be ratified or approved by an Act of Parliament if: they commit the 
finances of the State, if they modify provisions which are the preserve of statute law, if they 
relate to the status of persons, and if they involve the ceding, and exchanging or acquiring of 
territory. 
In the case of Indonesia, the design would be as follows: 
The President makes and unmakes treaties. To make peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties or agreements 
relating to international organizations, the President needs the approval of the DPR determined by Laws.  
 
The Constitutional Court may review the constitutionality of any treaties or international agreements challenged 
by either the President or the DPR before becoming a party (to the treaty or the international agreements 
 
To have domestic effect, all treaties or international agreementsshall be transformed into Law 
 
In terms of the diplomacy power, the area of diplomacy is mostly the domain of the 
President. It is because that the President is the head of the state and head of government. The 
diplomacy is part of running the state administration externally. To this extent, the power 
                                                           
905
Article 53 the French Constitution. 
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should be independently exercised by the President without intervention from other branches. 
The clause would be as follows: 
The President has the power to give diplomatic accreditation by issuing a letter of credence. The President has 
the power to verifydiplomatic letters from other states 
In some other certain diplomatic affairs related to foreign policy, the President must 
also be given a more substantive and independent power to determine, decide and deliver his 
view. This is because foreign policy making is part of the area of the executive. On 10 
September 2013, President SBY delivered a letter to the UN Security Council about Syria. In his 
letter, the President addressed his disagreement with the US President’s plan to launch a 
military force against Syria. In the G20 Meeting, the President delivered his personal view about 
the possibility not to use military force, but instead a peaceful operation under the UN and 
engage the political process with the people of Syria. The President SBY also offered Indonesian 
participation in the peacekeeping operation for Syria. At this point, the President had his 
personal point of view in which he does not have to consult the parliament. The clause would 
be as follows: 
The President is incharge offoreign affairs. The DPR must be consulted in a commencement, termination of the 
diplomatic relation and major policy issues, to be detemined by law. 
 
The President has the power to decide ona participation in any international activities, such as the peacekeeping 
operations after due consultation with the DPR 
 
The President ensures state compliance with International law including treaties and other international law 
instruments. 
 
On the pardoning power, the power should be given as an independent power where 
the President has the more substantial power to decide the final word. However, the power will 
always be exercised by and with advice. In some arguments, such power is classified as a 
judicial power of the President. However, for some reasons it may be inappropriate to say that 
the pardoning power of the president is a judicial power of the President. It is because judicial 
affairs are not under the area of executive affairs. The executive affairs are only for 
implementing the laws made by the Legislature but also including the implementation of the 
Court’s decision. The pardoning power of the President is always exercised after the judicial 
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process is finished. It is usually exercised after the court decision has been finalised. After the 
final court decision, the process will turn to the executive area as part of the law enforcement 
in order to implement the court decision. At this point, communication between the President 
and the Court would be needed. This is to respect the Court’s decision and the judicial process 
that has already been finished. By involving the Court, the pardoning power of the President 
would not undermine the judicial process.  
In general, it is argued that even though the pardoning power is a prerogative of the 
President, the power should be exercised after advice. For this matter, with the assumption 
that the President is the head of the state, there should be a commission on the Prerogative of 
pardoning established by the President. 906  The commission’s main duty is to give 
recommendations to the President.  The Constitution also has to provide the limitation of the 
pardoning power of the President. In this point, the US Constitution may give a good reference 
as it gives the President the pardoning power except in cases of impeachment.907 In addition, 
the Philippines Constitution may give a good reference for the articulation of amnesty.908 
Referring to the Philippines Constitution where the President has the concurrence votesof the 
Congress, the Indonesian Constitution should articulate that the amnesty granted by the 
Indonesian President should be with the advice of the DPR. It is because the President should 
still be given discretion, though it is limited, to determine the final decision on amnesty. 
The design for the pardoning power clause would be as follows: 
The President may grant pardon, except, in cases of impeachment, only upon advicefrom the commission of 
pardoning. 
The President may grant amnesty but only upon the advice of the DPR 
 
The following is the appointment and the state administration power. The appointment 
power is the most potential for the abuse of power. For the appointment power, the provision 
                                                           
906
The composition of the Commission may refer to the composition of Switzerland’s commission on the 
Prerogative of pardoning, consisting of the President’s advisory council, the state prosecutor, the minister of 
justice and human rights, and from the Supreme Court. 
907Article II section 2 of the US Constitution.  
908
Article VII Section 19 the Philippines Constitution. 
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should articulate the categories of the appointment, namely: the judicial appointment, state 
officer appointment (members of state institutions mentioned in the Constitution), public 
officer appointment (including the members of the independent agencies, state prosecutor, 
Chief of police, etc), executive officers appointment (ministers and other executiveofficers for 
the presidential office and the state ambassador), and military appointments (including high 
ranked military officers of army, navy, and air force). The appointment power may include the 
power to nominate, select and formally appoint. For the appointment power, the Philippines 
Constitution may provide a good reference in particular on the existence of a commission of 
appointment. As for Indonesia, there shoud be an independent advisory commission of 
appointment consisting of the DPR, DPD, Supreme Court, the Judicial Commission and other 
state institutions to advise the President. 
The President has the appointment powerto appoint public officers determined by Laws, upon advice from 
an independent advisory commissionof appointment and upon the opinion of the DPR 
 
The appointment of the senior member of the state officers and the Judges are made by a joint approval 
from the DPR, the President, and other state institutions. On the appointment of the Constitutional Court 
Judges, the joint approval is from the President, the DPR, and the Supreme Court; and on the appointment of 
the Supreme Court judges, the joint approval is from the DPR, the President and the Judicial Commision. 
 
In running the state administration, the President nominates, selects, and appoints ministers.The Ministers 
are under the executive department headed by the President. 
The President has the power to determine and establish ministerial departments and extra ministerial 
departmenst and has the power to coordinate and direct control over ministerial departments and other 
extra ministerial departments. 
The President appoints state ambassadors and other executive officers within the executive areas 
determined by law 
The President has the power to establish presidential office, executive commission, agency, or other 
executive auxiliary bodies to assist in particular area of the executive determined by laws 
 
The President has the power to supervise and coordinate local government and autonomous provincial 
government as a consequence of the unitary model of the state. 
 
The President makes and implements national policy and public policy for the purpose of state 
administration 
 
The President has the power to take any measure in accordance with anti-corruption measures 
 
The appointment powers have great potential for abuse of power. Therefore, it should 
be given in different ways. In addition to anticipating the abuse of power, however, the design 
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should still give room for the President to independently perform certain appointment powers. 
On the judicial appointment, the President would appropriately be given the power to formally 
appoint while the real appointment power would be attached to a joint approval. For the state 
ambassadors appointment, public officer appointment, military appointment, the model would 
be that the President has to act upon the advice of an independent advisory commission of 
appointment and the opinion of the DPR. For executive appointments that mostly have an 
executive function including ministers, chiefs of executive non‐ministerial department, other 
chiefs of executive agencies under the executive branch, and the executive officers within the 
presidential office, the President should be given independent power with his own discretion 
but in order to maintain a proportional power,the DPR should be notified about the 
appointments and at any time should have the right to give its opinion to the President. 
With respect to the administrative power, since it is the main power for the President, 
Article 85 of the South African Constitution may provide a good example to explicitly determine 
the administrative powers of the President.909 It clearly shows the main purpose of the 
executive function as the executor of national legislation, developer and executor of national 
policy, coordinator of the functions of state departments and administrations and the branch 
which performs any other executive functions provided for in the Constitution. Referring to the 
South Africa Constitution, the articulation of the provision should clearly specify the 
administrative power of the President. The design of the administrative power would cover the 
power to: 
1. exercise executive authority  
2. implement national legislation 
3. establish ministerial departments and any other extra ministerial departments (independent 
departments) ; 
4. coordinate and controlover the cabinet; 
5. issue government regulations; 
6. establish executive commissions, agencies, other executive bodies; 
7. establish other executive departments (such as executive auxiliary bodies or any institutions supporting 
state administration); 
8. supervise the local government and autonomous provinces; 
9. set and implement national policy and public policy 
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Article 85 of the South African Constitution. 
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10. set executive law 
The President has the power to establish a cabinet of ministers according to the vision, mission, 
and program of the President. He has also the power to reshuffle, or dissolve a ministerial 
department, the power to appoint, change, and dismiss the ministers. The administrative 
power of the President would be mostly an independent power where the President is the main 
decision maker and given the opportunity to independently decide but the President still has to 
notify the DPR.  
The Constitution has to make clear that ministers are the assistants of the President. It 
should provide the mechanism for the ministers to support the President’s constitutional 
duties, state administration and daily governmental activities. The President should appoint 
ministers based on their expertise and professionalism. Ministerial appointments on the basis 
on professionalism and expertise would help to avoid abuse of ministerial authority and 
anticipate ministers acting ultra vires; in fact in ministerial policy making, conflictswith the 
group interests of political parties were always involved and the policies in thesematters are 
usually just a matter of bargaining.910 To this extent, it will be important to clarify that the 
ministers are under the executive department which is headed by the President as the head of 
government. The term executive department may refer to the US Constitution.  
Moreover, the administrative powers of the President should be mostly given as an 
independent power. The Parliament may only use its power to invoke the oversight function 
and the Court may review the constitutionality of any of the government’s legal products. The 
administrative power would be more about executive affairs and they fall under the 
presidentas the head of government. The check over such power would be appropriately 
conducted by observing the running of the state administration. This is merely to maintain the 
independency of state administration. However, in certain powers such as the power to 
establish an executive commission, agency, or other executive auxiliary bodies, the power 
would also be given as an independent power but must be performed following consideration 
from the DPR. The consideration should be only on the grounds of the budget instead of 
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 Herbert Feith, Op. Cit., p. 172. 
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political grounds. In addition, it would also be important to give and specify in details about the 
power of the President as the unitary executive branch to supervise and intervene in certain 
purposes and particular issues of the local government. To this extent, the South African 
Constitution may give a good example to consider providing a constitutional basis for the 
President’s powers that is related to local government.According to Article 100 of the South 
African Constitution, the President as the head of the national executive has the power to 
intervene and take some measures when a local government does not fulfill an executive 
obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation.911 Moreover, it is also important to refer 
to the Philippines Constitution Article X section 4 for the real power of the President to 
supervise the local governments. 
In addition, there should be an additional power namely the extraordinary power for 
the President. The power may be needed for extraordinary circumstances when a fundamental 
decision is required or when the state’s sovereignty is under threat, such as a constitutional 
issue concerning self‐determination. This is according to the Indonesian experience when the 
referendum to give the right of self‐determination for the province of Timor‐Timor (which is 
now Timor Leste) in 1999 had no constitutional basis. The referendum that was conducted 
during the Habibie administration was said to be unconstitutional since it had no constitutional 
basis; on the other hand, the referendum had brought a major substantial decision for the 
Timor Leste secession. In the future, to deal with similar issues, the Constitution needs to 
provide an extraordinary power for the President.  
The power of referendum would be given for a very few and special circumstances, 
under high pressure, and in a situation when there is an issue concerning state sovereignty and 
territory. The parliament is the key point for such power. An extraordinary power should be a 
dependent power. It depends only on the approval from the both chambers in the MPR (the 
DPR and the DPD) and also the Constitutional Court. 
The clause of the referendum power would be as follows: 
                                                           
911
Article 100 of the South African Constitution. 
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The President by and with the consent from the MPR, has the power to call a  referendum in a situation when 
the state sovereignty requires it or in urgent situations when there is a fundamental and essential state 
question. The Constitutional Court may give a decision on the constitutionality of a referendum to be held 
upon request by the MPR, the President, the DPR, or the DPD. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND GENERAL REMARKS 
The Fifth Amendment of the Indonesian Constitution must be put on the agenda. It 
must be an agenda to reduce the ambiguity and obscurity in most of the Articles in the 
Amended Constitution. To be consistent with the democratic sphere, the process of 
amendment must accommodate public participation. It does not only reflect the proper theory, 
but also reconciles local and global international developments. This is intended to anticipate 
global challenges faced by Indonesia.   
Since experiment with other features of government system would be more precarious, 
the presidential system still needs to be preserved in Indonesia. It is not only because its 
original reason, which relates to the Indonesian founding father’s intention of the first Republic 
of Indonesia, but also due to the idea of preserving the Indonesian presidency as the original 
Indonesian government. Although the system has often been practised along with some 
irregularities, the presidential system has for a longperiodsurvived inIndonesia. Changing to 
another system would be ineffective and inefficient for Indonesia. It would take another 
transitional period. Experimenting with a new regime will not only push Indonesia to adjust 
with the new institutional framework, but also to deal with other legal and political 
complexities that could be even more problematic. Another factor that makes the presidential 
system worth preserving is because Indonesia has to deal with the complexity of political 
institutions. The presidential system would help, at least, to reduce the complexity by providing 
a simple institution with its feature of a single executive. Furthermore, according to theory, the 
system provides checks and balances and adheres to the doctrine of the separation of powers. 
By the separation of powers and checks and balances, it is expected that conflicts of power 
between branches as well as abuse of powers can be minimized.  
However, having regard to all the considerations to keep the presidential system, it does 
not mean that Indonesia has been satisfied with the existing presidential system. The process of 
finding the best model of a presidential system in Indonesia should continue. Indonesia must 
decide and clarify in what way the presidential system would be adapted, what presidential 
model would be chosen (whether a system that gives limited executive powers to the 
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president, a system that gives wide and excessive substance of executive powers to the 
president, or a system that gives proportional executive power to the president).  
There are no perfect or best practice government systems in the world; however, it 
would be good to have the framework for the executive power which is enriched with the 
adoption and combination of some good elements that have been well practised by other 
states. With all challenges and problems faced, the original US presidential system model which 
allocates a proportional power to the Presidentis the main model for a presidential system; a 
system which empowers the President with substantive powers without being over protective 
to the President.It is a system that views the executive as not only the executive, but also as the 
sole branch that has roles as the head of government and head of state and as the organ that 
can immediately react to any kinds of challenges and can deal with modern international 
developments. On the other hand, some states such as France, Germany, Poland, and other 
states which have adopted other frameworks for the executive powers should also be 
considered as giving a good model for the executive power. 
In general, the Indonesian president should be still given at least some essential powers 
as follows:  
1. law‐making powers, including the power to initiate Laws together with the DPR, 
and other kinds of rules and regulations;  
2. the budgetary and spending power, including the budget proposal and control 
over budget expenditure;  
3. the emergency power, including the power to determine and declare state 
emergency, issue emergency law, and take any measure to overcome and 
restore the situation;  
4. the self‐defense power, including the power to invoke the use of military force;  
5. the military power including the power to lead the armed forces organization, 
the power to ensure the national security and state sovereignty, the power to 
command and mobilize military forces, and the power to take any decision to 
participate in an international intervention or military operation;  
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
 
332 
 
6. the foreign affairs power including the treaty power, the diplomatic power, and 
other foreign policy powers including the power to ensure state compliance with 
International obligations;  
7. the pardoning power;  
8. the appointment power, consisting of the appointment of state officers including 
the judicial appointment; the public officers including the military appointment, 
the chief of police appointment, the state prosecutor, etc; the executive officers 
including the ministers, state ambassadors, and other executive officers;  
9. the administrative power, including the power that is relevant to the state 
administration and local government administration, and the additional symbolic 
power to take any measure in accordance with anti‐corruption measures; and  
10. the power to call a referendum that may be applied in an extra‐ordinary 
situation when a fundamental issue arises. 
The exercise of executive power doesnot only depend on the Constitution and Laws but 
also on other factors such as the presidential election system, political bargaining, legislature’s 
support; some factors like the presidential nomination and election process may have direct or 
indirect influences. This work does not recommend how the election system should be and 
what is the best presidential election system which should be adopted for the Indonesian 
presidential system. That is another area of future research.However, to be consistent with a 
presidential model, it is necessary to preserve a direct presidential election in Indonesia. It is 
also important to encourage a strong figure whom represents an entire nation rather than 
party interest. In fact, the party coalition in the parliament and the parliamentary majority vote 
is also significant to the executive power and its exercise. The more support the President gain 
from the legislature, the more legitimate the executive power exercised by the President.  
In order to promote executive accountability in Indonesia, it is important to formulate a 
provision about executive immunity and privilege in the Constitution.912This is not only for a 
                                                           
912
The executive immunity is part of guaranteeing the balancing power among the three branches of government. 
By explicitly adopting executive immunity in the Constitution, it will give constitutional certainty to the problems 
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clarification of in what way and what limits the immunity and privilege should be given to the 
President, but also to maintain the accountability of the executive power performance. At this 
point, a qualified immunity may be plausibly adopted by the Indonesian Constitution. A 
qualified immunity should be given in order to give the President limited immunity in certain 
official issues. It has to be given by clearly expressing an immunity clause in the Constitution. 
This is in order to prevent abuse of power by the President in the area of his private capacity by 
still legally shielding the President on the area of official capacity.  
As the present Indonesian Constitution gives limited portions of the executive powers to 
the President and this removal of some substantial executive power from the President will 
provide over‐checks and over‐ control for the exercise of power. The situation will treat the 
President as an underdog vis a vis the Legislature. In fact, it contributes to the disadvantage of 
the Indonesian constitutional system as a whole, provoking unsolved institutional conflicts, and 
preventingthe President from quickly dealing with imminent challenges and problems. 
Moreover, the unsolved conflicts between the Legislative and the President have put more 
tension in their relationship. The Legislatureand the President are more often fighting for 
fighting for their institutional powers, for example on the appointment power,currently the 
appointment power of the President is not real but only just a formal power. The Legislative 
mostly dominates the appointment power; they intervene too often for political reasons. This, 
in fact, frequently obstructs the President’s actions. The Legislative actually already has enough 
tools to constrain the presidential power in this area. They can use the scrutiny and budgetary 
power to counter‐balance the Presidential powers. Moreover, they can also invoke any kind of 
constitutional mechanism such as the right of question, the right of interpellation or right of 
investigation to counter‐balance the appointment power of the President. Too many 
Legislature interventions in the appointment process, about what actually the process should 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which arise on the special issue of the institutional conflict or power conflict. An explicit executive immunity clause 
would also help to make effective the roles of the President in office, which would benefit fromprotection for any 
controversial action that must be taken during the office. However, the immunity proposed in this thesis would not 
an absolute immunity, but a limited immunity which is commonly defined as a qualified immunity. 
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be on the area of the President, will bepresenting more political interest rather than useful 
debate. 
The Constitution must enable the President to exercise the executive power as well as 
enhancing the executive accountability in order to tackle emergency situations and take any 
action when a quick response is needed. Moreover, the Constitution should clarify which power 
should be shared, which power needs to rely on another branches’ approval, and which power 
may be independently exercised by the executive. To be more adaptive to global 
developments, the President as the executive branch must be able to ensure state compliance 
with International obligations and enable the President to take any measures to react against 
any International challenges. 
The Constitution should clarify whether the executive power is a shared power which 
can only be exercised jointly with other branches, a dependence power which may only be 
exercised after the approval or consent by other branches, or a virtually substantivepower of 
the President which can be independently exercised by the President. At this point, the 
Legislature and the Court play the role to counter‐balance the executive branch. On the other 
hand, it is important to enhance the Court’s independency and roles. 
With regards to the Legislative power, the power should remain in the handsof the 
Legislative branch as a whole. It is not only to avoid excessive overlap of the presidential power, 
with the theory that the Legislature is a branch which holds the power to make law, but also to 
prevent any inefficient deadlocks and conflict between the legislature and the executive. In 
Indonesia, while preserving the legislative power in the Legislature, the President should still be 
involved in the legislative process. However, the President should not be the co‐legislator who 
equally has the same power as the Legislature but the partner‐observer in the legislative 
process. The President may initiate the bill, jointly discuss but not jointly approve the bill. In the 
joint discussion, the President would better to have the right of executive preview over the 
legislation by submitting the bill to the constitutional court in order to test the constitutionality 
of the bill. Sucha mechanism can be found in the Polish Constitution of Article 122 stating that 
the President may refer to the Constitutional Court for the constitutionality of the bills. 
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However, the process from the executive preview to the judicial preview of the legislation 
should be conducted within a limited time and should not delay the legislation process. It 
should be limited within 14 days, after which the Legislative may still go to the next stage of 
approval.   
Furthermore, the President should be given the power to make rules and regulations. In 
general, it would be plausible to look at the Polish Constitution as it provides a good model for 
the law‐making power of the President. It clarifies that the President has the power to make 
regulations, executive orders, the power to issue decisions within the scope of his authority, 
and has the power according to Article 144 to issue official acts in particular formal matters. 
On the appointment power, it is important to make a clear distinction of appointment, 
particularly the state officer appointment (members of the state institutions established by the 
Constitution) including judicial appointment, public officers appointment including military 
appointments, the chief of police appointment, the state prosecutor, etc; and the executive 
appointment including the ministers, state ambassador, and other executive officers in the area 
of the executive. On the state officer appointment (the appointment of the members of the 
state institutions), the President should be merely acting as a branch running checks and 
balances vis a vis other branches. In such powers, the President should share the power with 
the Legislature; he has the right to nominate but the appointment should be jointly made by 
the DPR and other state institutions. On the judicial appointment, the President may have the 
formal power to formalize the appointment but the real judicial appointment would be with the 
joint approval of the DPR, the President, and other state institutions.913 On the executive officer 
appointment in particularly the cabinet appointment, the President should be given 
independent powers to establish ministries, appoint, reshuffle, and dismiss the ministers. 
Moreover, for the other executive officers appointment, such as the appointment of the state 
                                                           
913 In some cases of the appointment of the Constitutional Court’s Judges, the President SBY had unilaterally 
appointed a Constitutional Court Judge without considering the transparency principle. The case on the 
appointment of Judge Patrialis Akbar had raised a question before the Administrative Court (PTUN); however, the 
Court came to its decision to revoke  the Presidential Decision 87/2013 on the appointment of Judge Patrialis 
Akbar on 23 December 2013 (accessed on: http://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/adnan‐buyung‐gembira‐atas‐
putusan‐patrialis‐sebut‐sby‐otoriter.html, 24/12/2013).  
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ambassador, the member of executive agency or other executive officers within the 
presidential office, the President should be given more actual and substantive power instead of 
only formal appointment power. For this matter, the Philippines Constitution may provide a fair 
enough power in its Constitution. There should be a Committee of appointment (CA) that 
would formally work along with the president in the selection and nomination process of the 
executive officers, but the President would be the final decision maker. Therefore, the 
appointment power in particular areas of the executive would remain in the hands of the 
President as the executive. The legislature could oversee the performance and daily work of the 
executive officer and would have the power to criticise, give opinion, or even dismissal advice. 
  As the nature of the executive is for running the state administration, the President 
should be seen as an independent branch in running the daily state administration. It would be 
necessary to clarify the ministerial departments as the executive department in the 
Constitution to strongly confirm that the ministers are under the President as the head of 
government. The use of the term “the executive department” would be like in the US 
Constitution (Section 2 of Article II). As a unitary state, the President should have the power to 
supervise, develop, and control the local government including autonomous government in 
Indonesia. The President should have the power to coordinate all the local government affairs 
including the decision for expanding or merging the local government territories. At this point, 
the Philippines may provide an appropriate model for consideration. Article X section 4 of the 
Philippines Constitution firmly states that the President has the power to exercise general 
supervision over local governments. The need to have the supervision power over the local 
government written in the Constitution is not only for confirming that Indonesia is a unitary 
state, but also to provide a constitutional basis for the President to react immediately 
whenever it is needed. The power would enable the President to manage his daily 
administration, direct and control the institution in his branch while the parliament is doing its 
function, scrutiny and oversight of the administration.  Additionally, it is also important to 
expressly determine the President’s power to intervene in the local government on the 
President’s administrative power on the grounds that he is the head of the national executive. 
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  The foreign affairs power should be mainly vested in the hands of the President. 
However, the exercise of such power would be exercised in consultation by and with the DPR. 
On the treaty making power, the President should have the main power to make a treaty by 
and with the advice from the DPR. The DPR may challenge the constitutionality of the draft of 
the treaty by submitting the draft of the treaty to the constitutional court. As a result, the 
President may only ratify the treaty after the Constitutional Court has confirmed that the treaty 
is compatible with the Constitution or the Constitution has been reconciled with the subject of 
the treaty. At this point, the mechanism of treaty power in the Polish Constitution is a good 
example to consider. According to Article 133 section (2) of the Polish Constitution, the 
President may refer to the Constitutional Court for the conformity of the treaty to the 
Constitution.914 For the treaty classification, the French Constitution may help. Article 53 French 
Constitution expressly provides the classification of treaty and determines which treaty should 
be ratified or approved by the Law.915 On the other foreign affairs power or the diplomacy 
power, again, Article 133 section (1) of the Polish Constitution may be appropriate to be 
adopted. It clearly defines the diplomatic power of the President.916 
 In a global development of the international law, it would be important to give the power 
to take any action in order to ensure state compliance with the international obligation and the 
power to make sure that the implementation of international law depends on the President. 
The reason is not only because the President as the executive is the only branchwhich could 
take any direct response but also because it is commonly recommended by International law 
that the President is the representative of the state in the international community. Moreover, 
in international law perspective, the President as the executive has to be legally responsible 
before the International adjudication to represent his state. To this extent, the President should 
be given the power to take any measure in order to ensure state compliance with the 
International obligation. 
                                                           
914
Article 133 Section 2 Polish Constitution. 
915
Article 53 French Constitution. 
916
 Article 133 Section 1 the Polish Constitution.  
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  Furthermore, as the modern international practices have rapidly developed, the term 
war has been defined broadly but seems old‐fashioned. In this context, the German 
Constitution has used a modern concept of the state of defence instead of using the term war 
power in Article 115(a). The German term of state defence may be adopted to replace war 
power on the Indonesian Constitution. Moreover, the concept of a state of national defence, as 
mentioned in the South African Constitution, would be fit to replace the concept of war. In 
common practice, such power is a dependent power to be performed upon the DPR’s approval. 
  The clarity of the determination of the term emergency would be very important. In this 
context, the German Constitution provides the determination of the term as imminent threat 
and immediate attack. The President would only exercise the emergency power on particular 
issues. The emergency power of the President would only be exercised for actual and 
immediate threats. Other than that, the President should confirm and seek approval from the 
DPR. The emergency clause in the French Constitution would also be reasonable to be adopted. 
It provides clear definition of the emergency situations.On the other hand, the Constitution 
should guarantee the power of the President to command over the military forces in times of 
peace and in times of armed conflict. At this point, the model of Supreme Commander in Chief 
by the Polish Constitution in Article 134 and Article 136 combined with the Commander in Chief 
model written in the South African Constitution may be a good model to be adopted.  
  In addition, based on the Indonesian experience of a fundamental and crucial question 
about the seccession of the province of Timor‐Timur (which is now Timor‐Leste) there should 
be an anticipatory power that might be invoked by the President. For a very fundamental state 
question, such as the issue relating to secession, right of self‐determination, or state accession 
to (what is now being designed)a union model of the AEC (ASEAN Economic Community)or any 
union models similar to the EU model, it is important to empower the President with the power 
to call a referendum. However, such power would only be exercised by and with approval from 
the two chambers of the MPR (the DPR and the DPD). The inspiration of such a referendum 
power is from the Polish Constitution (Article 125) which gives the possibility for the President 
to invoke a referendum in respect of matters of particular importance to the State. 
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 Furthermore, the President is given the power to initiate the budget while the real power 
of approval is with the DPR. After the budget is approved, the President should be given the 
power to spend the budget independently. The DPR at this point could always monitor and 
oversee the exercise of spending power of the President. This model is similar to what happens 
in the US. 
  For the pardoning power, it is worth referring to the US and the Philippines. According 
to the US pardoning clause, it is important to clearly express the limitation of pardoning power; 
that the pardoning power does not apply in the impeachment case. While in general, the 
scopes of pardoning power would be rationally defined as what is written in the Philippines. 
  It is important to consider setting a constitutional basis for the power of the President 
that relates to the establishment and control of state intelligence services. This would be not 
only in order to maintain the accountability of intelligence operations but also providing a 
constitutional check over any intelligence operations conducted in a secret way by the 
President. To this extent, Article 209 of the South African Constitution may provide a model for 
the intelligence power of the President.  
  Lastly, as corruption is one of the greatest enemies for Indonesia and in order to 
enhance the anticipation and support on the anti‐corruption commitment, a symbolic 
constitutional power, namely the anti‐corruption power for the President may also be 
considered.917The reason for giving the anti‐corruption power to the President is because the 
President, as the head of the executive has to deal with the bureaucracy within the state 
administration. The President should ensure control over the bureaucracy and the executive 
                                                           
917
Such anti‐corruption power had been introduced in the Venezuela constitutional system when President Nicolas 
Maduro seeks the national legislature to enhance his constitutional power. He seeks fast‐track legislative powers 
to enable him enacting the laws by decree without the parliament in order to help his government to fight against 
corruption (see: Ezequiel Minaya: Venezuelan Leaders Seeks to Boost His Power, the Wall Street Journal, August 
13, 2013, available online on 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324769704579009772676705350, last accessed 
12/10/2013). The Venezuelan requirement for enhancing the Presidential power was approved by the Venezuelan 
national legislature by giving a special power to the President the decree powers to fight corruption and economic 
war (see: Ryan Mallett‐Outtrim: Venezuela’s Legislature Gives Maduro Decree Powers to fight against Corruption 
and Economic War, Venezuelananalysis.com, November 20, 2013, available online on 
http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/10178, last accessed 12/10/2013. 
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department under the executive branch, includingmaking sure the application of anti‐
corruption policy on the entirety of all institutions under his branch. It is rational to give to the 
President since the President has a direct access to the cabinet, state institution, executive 
agencies, local government, and other state agencies. 
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Summary 
Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution  
A comparative study of Constitutions 
 
This PhD dissertation on “Modellling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A 
Comparative study of Constitutions” generally proposes a presidency model for Indonesia. It mainly 
addresses to seek and find an appropriate constitutional framework for giving executive powers to the 
President. The issue is crucial for the proper and effective functioning of the Presidency as one of the 
important constitutional branches. This dissertation proposes a design framework of constitutional 
provisions on the specific issue of the executive powers of the President.  
This dissertation has the main method of observing theory and comparing other Constitutions to 
draw a general conclusion on how should the Executive be established in different countries. By 
comparing the Constitutions and analysing the constitutional provisions, concerning the Executive and 
its powers, this dissertation identifies the constitutional standards on how executive powers should be 
given to the President in the Indonesian presidential system. Another method used in this dissertation is 
to referring back to the constitutional history in Indonesia, in which the executive powers have evolved 
under different Constitutions, different regimes, and different models of government systems.  
In general, the arguments in this dissertation include the Executive and its powers provided by 
different model of Constitutions, thus encompassing the general executive mode and the modes of the 
executive powers. The findings presented in this dissertation are based on the normative method of 
analysis. The Constitutions are the normative basis of analysis in this dissertation, which, along with the 
Laws and Judicial decisions, allow us not only to determine the content of certain constitutional 
structures of government, but also to identify constitutional practices which do not come directly from 
the constitutional provisions. Limiting the scope of analysis to the constitutional provisions was 
intentional, as the Constitution is the main key to creating a constitutional and legal framework for the 
system of government, a presidential system, in Indonesia.  
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There are two major issues which presented themselves as the research questions in this 
dissertation. The first issue deals with the description of the existing constitutional framework for the 
executive powers in the Indonesian Constitution and the effect of the Amendment on the Constitution 
and its implications for the executive powers of the Indonesian President. The other is the assessment of 
the Indonesian executive powers and the idea for an alternative constitutional design of the Indonesian 
executive powers that may be developed in order to improve the Indonesian presidency, reduce 
unsolved power conflicts between branches, prevent abuse power and corruption, and adapt to 
International challenges.  
The dissertation consists of six chapters. While the first chapter is an introductory chapter, the 
second chapter is devoted to issues related to defining the theory and the depiction of other 
Constitutions to seek to find constitutional regularity standards for the Executive branch and how the 
Constitutions allocate the executive powers to the executive branch. In this chapter, an attempt is made 
to classify the constitutional standards and constitutional frameworks. Moreover, the relations between 
constitutional frameworks and other frameworks that make up the group of constitutional rules defining 
the powers of the Executive in the government systems are compared and described. The third chapter 
is focussed on the historical issue related to the development of the executive and its powers in 
Indonesia. It depicts the constitutional practices within different regimes of the Indonesian Presidents. 
The fourth chapter is focused on the matters related to the Executive and the executive powers under 
the Amended Constitution. There is an attempt to present the current constitutional conditions 
concerning the interpretation of the constitutional provisions. It is also essentially to identify all 
common features of the Indonesian presidential system. The constitutional provisions of the current 
Amended Constitution and identification of the vagueness, ambiguities, irregularities and 
inconsistencies in particular issues of the Executive and its powers mentioned in the Constitution, are 
also being reviewed in this chapter. The reviews are concentrated to identify the vagueness and 
ambiguity of the constitutional provision concerning the Executive and its power. In this chapter, the 
analysis and descriptions are outlined to find problems of what is happening with the system of 
government in Indonesia generally, and in particular, problems with the Presidency and its powers.  
Finally, the solutions of problems identified in this chapter are offered. The next chapter is devoted to 
proposing a design of constitutional framework on the particular issue of the Executive and the 
executive powers. The design is based on the constitutional regularity features and common characters 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
 
343 
 
of system of governments under some Constitutions. The design being made is addressed to prevent 
abuse of powers but still preserving the normal roles of the Executive in a presidential system. Such 
design may be introduced in order to propose the fifth amendment to the Constitution in Indonesia.  
The result of the research in this dissertation confirms that the executive powers in Indonesia 
have been evolved, starting from the revolutionary strong character of the executive powers to the 
authoritarian strong character and coming to the weak character of the executive powers. Following the 
fall of the regime of President Soeharto in Indonesia, the amendment to the Constitution had been 
proposed to curb the executive powers of the President. The Amended Indonesian Constitution had 
successfully introduced a limited presidency under a presidential system by setting limits and 
interventions to the executive powers of the President. The Legislature mostly dominated the Executive; 
it made too many political interventions into the executive powers. This, in fact, frequently prevented 
the President from, acting genuinely as what it should be.  
Furthermore, it contributed to the increasing disadvantages of the Indonesian constitutional 
system as a whole, the unsolved institutional conflicts and over‐restrained the President from quickly 
reacting to deal with imminent challenges and problems. The conclusion of this dissertation generally 
affirms that the Constitutional provisions establish the key elements of the system of government in 
Indonesia. Therefore, the framework of the Constitution, which elaborated from the articles, has to be 
fixed in order to improve the performance of the Indonesian presidency. Furthermore, this dissertation 
indicates that a presidential system is the system where the President has to be given some substantial 
executive powers, in order to support the president’s functions and roles, but has to be checked and 
balanced by other institutions.   
Key words: the Constitution, the Executive, the executive powers, presidential system, the Indonesian 
President, Amendment Constitution 
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Ringkasan (Bahasa) 
Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution  
A comparative study of Constitutions 
Pemodelan Kekuasaan Eksekutif dalam Konstitusi Indonesia: 
Studi Perbandingan Konstitusi 
 
Disertasi yang berjudul “Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A Comparative 
Study of Constitutions” ini bertujuan untuk menghasilkan pemikiran sebuah model sistem presidensial 
untuk Indonesia. Disertasi ini mencoba untuk mencari dan menemukan sebuah kerangka konstitusional 
yang cocok dalam memberikan kekuasaan eksekutif kepada Presiden. Isu tersebut krusial untuk 
ketepatan dan fungsi yang efektif kelembagaan Presiden sebagai salah satu institusi konstitutional yang 
penting. Disertasi ini mengajukan proposal sebuah desain kerangka konstitusional Pasal‐Pasal Konstitusi 
tentang isu‐isu khusus terkait kekuasaan eksekutif Presiden. Salah satu metode yang digunakan dalam 
disertasi ini adalah dengan mengacu kembali pada sejarah konstitusional Indonesia, dimana kekuasaan 
eksekutif telah hidup dan berevolusi dalam beberapa konstitusi yang berbeda yang berlaku di Indonesia, 
dalam rezim pemerintahan yang berbeda, dan dalam model sistem pemerintahan yang berbeda.  
Disertasi ini mempunyai metode utama mengobservasi teori dan membandingkan konstitusi untuk 
menarik gambaran umum tentang bagaimana seharusnya institusi Eksekutif dibangun di beberapa 
negara. Dengan melakukan perbandingan beberapa Konstitusi, dan menganalisa pasal‐pasal Konstitusi 
terkait dengan Eksekutif dan kekuasaan eksekutif, disertasi ini mengidentifikasi standar konstitutional 
terkait bagaimana seharusnya kekuasaan eksekutif harus diberikan kepada presiden dalam sebuah 
sistem presidensial. 
Secara umum, argumen‐argumen dalam disertasi ini meliputi eksekutif dan kekuasaan eksekutif dalam 
model konstitusi yang berbeda, sehingga, menggambarkan model eksekutif dan kekuasaan eksekutif 
secara umum. Penemuan yang dihasilkan dalam disertasi ini didasarkan dari analisa dengan 
menggunakan metode normatif. Pasal‐Pasal dalam Konstitusi‐Konstitusi merupakan dasar norma hukum 
yang di analisa secara normatif dalam disertasi ini, yang bersamaan dengan Undang‐Undang dan 
putusan‐putusan pengadilan tidak hanya memastikan isi dari struktur konstitusional tertentu, tetapi juga 
mengidentifikasi praktek konstitutional yang tidak secara langsung berasal dari pasal‐pasal dalam 
Konstitusi. Membatasi area analisis normatif hanya pada pasal‐pasal dalam Konstitusi adalah sebuah 
tujuan dalam disertasi ini, karena Konstitusi merupakan kunci utama untuk membuat kerangka 
konstitusional dan kerangka hukum untuk sebuah sistem pemerintahan, sistem presidensial di 
Indonesia. 
Dalam disertasi ini terdapat dua isu utama yang keduanya diformulasikan dalam rumusan masalah. Isu 
pertama adalah deskripsi pasal‐pasal konstitusi yang berlaku dan ada dalam kerangka Konstitusi 
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Indonesia yang merujuk pada kekuasaan eksekutif dalam Konstitusi Indonesia dan efek Amandemen 
Konstitusi beserta implikasinya terhadap kekuasaan eksekutif. Isu kedua adalah analisa kekuasaan 
eksekutif di Indonesia dan ide alternatif desain konstitusional untuk kekuasaan eksekutif di Indonesia 
yang mungkin dapat dibangun untuk memperbaiki kepresidenan di Indonesia, mengurangi konflik 
kekuasaan antar cabang kekuasaan yang tidak terselesaikan, mengantisipasi penyalahgunaan kekuasaan 
dan korupsi, dan mengadaptasi tantangan‐tantangan internasional. 
Disertasi ini terdiri dari enam bab. Bab pertama adalah pendahuluan, bab kedua merupakan teori dan 
penggambaran Konstitusi‐Konstitusi negara lain untuk mencari dan menemukan standart umum 
konstitutional untuk cabang eksekutif dan bagaimana konstitusi‐konstitusi tersebut mengalokasikan 
kekuasaan eksekutif untuk cabang kekuasaan eksekutifnya. Dalam bab ini, dicoba untuk membuat 
sebuat pengklasifikasian standart konstitusional dan kerangka konstitusi. lebih lanjut, hubungan antara 
kerangka konstitusi dan kerangka lainnya yang mengelompokkan norma‐norma konstitutional yang 
mengatur kekuasaan eksekutif dalam sistem pemerintahan yang berbeda diperbandingkan dan 
dideskripsikan. Bab ketiga difokuskan pada isu historis yang berkaitan dengan perkembangan eksekutif 
dan kekuasaannya di Indonesia. Bab tersebut menggambarkan praktek konstitusional dalam rezim 
kepresidenan yang berbeda di Indonesia. Bab empat difokuskan terkait dengan eksekutif dan kekuasaan 
eksekutif yang diatur dalam Konstitusi Indonesia setelah amandemen. Dalam bab ini diulas tentang 
kondisi konstitutional terkini dibawah rezim konstitusi amandemen Indonesia melalui interpretasi pasal‐
pasalnya. Dalam bab ini juga dipandang perlu untuk mengidentifikasikan fitur umum sistem presidensial 
di Indonesia. Pasal‐pasal dalam Konstitusi Indonesia setelah amandemen dan identifikasi ketidakjelasan, 
keambiguan, ketidakwajaran, dan ketidakkonsistenan terutama dalam isu eksekutif dan kekuasaan 
eksekutif yang diatur dalam Konstitusi akan dianalisa dalam bab ini. Analisa akan dikonsentrasikan untuk 
menidetifikasi ketidakjelasan dan keambiguan pasal‐pasal konstitusi terkait dengan eksekutid dan 
kekuasaannya. Dalam bab ini, analisa dan deskripsi diuraikan untuk mencari masalah‐masalah yang 
terjadi dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia secara umum, dan khususnya, masalah‐masalah yang terkait 
dengan kepresidenan dan kekuasaannya. Pada akhirnya, solusi‐solusi terhadap masalah‐masalah yang 
telah diidentifikasikan dalam bab ini diberikan. Bab selanjutnya dikhususkan untuk mengidekan sebuah 
desain kerangka konstitusional terkait isu eksekutif dan kekuasaannya. Desain ini didasarkan pada fitur 
konstitusional dan karakter‐karakter yang pada umumnya terdapat pada sistem pemerintahan dibawah 
konstitusi‐konstitusi yang berbeda. Desain yang dibuat ditujukan untuk mengantisipasi penyalahgunaan 
kekuasaaan dengan tetap mempertahankan fungsi eksekutif yang sebenarnya dalam sebuah sistem 
presidensial. Desain tersebut diharapkan dapat diintrodusir dalam proses amandemen konstitusi kelima 
di Indonesia.   
Hasil penelitian dalam disertasi ini menegaskan bahwa kekuasaan eksekutif di Indonesia telah 
berkembang secara berevolusi, dimulai dari karakter revolusioner kuat kekuasaan eksekutif berkembang 
menjadi kekuasaan eksekutif yang berkarakter otoriter kuat, dan beralih menjadi kekuasaan eksekutif 
yang mempunyai karakter lemah. Setelah jatuhnya rezim Soeharto di Indonesia, amandemen terhadap 
Konstitusi di Indonesia telah memangkas kekuasaan eksekutif presiden Indonesia. Amandemen 
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terhadap Konstitusi di Indonesia telah berhasil mengintrodusir kepresidenan yang berbatas dalam 
sebuah sistem presidensial dengan memberikan batasan‐batasan dan intervensi‐intervensi terhadap 
kekuasaan eksekutif presiden. Legislatur bertendensi dominan terhadap eksekutif dengan terlalu banyak 
memberikan intervensi politik terhadap kekuasaan eksekutif. Hal ini, dalam faktanya, telah berulang kali 
menghalangi presiden untuk melakukan hal yang seharusnya dilakukan oleh presiden. Lebih lanjut, hal 
tersebut berkontribusi untuk meningkatkan kerugian‐kerugian sistem konstitusional Indonesia secara 
menyeluruh, memprovokasi konflik institutional yang tidak terselesaikan, dan pengekangan berlebihan 
terhadap presiden untuk secara cepat berreaksi menghadapi tantangan nyata dan permasalahan‐
permasalahan.  
Kesimpulan dalam disertasi ini secara umum mengafirmasi bahwa pasal‐pasal konstitusi membangun 
elemen‐elemen kunci sistem pemerintahan di Indonesia. Sehingga, kerangka konstitutional yang 
dijabarkan dalam pasal‐pasal konstitusi harus direvisi untuk meningkatkan kinerja kepresidenan di 
Indonesia. Disertasi ini juga memberi indikasi bahwa sistem presidensial adalah sistem dimana presiden 
harus diberikan beberapa substansial kekuasaan eksekutif yang mendukung fungsi dan perannya, tetapi 
kekuasaan tersebut tetap harus diimbangi dengan mekanisme cek dari cabang kekuasaan yang lainnya. 
Kata kunci: Konstitusi, Eksekutif, Kekuasaan Eksekutif, Sistem President, Presiden Indonesia, 
Amandemen Konstitusi. 
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Appendix 1 
Excerpts from The First Indonesian 1945 Constitution (the UUD 1945 18 August 1945)  
Source: Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan UUD 1945, Edisi Revisi, Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan 
Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2012 (translation by the author) 
Articles  
Provision III of the 
Transitional Provision 
At the first time the Republic of Indonesia is established, the President and the Vice President shall be elected by 
the Preparatory Committee for Indonesia’s Independence 
Provision IV of the 
Transitional provision 
Prior to the formation of the MPR, the DPR, and the DPA in accordance with this Constitution, all their powers 
shall be exercised by the President assisted by a a national committee 
Article 3 The MPR has the power to enact the Constitution and the GBHN (the guidelines of the state policy) 
Article 5 section (1) 
 
The President shall hold the power to make Laws with the DPR’s approval 
Article 5 section (2) The President shall make the government regulationsas the directives to the Laws 
Article 10 
 
The President is the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. 
Article 11 With the approval from the DPR, the President declares war, makes peace and concludes treaties with other 
states 
Article 12  The President declares the state of emergency.  The conditions for such a declaration and the measures to deal 
with the emergency shall be set by law. 
Article 13 section (1) The President appoints ambassadors and consuls 
Article 13 section (2) The President receives the credentials of foreign ambassadors 
Article 14 The President grants mercy, amnesty, pardon, and restoration of rights 
Article 15 The President grants titles, decorations, and other distinctions of honors 
Article 17 Section (1) The President shall be assisted by the Ministers of State. 
Article 17 Section (2) The ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President 
Article 17 Section (3) The Ministers shall head the government departments 
Article 22 Section (1) 
 
In case of a compelling emergency, the President has the right to issue government regulations in lieu of laws 
(the emergency laws) 
 
Article 22 Section (2) 
 
Such regulations shall have the consent from the DPR during its subsequent sessions 
Article 22 Section (3) Where the approval of the DPR is not obtained, the government regulation shall be revoked 
Chapter VII on State 
Finance, Article 23 
section (1) 
The annual state budgetary shall be set by law. In case of the DPR rejects the draft of budget, the government 
shall adopt the budget of the preceding year 
Article 23 section (5) In order to examine the accountability of the state finances, a State Auditor shall be established by law. The audit 
report of the state auditor shall be reported to the DPR. 
Transitional Provision 
Clause IV 
Prior to the formation of the MPR, the DPR, the DPA (Supreme Advisory Council) in accordance with this 
Constitution, all their powers shall be exercised by the President assisted by a national committee. 
Chapter VII  paragraph 
2-4 
 
 
The President in exercising his powers has to take into consideration of the DPR’s opinion. The President cannot 
dissolve the DPR. The members of the DPR are also members of the MPR. The DPR is acting as counterbalance to 
the President. It functioned to oversee that the President’s has to act in accordance with the guidelines of the 
state policy which been set by the MPR. In any reasons that the DPR is in opinion that the President has acted in 
contrarary to the state policy as laid down in the Constitution and the state guidelines that had set by the MPR, 
the MPR can call for a special session and request for the president’s accountability 
Article 22 of the 
constitutional 
explanation 
Article 22 of the Constitution concerns the emergency rights (noodverordeningsrect) of the President. The 
necessity to have the article 22 is that the article will give constitutional basis for the government to guarantee 
the safety of the country by taking prompt and appropriate action. However, by the article, the government 
cannot eschew from the DPR’s control. The DPR mayput intervention to the president’s emergency power by 
approving the emergency law issued by the President on behalf of government. 
The annotation to the 
constitutional provision 
23 
Besides the DPR represents the peoples  and whereas the people has the right to participate in determining the 
state income and expenses, how the government spends the money (approved by the DPR) 
Annotation IV  “Under the People’s Consultative Assembly, the President is the highest government executive. In running the 
administration, the power and the responsibility are restedin the President. 
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Appendix 2 
Excerpts from The Federal Republic Indonesia Constitution 1949 (KRIS 1949) 
Translation by the author 
Articles  
Chapter III The state institutions are the President, the ministers, the senate, the people representative (the DPR), the 
Indonesia Supreme Court, and the Council of state financial auditor. 
Article 68 Section (1) The President and the ministers altogether are the government of the State.  
Article 68 Section (2) As the state government, the President and a minister or some or all the ministers, have special responsibility or 
general responsibility. The government of the State has to be in Jakarta and in case of the state of emergency, the 
government has the power to decide other places to be the head quarter of the state 
Article 85 Section (1) The President has the power to appoint the Chief of Senate according to the advice of the Senate. 
Article 117 (2) The government has the power to establish the Indonesia state welfare and specially to maintain the Constitution, 
the Federal Law, and other rules that are applied in Indonesia  
Article 120 section (2) The Ministers have to give written or oral explanation to the DPR as they required, as long as it is not against the 
public interest of the Republic Federal of Indonesia 
Article 123 Section (1) The government takes notice to the Senate only if it deemed to be necessary.  
Section (3) The Senate is to be considered about the important and special affairs regarding some or all states or 
part of the states or a special relationship between the Republic Federal of Indonesia and the states. The rule is 
excluded in any urgent and emergency situation that needed to be taken of an emergency action while the Senate 
is in recess. 
Section (4) The Senate is considered instead of the bill of the emergency law 
Section (5) The Government shall have to notify the Senate all the decisions that the Senate has the right to be 
considered 
Section (6) In accordance that the Senate is considered, it is mentioned in the head of the Decision Letter 
Article 128 section(1) The proposal from the Government on the Legislation is delivered to the DPR through the Presidential message and 
will be sent to the Senate to be noted. 
Article 128 section (2) The Senate has the right to propose the bill of legislation to the DPR on particular issues regarding to Article 127a. 
The Senate uses the rights by notifyng the copy of bill proposal to the President. 
Article 128 section (3) The DPR has the right to propose the bill of the Legislation to the Government. 
Article 139 section (1) The Government has the right to authorize and responsible to enact the emergency law, to adjust to the 
establishment of the Federal administration in time of emergency that needs to be taken in action.  
 
Article 139 Section 
(2) 
The emergency lawsare the Federal Law without prejudice 
Article 140 section (2) If the emergency law is rejected by the DPR, the law is no longer valid.  
Article 140 Section 
(3) 
If the emergency law is no longer valid and it is not being amended, the Federal law shall take action on it. 
Article 140 Section 
(4) 
If the rules determined in the emergency law is changed and enacted as the federal laws, all the consequences shall 
be adjusted to the laws. 
Article 141 Section 
(1)  
The government regulations as directive to the Legislation are made by the government and have the functions to 
implement the legislation 
 
Article 141 Section 
(2) 
The government regulationscan be completed with the sanctions. The sanction is limited by the Federal laws. 
Article 160 Section 
(1) 
The President shall have the right to give pardon. The pardon shall be given after the advice from the Supreme 
Court, and given by the Federal law without asking other Courts to give the advice. 
Article 160 Section 
(2) 
If the capital punishment is determined by the Court, it shall not be executed before the President decided to give 
or reject the pardon 
Article 160 Section 
(3) 
The Amnesty shall only be given by the Federal Law or according to the authorization of the Federal Law by the 
President after asking for the advice from the Supreme Court 
Article 176  According to the treaty and agreements that determined by Article 175, the Government shall decide to participate 
in the International organizations 
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Article 178 The President appoints the Republic Federal of Indonesia’s representatives for other states and accepts other 
states representatives 
Article 181 (1) The Government has the power of state defense affairs 
Article 181 Section 
(3) 
The officers of the state defense are appointed, promoted, and dismissed on behalf of the President and according 
to the Federal Law 
Article 184 section (1) According to the Federal Law, the Government declares the Republic Federal of Indonesia or part of the state is 
under the war or under the emergency war when it is necessary and urgent for the national interest and 
international security 
Article 184 section (2) The Federal Law regulates the consequences of the declaration of the state of emergency and stipulates that the 
civil power according to the Constitution, the public order, and the policy, can be transferred to other civil powers 
or military powers. Whereas, civil authority can be subjected to the military powers. 
Article 186 The “Konstituante” (the Committee of Constitution), together with the Government shallimmediately set the 
Constitution of Republic of Federal Indonesia replacing the temporary Constitution 
Article 187 Section 
(1) 
The draft of the Constitution is made by the Government with the presidential mandate to the Konstituante to be 
discussed in a session 
Article 187 Section 
(2) 
The Government shall ensure that the draft of the Constitution is according to the development of the Republic of 
the Federal Indonesia, the people’s will and democracy in article 43 and 46 
Article 188 (1) The “Konstituante” consists of all members of the DPR that has been elected according to Article 111, the new 
Senate that has been elected according to Article 97 and the ad-hoc members. 
Article 189 (1) the “Konstituante” cannot held session and decide the draft of the New Constitution if the session is not held by 
at least 2/3 of the members 
(2) the Konstituante has the right to change the draft of the Constitution. The new Constitution is enacted if the 
draft of the Constitution is accepted by at least 2/3 of the present members and will be validated by the 
Government 
(3) If the draft of the Constitution has been accepted by the Konstituante, it will be sent to the President to be 
validated by the Government. The Government shall validate the draft of the Constitution immediately and shall 
publish the Constitution 
(4) Each of the states is given the opportunity to accept the Constitution. In term that the State does not accept the 
Constitution, the Federal State has the right to discuss on a special relationship of the Republic Federal of Indonesia 
and the Kingdom of the Netherlands 
Article 196 After the Constitution is enacted, the Government order a committee that is appointed to run its duties as the 
direction, work and make sure that the rules that are needed by the Constitution is set, and all the Laws is set and 
adjusted according to the Constitution 
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Appendix 3 
Excerpts from The Temporary Constitution 1950 of Indonesia (the UUDS 1950) 
Translation by the author 
Articles  
Article 45  1. the President is the head of the state. 
2. in exercising his duties, the President is assisted by a Vice President 
3. the President and the Vice President is elected according to the Law 
4. For the first time, the Vice President is appointed by the President with the advice by the DPR 
Article 46 1. The President and the vice president hold the position in the government office 
2. The government is based in Jakarta. In term of emergency, the government has the right to decide others 
Article 48 If the President died, resign, or cannot run his duties in his office period, he can be replaced by his vice president until the 
office term is finished 
Article 50 The President establishes the ministries. 
Article 52 1. In a joint discussion session to discusspublic interests of the Republic of Indonesia, the Ministers hold the Council 
Minister session which are chaired by the Prime minister or if the Prime minister is in absence, by the Minister who is 
appointed by the Council of the Minister 
2. The Council of the Minister always informs all the important affairs to the President and the Vice President. A minister 
has the duties to do so in terms of the special affairs that are belongs to his duty 
Article 55 1. the president, vice president, and ministersare prohibited tohave double offices, neither in Indonesia nor abroad 
2.the President, the vice President and ministers are prohibited to directly or indirectly involved in a corporation according 
to the agreement to have profits or benefits, neither with the Republic of Indonesia nor with one of the autonomy 
provinces in Indonesia 
3. They cannot have any claims on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia except for general state obligations   
4. The prohibitions are also valid for the period three years after the office is finished 
Article 79  1. The chief, the vice-chief and the Supreme Court members are appointed according to the laws. The appointment is for 
the whole life 
2. The Legislation decides that the Chief, the vice-chief, or the members of the Supreme Court, to be dismissed in certain 
ages 
3. They can be dismissed or fired according to the procedures set by the laws 
4. They can be dismissed by the President or by their proposal 
Article 81  1. The chief or the vice chief or the members of the state auditoris appointed according to the laws. The appointment is for 
the whole life. 
2. The Legislation decides that the chief, the vice chief, or the members of the state auditor is dismissed in certain ages 
3. They can be removed or dismissed according to the laws 
4. The can be dismissed by the President 
Article 83 
section 1 
The President and the Vice President are inviolability 
Article 83 
Section (2) 
The Ministers are responsible for all the government policy either jointly or individually 
Article 84 The President has the rights to dissolve the DPR. A presidential decision declares the dissolution and orders to set the new 
DPR’s election within 30 days 
Article 85 All the Presidential decrees including those concerning the performance of presidential military powers military powers 
shall be countersigned by the ministers; except for the decree concerning on the appointment of the vice president (upon 
the recommendations submitted by the House of representative in article 45 paragraph 4) and decree concerning the 
appointment of the cabinet committee and of ministers in accordance to the recommendation of the cabinet committee 
(article 52 paragraph 4). 
Article 87 the President gives the honorable titles according to the laws 
Article 90 1. The government’s proposal on the bill of the legislation is delivered to the DPR by the presidential message 
2. The DPR has the right to propose the bill of legislation to the government 
Article 91 the DPR has the right to change the proposal of Legislation that is proposed by the Government 
Article 92 1. If the DPR accepts the proposal of legislation either with or without any changes, the proposal is sent with the 
notification to the President 
2. If the DPR rejects the proposal of legislation from the government, it shall be notified to the President 
Article 93 if the DPR decides to process the proposal of Legislation, they will send the proposal to be validated by the government to 
the President 
Article 94 1. As long as the proposal of Legislation has not been accepted by the DPR according to the law, the proposal can 
be withdrawn by the government 
2. The Government shall validate the proposal of Legislation that has been accepted except if within one month, it 
is being challenged.  
3. The validation by the government or the government’s objection as mentioned in previous article will be notified 
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by the DPR 
Article 96  Section 1. The government has the right of authority and responsibility to set the emergency law that determined the state 
administration and the government affairs because of the urgent situation that shall need to be immediately anticipated.  
Section 2 of the Article stipulates that the emergency law has the power and the degree as legislation. 
Article 97  1. The rules which are determined in the emergency law, after they are set, shall be delivered to the DPR at least in the next 
session. The DPR will discuss the law according to the procedures 
2. If the emergency law is rejected, the law is invalid. 
3. If the emergency law is invalid and does not determine the consequences, either the situation can be recovered or not, it 
shall have to be determined the action in anticipating the result and consequences.  
4. If the substance on the emergency law is changed and the emergency law is set as legislation, the results and its 
consequences shall be determined according to the law 
Article 98 1. The rules establish legislation is set by the Government. It is called by the government rules 
2. The government rules can have criminal sanctions against the violation. The sanction is limited by the legislation 
Article 99 
Section (1) 
the Legislation and the government rules can order other state institutions to regulate certain subjects which are 
determined in the laws 
Article 106 
Section (1) 
the President, the vice president, the ministers, the chief and the vice chief and the members of the DPR, the chief, the vice 
chief and the members of the Supreme Court, state prosecutor in the Supreme Court, the chief, the vice chief, and the 
members of the council of the state financial supervisor, the President of the bank, the members of the highest institutions 
and other state officers who are appointed by the legislation, are prosecuted in the first and highest Supreme Court after 
their resignation. The prosecution can be held because of the crimes and official violation and other crimes and other 
violations that are determined by the legislation and acted within their office 
Article 107 1. The President has the right to give pardoning. The pardoning is given after asking the advice from the Supreme 
Court 
2. In case of death penalty, it cannot be executed before the President decides to give or not to give the pardoning 
3. The Amnesty and abolition is only be given by law or on behalf of the law, by the President after asking the 
advice to the Supreme Court 
Article 109 
Section 4 
Valid payment tools are diffused by the government of the Republic of Indonesia or the bank. 
Article 111 
Section 1 
The government holds the financial general affairs. The state financial is managed and responsible according to the law 
Article 112 
Section 1 
The state auditor shall audit the state financial. Furthermore, section 2 of the Article stated that the report of the 
auditingare submitted to the DPR 
Article 114 1. The proposal ofthe state budget legislation is proposed to the DPR bu the government in early of the year that shall not 
within 2 years 
2. The proposal to amend the state budget legislation is proposed to the DPR by the government 
Article 116 the  state expenses and the state incomes of the Republic of Indonesia are being responsible to the DPR 
Article 117 The government shall not collect tax, customs for the benefit of the state instead of according to the Law or authorized by 
the laws 
Article 120 
Section 1 
the President makes and ratifies treaty and other agreements between other states. Instead of contradictory to the laws, 
the treaty or other agreements shall not be ratified. They shall be approved by the Legislation”. 
Article 120 
Section 2 
The President concludes and decidestreaty and other agreements by the Laws” 
Article 127 
Section 1 – 
Section 3 
1. the President has the highest power in the army of the Republic of Indonesia.  
2. the government assigns the army under a commander in chief. The President has the power to appoint and 
dismiss the army officers.  
3. the army officers are appointed and dismissed by and on behalf of the President according to the laws”. 
Article 128  the President shall not declare war instead of by the approval from the DPR. 
Article 129 
Section 1 
According to the laws, the President can declare the Republic of Indonesia or part of the Republic of Indonesia is under 
dangerous situationson the basis of state security, public interest and international security 
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Appendix 4 
Excerpts from The Amended Constitution of Indonesia (the “UUDNRI 1945”) 
Source: Indonesia’s Constitution of 1945, Reinstated in 1959, with Amendments through 2002, Constitute, 
accessed at www.constituteproject.org  
Articles   
Article 11 Section (1) “The President with the approval from the DPR declares war, makes peace and concludes treaty with other 
countries”. 
Article 11 Section (2) “The President in making other international agreements, whichpotentially create an extensive and fundamental 
impact on the people,influence the state financial burden, and/or require an amendment to or the enactment of a 
law, shall obtain the approval from the DPR”. 
 
Article 13 Section (1) The President appoints ambassadors and consuls.  
Article 13 Section (2) In the appointment of ambassadors, the President takes into account the consideration of the DPR 
Article 13 Section (3) The President receives the accreditation of ambassadors of foreign nations by taking into account the consideration 
of the DPR 
Article 16 The President establishes an Advisory Council which has the duty to give advice and consideration to the President. 
Furthermore, the establishment shall be regulated by Law 
Article 17 Section (1) the Ministers are the President’s assistant 
Article 20A Section 
(1) 
The DPR shall hold legislative, budgeting and oversight functions 
Article 22  Section 1: In time of urgent and emergency situation, the President has the power to issue the government rule in 
lieu the Legislation/ the emergency law 
Section 2: Such law shall have approval from the DPR in the next session. However, if the DPR rejects, it shall be 
revoked 
Article 24A Section 
(3) 
 
The candidates of the Supreme Court judges are proposed to the judicial commission to the DPR to have its 
approval. They will be formally appointed as the Supreme Court judges by the President. 
Article 24C Section 
(3) 
The Constitutional Court has 9 judges that formally appointed by the President.  The candidates are proposed by 
each 3 judges from the Supreme Court, 3 judges form the DPR, and the three Judges from the President 
Article 30 Section (3) The TNI (the “Tentara Nasional Indonesia”: the Indonesian National Military) consists of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, as the state instrument, has duties to defend, protect, and maintain the state sovereignty and integrity 
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Appendix 5 
Excerpts from the National Legislations 
Source: the Indonesian Laws, translation by the author 
Articles  
 Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations 
Article 6 Section (1) 
Law No. 37/1999 
The power to establish the International relation and to apply political foreign policy is in the hand of the President. 
Whereas, the power to declare war, make peace, and the agreements with other states needs approval from the DPR 
Article 6 Section (2) 
Law No. 37/1999 
The President delegates the power to establish the International relation and to apply  the Republic of Indonesia 
political foreign policy to the Minister 
Article 7 Section (1) 
Law No. 37/1999 
The President appoints the state official in addition to the foreign affairs minister, the government official, or others 
in order to establish foreign affairs relation in a particular field 
Article 9 Section (1) 
Law No. 37/1999 
The establishment and the termination of the diplomatic or consular with other states and the membership and the 
membership termination from the international organization shall be decided by the President with the consideration 
from the DPR. 
Article 9 Section (2) 
Law No. 37/1999 
To establish and shutdown the diplomatic or consular representative office in other countries or the representative 
office of Indonesian government in the international organization, the President shall make Presidential Decision. 
Article 10 Law No. 
37/1999 
To send the troops or the peace keeping mission are decided by the President with the consideration from the DPR” 
Article 22 Law No. 
37/1999 
In terms of war or the termination of the diplomatic relation with other countries, the minister or the state officer 
assigned by the President, coordinates effort for secure and protect national interest including the citizen. 
Article 25 Law No. 
37/1999 
Section 1: “the Authority to grant asylum for foreigner is in the hand of the President with the consideration from the 
minister”;  
Section (2): further shall be regulated by a presidential decision” 
Article 27 Section 
(1) Law No. 
37/1999 
The President decides the policy against the refugees from outside countries with the consideration from the 
minister; in section (2), the main policies shall be regulated by the Presidential decision. 
 Law No. 24/2000 on International Agreements 
Article 2 Law 
24/2000 
The Foreign Minister has the competence to give the political consideration and take any actions against the treaty 
making and its ratification. However, the Competences shall be consulted with the DPR 
Article 5 Section (1) 
Law No. 24/2000 
The state institutions and the government institutions, whether it is a department or a non- department, in the 
national level and local level, that has an initiative to make international agreements,shall consult and coordinate 
with the minister.  
The explanation off 
Article 11 Section 
(2) Law No. 
24/2000 
Although the President does not need to ask for the DPR’s approval, the DPR can oversee the government in terms of 
treaty implementation, by monitoring the implementation the Laws (which transform a treaty or an agreement). 
 Law No. 2/2002 on the State Police of the Republic Indonesia 
Article 11 Law No. 
2/2002 
Within 20 days of work after the Presidential letter, the DPR shall give approval or disapproval. However, in case that 
the DPR does not give any decisions, the candidate of the chief of police is assumed to be approved by the DPR. In 
any urgent case, the Presidenttemporary dismisses the chief of police and appoint a temporary chief and ask the 
DPR’s approval. 
 Law No. 34/2004 on the National Army of Indonesia 
Article 13 Law 
34/2004 
The President proposes one name of the candidate chief of military to have the DPR’s approval. The approval from 
the DPR on the candidate of the chief military shall be given at least 20 days work after the proposal is received. In 
case that the DPR rejects; the President shall propose other candidates. However, in case there is no response from 
the DPR, the DPR is assumed to be agreed with the President’s nominee 
 Law No. 16/2004 on the State Prosecutor 
Article 37 Law 
16/2004 
The state prosecutor shall accountably make a report and shall submit it to the President and the DPR. 
 Law No. 1/2004 on the State Treasury 
Article 41 Law 
1/2004  
The government makes long-term investment to have economic, social, or other benefits. It can be in the form of 
shares, obligations, and direct investments. The government encloses its shares to the state company, local 
government company, or private company. 
 
Article 46 Law 
1/2004 
 The DPR’s approval shall be needed for transferring assets, property of land,building, and state property more than 1 
Billion Rupiah. 
Article 58 Section 
(1) Law 1/2004 
For the improvement of the government performance, the transparency and the accountability of the state finances 
management, the President as the head of the government, has the power to comprehensively direct and establish 
the system of the internal government control.  
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 Law. No. 39/2008 on the State Ministry 
Article 14 Law 
39/2008 
For the purpose of synchronization and coordination among the ministerial affairs, the President may establish a 
ministry of coordination”. 
Article 22 Law 
39/2008 
The requirements to be appointed as minister are as follows:Indonesia citizenship, loyal to God, loyal to the 
“Pancasila” as the state ideology, devoted to the UUD NRI 1945 as the Indonesia constitution,devoted to the aims of 
the proclamation of independence, physically and mentally health, having high integrity and good personality and 
never been sentenced to prison under the court decisions for committing serious crimes  
Article 20 Law No. 
39/2008 
The liquidation of a ministry (education, culture, health, social, labor, industry, trade, mining, energy, public work, 
transmigration, transportation, information, communication, agriculture, plantation, forestry, animal husbandry, 
marine and fisheries, national development planning, state apparatus, state secretariat, state company, land, 
population, environment, science, technology, investment, cooperation, small and medium enterprises, tourism, 
woman empowering, sports, housing and construction area or disadvantages area) shall have with the DPR 
consideration. The DPR consideration shall also be asked by the President in terms of the liquidation of the ministry 
of religion, Justice, finance, and defense. 
 Law No. 27/2009 on the People Assemby, the People Representative Council, the Local 
Representative Council, and the Local People Representative Council 
Article 265 Law No. 
27/2009 
Section 2: A member of the DPD shall not be prosecute and accused before the Court for the statement, question, 
and/or opinion which delivered either written or unwritten within the DPD’s session or outside the DPD’s session 
that related to the functions, duties and authorities of the DPD.  
Section 3: A member of the DPD shall not be removed because of the statement, questions, and/or the opinion that 
deliver within the session or outside session that related to the function, duties and authority of the DPD.  
 Law No. 12/2011 on The Law Making  
Article 8 Section (2) 
LawNo.12/2011 
The Ministerial Rules, as long as ordered by the higher law are regarded as law and have legal binding  
The explanation of 
Article 8 Law No. 
12/2011 
The Ministerial Rules are rules which set by a Minister in order to particular government affairs 
Article 52 Law No. 
12/2011 
Section 4: In case that the DPR gives approval to an emergency law, such law shall be set as the Legislation.  
Section 5: In case that the DPR disapproves the emergency law, the emergency law shall be revoked and shall be 
declared invalid by Law. 
Article 155 Law No. 
12/2011 
The making of budgetary framework is based on the work plans of the government in order to implement the state’s 
purposes. The government’s work plansaremade by the Government to be discussed and jointly agreed with the DPR. 
The Government work plans which have been discussed and jointly agreed are the guideline to arrange the state 
budget and shall be set as the state budget by a Presidential Decision 
 Law No. 17/2011 on State Intelligence 
Article 41 Law 
17/2011 
The state intelligence activities cost are funded by the state budget 
Article 36 Law 
17/2011 
The DPR’s consideration against the candidate of the Chief of the state intelligence is given at least within 20 working 
daysafter the request of a consideration is received by the DPR 
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Appendix 6 
Excerpts from The US Constitution 
Source: the United State of America’s Constitution of 1789 with Amendments through 1992, generated from 
excerpts of texts from the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project, accessed at 
www.constituteproject.org  
Article II 
Section 1 
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term 
of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, 
chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows: 
 
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector. 
 
[The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an 
Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of 
Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House 
of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number 
of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be 
more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall 
immediately choose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the 
List the said House shall in like Manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall be taken by 
States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or 
Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after 
the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But 
if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall choose from them by Ballot the Vice 
President.]* 
 
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day 
shall be the same throughout the United States. 
 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizenof the United States, at the time of the Adoption of thisConstitution, 
shall be eligible to the Office of President;neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shallnot have attained to 
the Age of thirty five Years, and beenfourteen Years a Resident within the United States. 
 
[In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or ofhis Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and 
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on theVice President, and the Congress may by Law provide forthe Case of 
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, bothof the President and Vice President, declaring what Officershall then act as 
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly,until the Disability be removed, or a Presidentshall be elected.]* 
 
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services,a Compensation, which shall neither be increased 
nordiminished during the Period for which he shall have beenelected, and he shall not receive within that Period anyother 
Emolument from the United States, or any of them. 
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shalltake the following Oath or Affirmation:- “I do solemnly swear (or 
affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office ofPresident of the United States, and will to the best of myAbility, preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution ofthe United States.” 
 
Article II 
Section 2 
The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal 
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he 
shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. 
 
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the 
Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, 
whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may 
by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments. 
 
The President shall have Power to fi ll up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session. 
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Article II 
Section 3 
He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their 
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both 
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may 
adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States. 
 
Article II 
Section 4 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, 
and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors. 
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Appendix 7 
Excerpts from The Philippines Constitution 
Source: Philippines’s Constitution of 1987, generated from excerpt of texts from repository of the Comparative 
Constitutions Project, accessed at www.constituteprojects.org  
Article I on 
National Territory 
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all 
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and 
aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. 
The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and 
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. 
 
Article II on 
Declaration of 
Principles and 
State Policies 
Principles Section 2 
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of 
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, 
cooperation, and amity with all nations. 
Article VII Section 1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. 
Article VII Section 2 No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to 
read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten 
years immediately preceding such election. 
Article VII Section 3 There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with, and in 
the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President. 
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation. 
Article VII Section 4 The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall 
begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same 
date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as 
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any 
time. 
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length 
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was 
elected. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the 
second Monday of May. 
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each 
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the 
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open 
all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the 
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass 
the votes. 
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an 
equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the 
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately. 
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates. 
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and 
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. 
 
Article VII Section 5 Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice-President, or the Acting President shall take 
the following oath or affirmation: 
"I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President [or Vice-
President or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to 
every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." 
[In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted]. 
 
Article VII Section 6 The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by 
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the 
expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their 
tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source. 
 
Article VII Section 7 The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms. 
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have 
qualified. 
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have 
been chosen and qualified. 
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If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently 
disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President. 
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died 
or become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified. 
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a 
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials 
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph. 
 
Article VII Section 8 In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall 
become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or 
resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have 
been elected and qualified. 
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation 
of the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, 
and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President. 
 
Article VII Section 9 Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the 
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives 
who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, 
voting separately. 
 
Article VII Section 
10 
The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and 
Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days, enact a law 
calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor 
later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under 
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by 
the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be 
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the 
Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy 
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election. 
 
Article VII Section 
11 
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his 
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a 
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice- President as Acting 
President. 
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office, the Vice- President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting 
President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. 
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the 
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall 
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call. 
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days 
after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the 
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office. 
 
Article VII Section 
12 
In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members of the 
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines shall not be denied access to the President during such illness. 
 
Article VII Section 
13 
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless 
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, 
during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially 
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any 
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their 
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. 
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during 
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his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as 
Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled 
corporations and their subsidiaries. 
Article VII Section 
14 
Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected President, 
within ninety days from his assumption or re-assumption of office. 
Article VII Section 
15 
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting 
President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued 
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. 
 
Article VII Section 
16 
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the 
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the 
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He 
shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, 
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other 
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or 
boards.  
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or 
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or 
until the next adjournment of the Congress. 
Article VII Section 
17 
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws 
be faithfully executed. 
Article VII Section 
18 
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes 
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of 
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any 
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. 
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may 
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative 
of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be 
determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. 
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in 
accordance with its rules without need of a call.  
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis 
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension 
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. 
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil 
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over 
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion 
or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion. 
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be 
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released. 
Article VII Section 
19 
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, 
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. 
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress. 
Article VII Section 
20 
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior 
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board 
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report 
of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned 
and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters 
as may be provided by law. 
Article VII Section 
21 
No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the 
Members of the Senate. 
Article VII Section 
22 
The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as the basis 
of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from existing 
and proposed revenue measures. 
 
Article VII Section 
23 
The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it at any 
other time. 
Article IX B on the 
Civil Service 
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on 
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold 
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Commission 
Section 1 (2) 
office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without 
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall 
any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. 
Article IX C on the 
Commission on 
Elections Section 1 
(2) 
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on 
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold 
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. 
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be 
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. 
Article IX C on the 
Commission on 
Elections Section 5 
No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be 
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission. 
Article IX D on the 
Commission on 
Audit Section 1 (2) 
The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on 
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold 
office for seven years, one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without 
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. 
In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. 
Article X on Local 
Government 
Section 4 
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to 
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays, shall ensure 
that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions. 
Article X on Local 
Government 
Section 14 
The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies composed of local government 
officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental 
organizations within the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the 
units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region. 
Article X on Local 
Government 
Section 16 
The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. 
Article XI on 
Accountability of 
Public Officers 
Section 2 
The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional 
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable 
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All 
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment. 
Article XI Section 9 The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by 
the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall 
require no confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur. 
Article XI Section 
16 
No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or 
indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, 
the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the 
Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. 
Article XII on 
National Economy 
and Patrimony 
Section 2 
paragraph 4 
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial 
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils 
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth 
and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local 
scientific and technical resources. 
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty 
days from its execution. 
Article XII on 
National Economy 
and Patrimony 
Section 17 
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under 
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility 
or business affected with public interest. 
Article XVIII on 
Transitory 
Provisions Section 
4 
All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall not be renewed or extended 
without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. 
Article XVII on 
Transitory 
Provision Section 6 
The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened. 
Article XVII on 
Transitory 
Provision Section 7 
Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a list ofnominees by the respective sectors, the 
seats reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article V1 of this Constitution. 
 
Article XVII on 
Transitory 
Provision Section 8 
Until otherwise provided by the Congress, the President may constitute the Metropolitan Manila Authority to be 
composed of the heads of all local government units comprising the Metropolitan Manila area. 
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Appendix 8 
Excerpts from The German Basic Law 
Source: German Constitution, Deutscher Bundestag, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, translated 
by Christian Tomuschat and David P. Curie, Donald P. Kommers in cooperation with the Language Service of the 
German Bundestad, Printed version at November 2012 
Article 25 on 
Primacy of 
International 
Law 
The general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws 
and directly create rights and duties for the inhabitants of the federal territory. 
Article 55  1) The Federal President may not be a member of the government or of a legislative body of the Federation or of a 
Land.  
 
Article 58 Orders and directions of the Federal President shall require for their validity the countersignature of the Federal 
Chancellor or of the competent Federal Minister. This provision shall not apply to the appointment or dismissal of the 
Federal Chancellor, the dissolution of the Bundestag under Article 63, or a request made under paragraph (3) of Article 
69. 
Article 59on 
Representation 
of the Federation 
for the purposes 
of international 
law  
 
 (1) The Federal President shall represent the Federation for the purposes of international law. He shall conclude 
treaties with foreign states on behalf of the Federation. He shall accredit and receive envoys.  
(2) Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation shall require 
the consent or participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of 
federal law. In the case of executive agreements the provisions concerning the federal administration shall apply 
mutatis mutandis. 
 
Article 60 on 
Appointment of 
civil servants - 
Pardon - 
Immunity  
 
(1) The Federal President shall appoint and dismiss federal judges, federal civil servants, and commissioned and 
noncommissioned officers of the Armed Forces, except as may otherwise be provided by a law.  
(2) He shall exercise the power to pardon individual offenders on behalf of the Federation.  
(3) He may delegate these powers to other authorities.  
(4) Paragraphs (2) to (4) of Article 46 shall apply to the Federal President mutatis mutandis.  
Article 61 on 
Impeachment 
before the 
Federal 
Constitutional 
Court 
(1) The Bundestag or the Bundesrat may impeach the Federal President before the Federal Constitutional Court for 
wilful violation of this Basic Law or of any other federal law. The motion of impeachment must be supported by at least 
one quarter of the Members of the Bundestag or one quarter of the votes of the Bundesrat. The decision to impeach 
shall require a majority of two thirds of the Members of the Bundestag or of two thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat. 
The case for impeachment shall be presented before the Federal Constitutional Court by a person commissioned by the 
impeaching body.  
(2) If the Federal Constitutional Court finds the Federal President guilty of a willful violation of this Basic Law or of any 
other federal law, it may declare that he has forfeited his office. After the Federal President has been impeached, the 
Court may issue an interim order preventing him from exercising his functions.  
Article 62 The Federal Government shall consist of the Federal Chancellor and the Federal Ministers. 
Article 63 Election of the Federal Chancellor  
(1) The Federal Chancellor shall be elected by the Bundestag without debate on the proposal of the Federal President.  
(2) The person who receives the votes of a majority of the Members of the Bundestag shall be elected. The person 
elected shall be appointed by the Federal President.  
(3) If the person proposed by the Federal President is not elected, the Bundestag may elect a Federal Chancellor within 
fourteen days after the ballot by the votes of more than one half of its Members.  
(4) If no Federal Chancellor is elected within this period, a new election shall take place without delay, in which the 
person who receives the largest number of votes shall be elected. If the person elected receives the votes of a majority 
of the Members of the Bundestag, the Federal President must appoint him within seven days after the election. If the 
person elected does not receive such a majority, then within seven days the Federal President shall either appoint him 
or dissolve the Bundestag. 
Article 65 Power to determine policy guidelines - Department and collegiate responsibility  
The Federal Chancellor shall determine and be responsible for the general guidelines of policy. Within these limits each 
Federal Minister shall conduct the affairs of his department independently and on his own responsibility. The Federal 
Government shall resolve differences of opinion between Federal Ministers. The Federal Chancellor shall conduct the 
proceedings of the Federal Government in accordance with rules of procedure adopted by the Government and 
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approved by the Federal President. 
Article 65a Article 65a Command of the Armed Forces  
(1) Command of the Armed Forces shall be vested in the Federal Minister of Defense.  
Article 67 Vote of no confidence  
(1) The Bundestag may express its lack of confidence in the Federal Chancellor only by electing a successor by the vote 
of a majority of its Members and requesting the Federal President to dismiss the Federal Chancellor. The Federal 
President must comply with the request and appoint the person elected.  
(2) Forty-eight hours shall elapse between the motion and the election.  
Article 68 Vote of confidence  
(1) If a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of confidence is not supported by the majority of the Members of 
the Bundestag, the Federal President, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor, may dissolve the Bundestag within 
twenty-one days. The right of dissolution shall lapse as soon as the Bundestag elects another Federal Chancellor by the 
vote of a majority of its Members.  
(2) Forty-eight hours shall elapse between the motion and the vote.  
Article 69 Deputy Federal Chancellor - Term of office  
(1) The Federal Chancellor shall appoint a Federal Minister as his deputy.  
(2) The tenure of office of the Federal Chancellor or of a Federal Minister shall end in any event when a new Bundestag 
convenes; the tenure of office of a Federal Minister shall also end on any other occasion on which the Federal 
Chancellor ceases to hold office.  
(3) At the request of the Federal President the Federal Chancellor, or at the request of the Federal Chancellor or of the 
Federal President a Federal Minister, shall be obliged to continue to manage the affairs of his office until a successor is 
appointed.  
Article 76 Bills  
(1) Bills may be introduced in the Bundestag by the Federal Government, by the Bundesrat, or from the fl oor of the 
Bundestag.  
(2) Federal Government bills shall first be submitted to the Bundesrat. The Bundesrat shall be entitled to comment on 
such bills within six weeks. If for important reasons, especially with respect to the scope of the bill, the Bundesrat 
demands an extension, the period shall be increased to nine weeks. If in exceptional circumstances the Federal 
Government on submitting a bill to the Bundesrat declares it to be particularly urgent, it may submit the bill to the 
Bundestag after three weeks or, if the Bundesrat has demanded an extension pursuant to the third sentence of this 
paragraph, after six weeks, even if it has not yet received the Bundesrat’s comments; upon receiving such comments, it 
shall transmit them to the Bundestag without delay. In the case of bills to amend this Basic Law or to transfer sovereign 
powers pursuant to Article 23 or 24 the comment period shall be nine weeks; the fourth sentence of this paragraph 
shall not apply.  
Article 81 Legislative emergency  
(1) If, in the circumstances described in Article 68, the Bundestag is not dissolved, the Federal President, at the request 
of the Federal Government and with the consent of the Bundesrat, may declare a state of legislative emergency with 
respect to a bill, if the Bundestag rejects the bill although the Federal Government has declared it to be urgent. The 
same shall apply if a bill has been rejected although the Federal Chancellor had combined it with a motion under Article 
68.  
(2) If, after a state of legislative emergency has been declared, the Bundestag again rejects the bill or adopts it in a 
version the Federal Government declares unacceptable, the bill shall be deemed to have become law to the extent that 
it receives the consent of the Bundesrat. The same shall apply if the Bundestag does not pass the bill within four weeks 
after it is reintroduced.  
(3) During the term of office of a Federal Chancellor, any other bill rejected by the Bundestag may become law in 
accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article within a period of six months after the first declaration of a state 
of legislative emergency. After the expiration of this period, no further declaration of a state of legislative emergency 
may be made during the term of office of the same Federal Chancellor.  
(4) This Basic Law may neither be amended nor abrogated nor suspended in whole or in part by a law enacted pursuant 
to paragraph (2) of this Article.  
Article 82 Certification - Promulgation - Entry into force  
(1) Laws enacted in accordance with the provisions of this Basic Law shall, after countersignature, be certified by the 
Federal President and promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette. Statutory instruments shall be certified by the agency 
that issues them and, unless a law otherwise provides, shall be promulgated in the Federal Law Gazette. 
Article 84 (2) The Federal Government, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may issue general administrative rules. 
 
(3) The Federal Government shall exercise oversight to ensure that the Länder execute federal laws in accordance with 
the law. For this purpose the Federal Government may send commissioners to the highest Land authorities and, with 
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their consent or, where such consent is refused, with the consent of the Bundesrat, also to subordinate authorities.  
(4) Should any deficiencies that the Federal Government has identified in the execution of federal laws in the Länder 
not be corrected, the Bundesrat, on application of the Federal Government or of the Land concerned, shall decide 
whether that Land has violated the law. The decision of the Bundesrat may be challenged in the Federal Constitutional 
Court.  
(5) With a view to the execution of federal laws, the Federal Government may be authorized by a federal law requiring 
the consent of the Bundesrat to issue instructions in particular cases. They shall be addressed to the highest Land 
authorities unless the Federal Government considers the matter urgent.  
Article 85 (2) The Federal Government, with the consent of the Bundesrat, may issue general administrative rules. It may provide 
for the uniform training of civil servants and other salaried public employees. The heads of intermediate authorities 
shall be appointed with its approval.  
Article 86 Federal administration  
Where the Federation executes laws through its own administrative authorities or through federal corporations or 
institutions established under public law, the Federal Government shall, insofar as the law in question contains no 
special provision, issue general administrative rules. The Federal Government shall provide for the establishment 
of the authorities insofar as the law in question does not otherwise provide.  
Article 87 Matters  
(1) The foreign service, the federal financial administration, and, in accordance with the provisions of Article 89, the 
administration of federal waterways and shipping shall be conducted by federal administrative authorities with their 
own administrative substructures. A federal law may establish Federal Border Police authorities and central offices for 
police information and communications, for the criminal police, and for the compilation of data for purposes of 
protection of the constitution and of protection against activities within the federal territory which, through the use of 
force or acts preparatory to the use of force, endanger the external interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
Article 87a Armed Forces  
(1) The Federation shall establish Armed Forces for purposes of defense. Their numerical strength and general 
organizational structure must be shown in the budget.  
(2) Apart from defense, the Armed Forces may be employed only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law.  
(3) During a state of defense or a state of tension the Armed Forces shall have the power to protect civilian property 
and to perform traffic control functions to the extent necessary to accomplish their defense mission. Moreover, during 
a state of defense or a state of tension, the Armed Forces may also be authorized to support police measures for the 
protection of civilian property; in this event the Armed Forces shall cooperate with the competent authorities.  
(4) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, 
the Federal Government, if the conditions referred to in paragraph (2) of Article 91 obtain and the police forces and the 
Federal Border Police prove inadequate, may employ the Armed Forces to support the police and the Federal Border 
Police in protecting civilian property and in combating organized armed insurgents. Any such employment of the Armed 
Forces shall be discontinued if the Bundestag or the Bundesrat so demands.  
Article 87b Federal Defense Administration  
(1) The Federal Defense Administration shall be conducted as a federal administrative authority with its own 
administrative substructure. It shall have jurisdiction for personnel matters and direct responsibility for satisfaction of 
the procurement needs of the Armed Forces. Responsibilities connected with pensions for injured persons or with 
construction work may be assigned to the Federal Defense Administration only by a federal law requiring the consent 
of the Bundesrat. Such consent shall also be required for any laws to the extent that they empower the Federal Defense 
Administration to interfere with rights of third parties; this requirement, however, shall not apply in the case of laws 
regarding personnel matters.  
(2) In addition, federal laws concerning defense, including recruitment for military service and protection of the civilian 
population, may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, provide that they shall be executed, wholly or in part, either by 
federal administrative authorities with their own administrative substructures or by the Länder on federal commission. 
If such laws are executed by the Länder on federal commission, they may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, provide 
that the powers vested in the Federal Government or in the competent highest federal authorities pursuant to Article 
85 be transferred wholly or in part to federal higher authorities; in this event the law may provide that such authorities 
shall not require the consent of the Bundesrat in issuing general administrative rules pursuant to the first sentence of 
paragraph (2) of Article 85.  
Article 91 Internal emergency  
(1) In order to avert an imminent danger to the existence or free democratic basic order of the Federation or of a Land, 
a Land may call upon police forces of other Länder, or upon personnel and facilities of other administrative authorities 
and of the Federal Border Police.  
(2) If the Land where such danger is imminent is not itself willing or able to combat the danger, the Federal Government 
may place the police in that Land and the police forces of other Länder under its own orders and deploy units of the 
Federal Border Police. Any such order shall be rescinded once the danger is removed, or at any time on the demand of 
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the Bundesrat. If the danger extends beyond the territory of a single Land, the Federal Government, insofar as is 
necessary to combat such danger, may issue instructions to the Land governments; the first and second sentences of 
this paragraph shall not be affected by this provision.  
Article 115a Declaration of state of defence  
(1) Any determination that the federal territory is under attack by armed force or imminently threatened with such an 
attack (state of defence) shall be made by the Bundestag with the consent of the Bundesrat. Such determination shall 
be made on application of the Federal Government and shall require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall 
include at least a majority of the Members of the Bundestag.  
(2) If the situation imperatively calls for immediate action, and if insurmountable obstacles prevent the timely 
convening of the Bundestag or the Bundestag cannot muster a quorum, the Joint Committee shall make this 
determination by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, which shall include at least a majority of its members.  
(3) The determination shall be promulgated by the Federal President in the Federal Law Gazette pursuant to Article 82. 
If this cannot be done in time, promulgation shall be effected in another manner; the determination shall be printed in 
the Federal Law Gazette as soon as circumstances permit.  
 
(4) If the federal territory is under attack by armed force, and if the competent federal authorities are not in a position 
at once to make the determination provided for in the first sentence of paragraph (1) of this Article, the determination 
shall be deemed to have been made and promulgated at the time the attack began. The Federal President shall 
announce that time as soon as circumstances permit.  
(5) If the determination of a state of defense has been promulgated, and if the federal territory is under attack by 
armed force, the Federal President, with the consent of the Bundestag, may issue declarations under international law 
regarding the existence of the state of defense. Under the conditions specified in paragraph (2) of this Article, the Joint 
Committee shall act in place of the Bundestag. 
Article 115b Power of command of the Federal Chancellor  
Upon the promulgation of a state of defense the power of command over the Armed Forces shall pass to the Federal 
Chancellor. 
Article 115d Urgent bills  
(1) During a state of defense the federal legislative process shall be governed by the provisions of paragraphs (2) 
and (3) of this Article without regard to the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 76, the second sentence of 
paragraph (1) and paragraphs (2) to (4) of Article 77, Article 78, and paragraph (1) of Article 82.  
(2) Federal Government bills that the Government designates as urgent shall be forwarded to the Bundesrat at the 
same time as they are submitted to the Bundestag. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat shall debate such bills in joint 
session without delay. Insofar as the consent of the Bundesrat is necessary for any such bill to become law, a majority 
of its votes shall be required. Details shall be regulated by rules of procedure adopted by the Bundestag and requiring 
the consent of the Bundesrat.  
(3) The second sentence of paragraph (3) of Article 115a shall apply to the promulgation of such laws mutatis mutandis.  
Article 115f Use of Federal Border Police - Extended powers of instruction  
(1) During a state of defense the Federal Government, to the extent circumstances require, may:  
1. employ the Federal Border Police throughout the federal territory;  
2. issue instructions not only to federal administrative authorities but also to Land governments and, if it deems the 
matter urgent, to Land authorities, and may delegate this power to members of Land governments designated by 
it.  
(2) The Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the Joint Committee shall be informed without delay of the measures taken in 
accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article. 
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Appendix 9 
Excerpts fromThe South African Constitution 
Source: South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 wih Amendments through 2012, generated from excerpts of texts 
from the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project and accessed at www.constitutionproject.org  
Article 83 The President  
The President-  
(a) is the Head of State and head of the national executive;  
(b) must uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic; and  
(c) promotes the unity of the nation and that which will advance the Republic. 
Article 84 Powers and functions of President  
(1) The President has the powers entrusted by the Constitution and legislation, including those necessary to perform the 
functions of Head of State and head of the national executive.  
(2) The President is responsible for-  
(a) assenting to and signing Bills;  
(b) referring a Bill back to the National Assembly for reconsideration of the Bill's constitutionality;  
(c) referring a Bill to the Constitutional Court for a decision on the Bill's constitutionality; 
(d) summoning the National Assembly, the National Council of Provinces or Parliament to an  
extraordinary sitting to conduct special business;  
(e) making any appointments that the Constitution or legislation requires the President to make, other  
than as head of the national executive;  
(f) appointing commissions of inquiry;  
(g) calling a national referendum in terms of an Act of Parliament;  
(h) receiving and recognizing foreign diplomatic and consular representatives;  
(i) appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular representatives;  
(j) pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or forfeitures; and  
(k) conferring honors 
Article 85 Executive authority of the Republic  
(1) The executive authority of the Republic is vested in the President.  
(2) The President exercises the executive authority, together with the other members of the Cabinet, by-  
(a) implementing national legislation except where the Constitution or an Act of Parliament provides  
otherwise;  
(b) developing and implementing national policy;  
(c) co-ordinating the functions of state departments and administrations;  
(d) preparing and initiating legislation; and  
(e) performing any other executive function provided for in the Constitution or in national legislation. 
Article 86 Election of President  
(1) At its first sitting after its election, and whenever necessary to fill a vacancy, the National Assembly must elect a woman or 
a man from among its members to be the President.  
(2) The Chief Justice must preside over the election of the President, or designate another judge to do so. The procedure set 
out in Part A of Schedule 3 applies to the election of the President.  
[Sub-s. (2) substituted by s. 6 of the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001.]  
(3) An election to fill a vacancy in the office of President must be held at a time and on a date determined by the Chief Justice, 
but not more than 30 days after the vacancy occurs.  
[Sub-s. (3) substituted by s. 6 of the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001.] 
Article 87 Assumption of office by President  
When elected President, a person ceases to be a member of the National Assembly and, within five days,  
must assume office by swearing or affirming faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the  
Constitution, in accordance with Schedule 2. 
Article 88  Term of office of President  
(1) The President's term of office begins on assuming office and ends upon a vacancy occurring or when the person next 
elected President assumes office.  
(2) No person may hold office as President for more than two terms, but when a person is elected to fill a  
vacancy in the office of President, the period between that election and the next election of a President 
is not regarded as a term. 
Article 89 
Removal 
of 
President 
(1) The National Assembly, by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, may remove 
the President from office only on the grounds of-  
(a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;  
(b) serious misconduct; or  
(c) in-ability to perform the functions of office.  
(2) Anyone who has been removed from the office of President in terms of subsection (1) (a) or (b) may  
not receive any benefits of that office, and may not serve in any public office. 
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Article 90 Acting President  
(1) When the President is absent from the Republic or otherwise unable to fulfill the duties of President, or during a vacancy 
in the office of President, an office-bearer in the order below acts as President:  
(a) The Deputy President.  
(b) A Minister designated by the President.  
(c) A Minister designated by the other members of the Cabinet.  
(d) The Speaker, until the National Assembly designates one of its other members.  
(2) An Acting President has the responsibilities, powers and functions of the President.  
(3) Before assuming the responsibilities, powers and functions of the President, the Acting President must swear or affirm 
faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution, in accordance with Schedule 2.  
(4) A person who as Acting President has sworn or affirmed faithfulness to the Republic need not repeat the swearing or 
affirming procedure for any subsequent term as acting President during the period ending when the person next elected 
President assumes office.  
[Sub-s. (4) added by s. 1 of the Constitution First Amendment Act of 1997.] 
Article 91 Cabinet  
(1) The Cabinet consists of the President, as head of the Cabinet, a Deputy President and Ministers.  
(2) The President appoints the Deputy President and Ministers, assigns their powers and functions, and may dismiss them.  
(3) The President-  
(a) must select the Deputy President from among the members of the National Assembly;  
(b) may select any number of Ministers from among the members of the National Assembly; and  
(c) may select no more than two Ministers from outside the Assembly.  
(4) The President must appoint a member of the Cabinet to be the leader of government business in the National Assembly.  
(5) The Deputy President must assist the President in the execution of the functions of government.  
Article 92 Accountability and responsibilities  
(1) The Deputy President and Ministers are responsible for the powers and functions of the executive assigned to them by the 
President. 
(2) Members of the Cabinet are accountable collectively and individually to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and 
the performance of their functions.  
(3) Members of the Cabinet must-  
(a) act in accordance with the Constitution; and  
(b) provide Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control. 
Article 93 Deputy Ministers  
(1) The President may appoint-  
(a) any number of Deputy Ministers from among the members of the National Assembly; and  
(b) no more than two Deputy Ministers from outside the Assembly,  
to assist the members of the Cabinet, and may dismiss them.  
(2) Deputy Ministers appointed in terms of subsection (1) (b) are accountable to Parliament for the exercise of their powers 
and the performance of their functions.  
[S. 93 substituted by s. 7 of the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001.] 
Article 97 Transfer of functions  
The President by proclamation may transfer to a member of the Cabinet-  
(a) the administration of any legislation entrusted to another member; or  
(b) any power or function entrusted by legislation to another member.  
Article 98 Temporary assignment of functions  
The President may assign to a Cabinet member any power or function of another member who is absent  
from office or is unable to exercise that power or perform that function. 
Article 100 National intervention in provincial administration  
(1) When a province cannot or does not fulfill an executive obligation in terms of the Constitution or legislation, the national 
executive may intervene by taking any appropriate steps to ensure fulfillment of that obligation, including-  
(a) issuing a directive to the provincial executive, describing the extent of the failure to fulfill its  
obligations and stating any steps required to meet its obligations; and  
(b) assuming responsibility for the relevant obligation in that province to the extent necessary to-  
(i) maintain essential national standards or meet established minimum standards for the rendering of a  
service;  
(ii) maintain economic unity;  
(iii) maintain national security; or  
(iv) prevent that province from taking unreasonable action that is prejudicial to the interests of another  
provinces or to the country as a whole.  
[Sub-s. (1) amended by s. 2 (b) of the Constitution Eleventh Amendment Act of 2003.]  
(2) If the national executive intervenes in a province in terms of subsection (1) (b)-  
(a) it must submit a written notice of the intervention to the National Council of Provinces within 14 days  
after the intervention began;  
(b) the intervention must end if the Council disapproves the intervention within 180 days after the  
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intervention began or by the end of that period has not approved the intervention; and  
(c) the Council must, while the intervention continues, review the intervention regularly and may make  
any appropriate recommendations to the national executive.  
[Sub-s. (2) substituted by s. 2 (c) of the Constitution Eleventh Amendment Act of 2003.]  
(3) National legislation may regulate the process established by this section.  
[S. 100 amended by s. 2 (a) of the Constitution Eleventh Amendment Act of 2003.] 
Article 101 Executive decisions  
(1) A decision by the President must be in writing if it-  
(a) is taken in terms of legislation; or  
(b) has legal consequences.  
(2) A written decision by the President must be countersigned by another Cabinet member if that decision concerns a function 
assigned to that other Cabinet member.  
(3) Proclamations, regulations and other instruments of subordinate legislation must be accessible to the public.  
(4) National legislation may specify the manner in which, and the extent to which, instruments mentioned in subsection (3) 
must be-  
(a) tabled in Parliament; and  
(b) approved by Parliament 
Article 102 Motions of no confidence  
(1) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no confidence in the 
Cabinet excluding the President, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.  
(2) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its members, passes a motion of no  
confidence in the President, the President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy  
Ministers must resign. 
Article 174 Appointment of judicial officers  
(1) Any appropriately qualified woman or man who is a fit and proper person may be appointed as a judicial officer. Any 
person to be appointed to the Constitutional Court must also be a South African citizen.  
(2) The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of South Africa must be considered when 
judicial officers are appointed.  
(3) The President as head of the national executive, after consulting the Judicial Service Commission and the leader of parties 
represented in the National Assembly, appoints the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice and, after consulting the Judicial 
Service Commission, appoints the President and Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal.  
[Sub-s. (3) substituted by s. 13 of the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001.]  
(4) The other judges of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the President, as head of the national executive, after 
consulting the Chief Justice and the leaders of parties represented in the National Assembly, in accordance with the following 
procedure:  
(a) The Judicial Service Commission must prepare a list of nominees with three names more than the numbers of 
appointments to be made, and submit the list to the President.  
(b) The President may make appointments from the list, and must advise the Judicial Service  
Commission, with reasons, if any of the nominees are unacceptable and any appointment remains to be  
made.  
(c) The Judicial Service Commission must supplement the list with further nominees and the President  
must make the remaining appointments from the supplemented list.  
[Sub-s. (4) substituted by s. 13 of the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001.]  
(5) At all times, at least four members of the Constitutional Court must be persons who were judges at the time they were 
appointed to the Constitutional Court.  
(6) The President must appoint the judges of all other courts on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.  
(7) Other judicial officers must be appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament which must ensure that the appointment, 
promotion, transfer or dismissal of, or disciplinary steps against, these judicial officers take place without favor or prejudice.  
(8) Before judicial officers begin to perform their functions, they must take an oath or affirm, in accordance with Schedule 2, 
that they will uphold and protect the Constitution.  
175 Acting judges  
(1) The President may appoint a woman or a man to be an acting judge of the Constitutional Court if there is a vacancy or if a 
judge is absent. The appointment must be made on the recommendation of the Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice acting with the concurrence of the Chief Justice.  
[Sub-s. (1) substituted by s. 14 of the Constitution Sixth Amendment Act of 2001.]  
(2) The Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must appoint acting judges to other  
courts after consulting the senior judge of the court on which the acting judge will serve. 
Article 177 Removal  
(1) A judge may be removed from office only if-(a) the Judicial Service Commission funds that the judge  
suffers from an incapacity, is grossly incompetent or is guilty of gross misconduct; and  
(b) the National Assembly calls for that judge to be removed, by a resolution adopted with a supporting  
vote of at least two thirds of its members.  
(2) The President must remove a judge from office upon adoption of a resolution calling for that judge to be removed.  
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(3) The President, on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, may suspend a judge who is the  
subject of a procedure in terms of subsection (1). 
Article 179 Prosecuting authority  
(1) There is a single national prosecuting authority in the Republic, structured in terms of an Act of Parliament, and consisting 
of-  
(a) a National Director of Public Prosecutions, who is the head of the prosecuting authority, and is  
appointed by the President, as head of the national executive; and  
(b) Directors of Public Prosecutions and prosecutors as determined by an Act of Parliament. 
Article 193 Appointments  
(1) The Public Protector and the members of any Commission established by this Chapter must be women or men who-  
(a) are South African citizens;  
(b) are fit and proper persons to hold the particular office; and  
(c) are complied with any other requirements prescribed by national legislation.  
(2) The need for a Commission established by this Chapter to reflect broadly the race and gender composition of South Africa 
must be considered when members are appointed.  
(3) The Auditor-General must be a woman or a man who is a South African citizen and a fit and proper person to hold that 
office. Specialised knowledge of, or experience in, auditing, state finances and public administration must be given due regard 
in appointing the Auditor-General.  
(4) The President, on the recommendation of the National Assembly, must appoint the Public Protector, the Auditor-General 
and the members of-  
(a) the South African Human Rights Commission;  
[Para. (a) amended by s. 4 of the Constitution Second Amendment Act of 1998.]  
(b) the Commission for Gender Equality; and  
(c) the Electoral Commission.  
(5) The National Assembly must recommend persons-  
(a) nominated by a committee of the Assembly proportionally composed of members of all parties  
represented in the Assembly; and(b) approved by the Assembly by a resolution adopted with a  
supporting vote-  
(i) of at least 60 per cent of the members of the Assembly, if the recommendation concerns the  
appointment of the Public Protector or the Auditor-General; or  
(ii) of a majority of the members of the Assembly, if the recommendation concerns the appointment of a  
member of a Commission.  
(6) The involvement of civil society in the recommendation process may be provided for as envisaged in  
section 59 (1) (a). 
Article 194 Removal from office  
(1) The Public Protector, the Auditor-General or a member of a Commission established by this Chapter may be removed from 
office only on-  
(a) the ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence;  
(b) a finding to that effect by a committee of the National Assembly; and  
(c) the adoption by the Assembly of a resolution calling for that person's removal from office  
(2) A resolution of the National Assembly concerning the removal from office of-  
(a) the Public Protector or the Auditor-General must be adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of the members 
of the Assembly; or  
(b) a member of a Commission must be adopted with a supporting vote of a majority of the members of the Assembly.  
(3) The President-  
(a) may suspend a person from office at any time after the start of the proceedings of a committee of the National Assembly 
for the removal of that person; and  
(b) must remove a person from office upon adoption by the Assembly of the resolution calling for that person's removal. 
Article 198 CHAPTER 11 SECURITY SERVICES (ss 198-210)  
Governing principles  
The following principles govern national security in the Republic:  
(a) National security must reflect the resolve of South Africans, as individuals and as a nation, to live as  
equals, to live in peace and harmony, to be free from fear and want and to seek a better life.  
(b) The resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in  
armed conflict, nationally or internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or  
national legislation.  
(c) National security must be pursued in compliance with the law, including international law.  
(d) National security is subject to the authority of Parliament and the national executive.  
Article 199 Establishment, structuring and conduct of security services  
(1) The security services of the Republic consist of a single defense force, a single police service and any intelligence services 
established in terms of the Constitution.  
(2) The defense force is the only lawful military force in the Republic.  
(3) Other than the security services established in terms of the Constitution, armed organizations or services may be 
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established only in terms of national legislation.  
(4) The security services must be structured and regulated by national legislation.  
(5) The security services must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and 
the law, including customary international Copyright Juta & Company Limitedlaw and international agreements binding on 
the Republic.  
(6) No member of any security service may obey a manifestly illegal order.  
(7) Neither the security services, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their functions-  
(a) prejudice a political party interest that is legitimate in terms of the Constitution; or  
(b) further, in a partisan manner, any interest of a political party.  
(8) To give effect to the principles of transparency and accountability, multi-party parliamentary committees, have oversight 
of all security services in a manner determined by national legislation or the rules and orders of Parliament. 
Article 201 Political responsibility  
(1) A member of the Cabinet must be responsible for defense.  
(2) Only the President, as head of the national executive, may authorize the employment of the defense force-  
(a) in co-operation with the police service;  
(b) in defense of the Republic; or  
(c) in fulfillment an international obligation.  
(3) When the defense force is employed for any purpose mentioned in subsection (2), the President must inform Parliament, 
promptly and in appropriate detail, of-  
(a) the reasons for the employment of the defence force;  
(b) any place where the force is being employed;  
(c) the number of people involved; and  
(d) the period for which the force is expected to be employed.  
(4) If Parliament does not sit during the first seven days after the defence force is employed as envisaged in subsection (2), the 
President must provide the information required in subsection (3) to the appropriate oversight committee. 
Article 201 Command of defence force  
(1) The President as head of the national executive is Commander-in-Chief of the defence force, and must appoint the Military 
Command of the defence force.  
(2) Command of the defence force must be exercised in accordance with the directions of the Cabinet  
member responsible for defence, under the authority of the President. 
Article 203 State of national defence  
(1) The President as head of the national executive may declare a state of national defence, and must inform Parliament 
promptly and in appropriate detail of-  
(a) the reasons for the declaration;  
(b) any place where the defence force is being employed; and  
(c) the number of people involved.  
(2) If Parliament is not sitting when a state of national defence is declared, thePresident must summon Parliament to an 
extraordinary sitting within seven days of the declaration.  
(3) A declaration of a state of national defence lapses unless it is approved by Parliament within seven  
days of the declaration. 
Article 207 Control of police service  
(1) The President as head of the national executive must appoint a woman or a man as the National  
Commissioner of the police service, to control and manage the police service. 
Article 209 Establishment and control of intelligence services  
(1) Any intelligence service, other than any intelligence division of the defence force or police services, may be established 
only by the President, as head of the national executive, and only in terms of national legislation.  
(2) The President as head of the national executive must appoint a woman or a man as head of each  
intelligence service established in terms of subsection (1), and must either assume political responsibility  
for the control and direction of any of those services, or designate a member of the Cabinet to assume  
that responsibility. 
Article 210 Powers, functions and monitoring 
National legislation must regulate the objects, powers and functions of the intelligence services, including any intelligence 
division of the defence force or police service, and must provide for-  
(a) the co-ordination of all intelligence services; and  
(b) civilian monitoring of the activities of those services by an inspector appointed by the President, as  
head of the national executive, and approved by a resolution adopted by the National Assembly with a  
supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members. 
Article 220 Financial and Fiscal Commission (ss 220-222)  
Establishment and functions  
(1) There is a Financial and Fiscal Commission for the Republic which makes recommendations envisaged in this Chapter, or in 
national legislation, to Parliament, provincial legislatures and any other authorities determined by national legislation.  
(2) The Commission is independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and must be impartial.  
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(3) The Commission must function in terms of an Act of Parliament and, in performing its functions, must consider all relevant 
factors, including those listed in section 214 (2).  
221 Appointment and tenure of members  
(1) The Commission consists of the following women and men appointed by the President, as head of the national executive:  
(a) A chairperson and deputy chairperson;  
(b) three persons selected, after consulting the Premiers, from a list compiled in accordance with a  
process prescribed by national legislation;  
(c) two persons selected, after consulting organized local government, from a list compiled in accordance  
with a process prescribed by national legislation; and  
(d) two other persons.  
[Sub-s. (1) substituted by s. 7 (a) of the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act of 2001.]  
(1A) National legislation referred to in subsection (1) must provide for the participation of-  
(a) the Premiers in the compilation of a list envisaged in subsection (1) (b); and  
(b) organized local government in the compilation of a list envisaged in subsection (1) (c).  
[Sub-s. (1A) inserted by 7 (b) of the Constitution Seventh Amendment Act of 2001.]  
(2) Members of the Commission must have appropriate expertise.  
(3) Members serve for a term established in terms of national legislation. The President may remove a  
member from office on the ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence. 
Article 231 International agreements  
(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive.  
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).  
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive nature, or an agreement which does not require 
either ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by the National 
Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.  
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-
executing provision of an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with 
the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding on the Republic when this Constitution took effect. 
Article 232 Customary international law  
Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
Article 233 Application of international law  
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the  
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is  
inconsistent with international law. 
Article 238 Agency and delegation  
An executive organ of state in any sphere of government may-  
(a) delegate any power or function that is to be exercised or performed in terms of legislation to any  
other executive organ of state, provided the delegation is consistent with the legislation in terms of  
which the power is exercised or the function is performed; or  
(b) exercise any power or perform any function for any other executive organ of state on an agency or  
delegation basis. 
 ANNEXURE B GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY: NATIONAL SPHERE  
1. Section 84 of the new Constitution is deemed to contain the following additional subsection:  
'(3) The President must consult the Executive Deputy Presidents-  
(a) in the development and execution of the policies of the national government;  
(b) in all matters relating to the management of the Cabinet and the performance of Cabinet business;  
(c) in the assignment of functions to the Executive Deputy Presidents;  
(d) before making any appointment under the Constitution or any legislation, including the appointment  
of ambassadors or other diplomatic representatives;  
(e) before appointing commissions of inquiry;  
(f) before calling a referendum; and  
(g) before pardoning or reprieving offenders.'.  
2. Section 89 of the new Constitution is deemed to contain the following additional subsection:  
'(3) Subsections (1) and (2) apply also to an Executive Deputy President.' 
3. Paragraph (a) of section 90 (1) of the new Constitution is deemed to read as follows.  
'(a) an Executive Deputy President designated by the President;' 
4. Section 91 of the new Constitution is deemed to read as follows:  
'Cabinet  
Section 91 (1) The Cabinet consists of the President, the Executive Deputy Presidents and-  
(a) not more than 27 Ministers who are members of the National Assembly and appointed in terms of  
subsections (8) to (12); and  
(b) not more than one Minister who is not a member of the National Assembly and appointed in terms of  
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subsection (13), provided the President, acting in consultation with the Executive Deputy Presidents and  
the leaders of the participating parties, deems the appointment of such a Minister expedient.  
(2) Each party holding at least 80 seats in the National Assembly is entitled to designate an Executive  
Deputy President from among the members of the Assembly.  
(3) If no party or only one party holds 80 or more seats in the Assembly, the party holding the largest  
number of seats and the party holding the second largest number of seats are each entitled to designate  
one Executive Deputy President from among the members of the Assembly.  
(4) On being designated, an Executive Deputy President may elect to remain or cease to be a member of  
the Assembly.  
(5) An Executive Deputy President may exercise the powers and must perform the functions vested in  
the office of Executive Deputy President by the Constitution or assigned to that office by the President.  
(6) An Executive Deputy President holds office-  
(a) until 30 April 1999 unless replaced or recalled by the party entitled to make the designation in terms  
of subsections (2) and (3); or  
(b) until the person elected President after any election of the National Assembly held before 30 April  
1999, assumes office.  
(7) A vacancy in the office of an Executive Deputy President may be filled by the party which designated  
that Deputy President.  
(8) A party holding at least 20 seats in the National Assembly and which has decided to participate in the  
government of national unity, is entitled to be allocated one or more of the Cabinet portfolios in respect  
of which Ministers referred to in subsection (1) (a) are to be appointed, in proportion to the number of  
seats held by it in the National Assembly relative to the number of seats held by the other participating  
parties.  
(9) Cabinet portfolios must be allocated to the respective participating parties in accordance with the  
following formula:  
(a) A quota of seats per portfolio must be determined by dividing the total number of seats in the  
National Assembly held jointly by the participating parties by the number of portfolios in respect of  
which Ministers referred to in subsection (1) (a) are to be appointed, plus one.  
(b) The result, disregarding third and subsequent decimals, if any, is the quota of seats per portfolio.  
(c) The number of portfolios to be allocated to a participating party is determined by dividing the total  
number of seats held by that party in the National Assembly by the quota referred to in paragraph (b).  
(d) The result, subject to paragraph (e), indicates the number of portfolios to be allocated to that party.  
(e) Where the application of the above formula yields a surplus not absorbed by the number of  
portfolios allocated to a party, the surplus competes with other similar surpluses accruing to another  
party or parties, and any portfolio or portfolios which remain unallocated must be allocated to the party  
or parties concerned in sequence of the highest surplus.  
(10) The President after consultation with the Executive Deputy Presidents and the leaders of the  
participating parties must-  
(a) determine the specific portfolios to be allocated to the respective participating parties in accordance  
with the number of portfolios allocated to them in terms of subsection (9);  
(b) appoint in respect of each such portfolio a member of the National Assembly who is a member of the  
party to which that portfolio was allocated under paragraph (a), as the Minister responsible for that  
portfolio;  
(c) if it becomes necessary for the purposes of the Constitution or in the interest of good government,  
vary any determination under paragraph (a), subject to subsection (9);  
(d) terminate any appointment under paragraph (b)-  
(i) if the President is requested to do so by the leader of the party of which the Minister in question is a  
member; or  
(ii) if it becomes necessary for the purposes of the Constitution or in the interest of good government; or  
(e) fill, when necessary, subject to paragraph (b), a vacancy in the office of Minister.  
(11) Subsection (10) must be implemented in the spirit embodied in the concept of a government of  
national unity, and the President and the other functionaries concerned must in the implementation of  
that subsection seek to achieve consensus at all times: Provided that if consensus cannot be achieved  
on-  
(a) the exercise of a power referred to in paragraph (a), (c) or (d) (ii) of that subsection, the President's  
decision prevails;  
(b) the exercise of a power referred to in paragraph (b), (d) (i) or (e) of that subsection affecting a person  
who is not a member of the President's party, the decision of the leader of the party of which that  
person is a member prevails; and  
(c) the exercise of a power referred to in paragraph (b) or (e) of that subsection affecting a person who is  
a member of the President's party, the President's decision prevails.  
(12 ) If any determination of portfolio allocations is varied under subsection (10) (c), the affected  
Ministers must vacate their portfolios but are eligible, where applicable, for reappointment to other  
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portfolios allocated to their respective parties in terms of the varied determination.  
(13) The President-  
(a) in consultation with the Executive Deputy Presidents and the leaders of the participating parties,  
must-  
(i) determine a specific portfolio for a Minister referred to in subsection (1) (b) should it become  
necessary pursuant to a decision of the President under that subsection;  
(ii) appoint in respect of that portfolio a person who is not a member of the National Assembly, as the  
Minister responsible for that portfolio; and  
(iii) fill, if necessary, a vacancy in respect of that portfolio; or  
(b) after consultation with the Executive Deputy Presidents and the leaders of the participating parties,  
must terminate any appointment under paragraph (a) if it becomes necessary for the purposes of the  
Constitution or in the interest of good government.  
(14) Meetings of the Cabinet must be presided over by the President, or, if the President so instructs, by  
an Executive Deputy President: Provided that the Executive Deputy Presidents preside over meetings of  
the Cabinet in turn unless the exigencies of government and the spirit embodied in the concept of the government of national 
unity otherwise demand.  
(15) The Cabinet must function in a manner which gives consideration to the consensus-seeking spirit  
embodied in the concept of a government of national unity as well as the need for effective  
government.'  
5. Section 93 of the new Constitution is deemed to read as follows:  
'Appointment of Deputy Ministers 
93 (1) The President may, after consultation with the Executive Deputy Presidents and the leaders of the  
parties participating in the Cabinet, establish deputy ministerial posts. 
(2) A party is entitled to be allocated one or more of the deputy ministerial posts in the same proportion  
and according to the same formula that portfolios in the Cabinet are allocated.  
(3) The provisions of section 91 (10) to (12) apply, with the necessary changes, in respect of Deputy  
Ministers, and in such application a reference in that section to a Minister or a portfolio must be read as  
a reference to a Deputy Minister or a deputy ministerial post, respectively.  
(4) If a person is appointed as the Deputy Minister of any portfolio entrusted to a Minister-  
(a) that Deputy Minister must exercise and perform on behalf of the relevant Minister any of the powers  
and functions assigned to that Minister in terms of any legislation or otherwise which may, subject to  
the directions of the President, be assigned to that Deputy Minister by that Minister; and  
(b) any reference in any legislation to that Minister must be construed as including a reference to the  
Deputy Minister acting in terms of an assignment under paragraph (a) by the Minister for whom that  
Deputy Minister acts.  
(5) Whenever a Deputy Minister is absent or for any reason unable to exercise or perform any of the  
powers or functions of office, the President may appoint any other Deputy Minister or any other person  
to act in the said Deputy Minister's stead, either generally or in the exercise or performance of any  
specific power or function.'.  
6. Section 96 of the new Constitution is deemed to contain the following additional subsections:  
'(3) Ministers are accountable individually to the President and to the National Assembly for the  
administration of their portfolios, and all members of the Cabinet are correspondingly accountable  
collectively for the performance of the functions of the national government and for its policies.  
(4) Ministers must administer their portfolios in accordance with the policy determined by the Cabinet.  
(5) If a Minister fails to administer the portfolio in accordance with the policy of the Cabinet, the  
President may require the Minister concerned to bring the administration of the portfolio into  
conformity with that policy.  
(6) If the Minister concerned fails to comply with a requirement of the President under subsection (5),  
the President may remove the Minister from office-  
(a) if it is a Minister referred to in section 91 (1) (a), after consultation with the Minister and, if the  
Minister is not a member of the President's party or is not the leader of a participating party, also after  
consultation with the leader of that Minister's party; or  
(b) if it is a Minister referred to in section 91 (1) (b), after consultation with the Executive Deputy  
Presidents and the leaders of the participating parties.'. 
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Appendix 10 
Excerpts from The French Constitution 
Source: France’s Constitution of 1958 with Amendments through 2008, generated from excerpt of texts from the 
repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project, accessed at www.constituteproject.org  
Article 5 The President of the Republic shall ensure due respect for the Constitution. He shall ensure, by his arbitration, the proper 
functioning of the public authorities and the continuity of the State.  
He shall be the guarantor of national independence, territorial integrity and due respect for Treaties. 
Article 6 The President of the Republic shall be elected for a term of five years by direct universal suffrage.  
No one may hold office for more than two consecutive terms.  
The manner of implementation of this article shall be determined by an Institutional Act. 
Article 7 The President of the Republic shall be elected by an absolute majority of votes cast. If such a majority is not obtained on the 
first ballot, a second ballot shall take place on the fourteenth day thereafter. Only the two candidates polling the greatest 
number of votes in the first ballot, after any withdrawal of better placed candidates, may stand in the second ballot.  
The process of electing a President shall commence by the calling of said election by the Government.  
The election of the new President shall be held no fewer than twenty days and no more than thirty-five days before the 
expiry of the term of the President in office.  
Should the Presidency of the Republic fall vacant for any reason whatsoever, or should the Constitutional Council on a 
referral from the Government rule by an absolute majority of its members that the President of the Republic is 
incapacitated, the duties of the President of the Republic, with the exception of those specified in articles 11 and 12, shall 
be temporarily exercised by the President of the Senate or, if the latter is in turn incapacitated, by the Government.  
In the case of a vacancy, or where the incapacity of the President is declared to be permanent by the Constitutional Council, 
elections for the new President shall, except in the event of a finding by the Constitutional Council of force majeure, be held 
no fewer than twenty days and no more than thirty-five days after the beginning of the vacancy or the declaration of 
permanent incapacity.  
In the event of the death or incapacitation in the seven days preceding the deadline for registering candidacies of any of the 
persons who, fewer than thirty days prior to such deadline, have publicly announced their decision to stand for election, the 
Constitutional Council may decide to postpone the election.  
If, before the first round of voting, any of the candidates dies or becomes incapacitated, the Constitutional Council shall 
declare the election to be postponed.  
In the event of the death or incapacitation of either of the two candidates in the lead after the first round of voting before 
any withdrawals, the Constitutional Council shall declare that the electoral process must be repeated in full; the same shall 
apply in the event of the death or incapacitation of either of the two candidates still standing on the second round of 
voting.  
All cases shall be referred to the Constitutional Council in the manner laid down in the second paragraph of article 61 or in 
that laid down for the registration of candidates in the Institutional Act provided for in article 6.  
The Constitutional Council may extend the time limits set in paragraphs three and five above, provided that polling takes 
place no later than thirty-five days after the decision of the Constitutional Council. If the implementation of the provisions 
of this paragraph results in the postponement of the election beyond the expiry of the term of the President in office, the 
latter shall remain in office until his successor is proclaimed. 7  
Neither articles 49 and 50 nor article 89 of the Constitution shall be implemented during the vacancy of the Presidency of 
the Republic or during the period between the declaration of the permanent incapacity of the President of the Republic and 
the election of his successor. 
Article 8 The President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister. He shall terminate the appointment of the Prime Minister 
when the latter tenders the resignation of the Government.  
On the recommendation of the Prime Minister, he shall appoint the other members of the Government and terminate their 
appointments. 
Article 9 The President of the Republic shall preside over the Council of Ministers. 
Article 10 The President of the Republic shall promulgate Acts of Parliament within fifteen days following the final passage of an Act 
and its transmission to the Government.  
He may, before the expiry of this time limit, ask Parliament to reopen debate on the Act or any sections thereof. Such 
reopening of debate shall not be refused. 
Article 11 The President of the Republic may, on a recommendation from the Government when Parliament is in session, or on a joint 
motion of the two Houses, published in the Journal Officiel, submit to a referendum any Government Bill which deals with 
the organization of the public authorities, or with reforms relating to the economic or social policy of the Nation, and to the 
public services contributing thereto, or which provides for authorization to ratify a treaty which, although not contrary to 
the Constitution, would affect the functioning of the institutions.  
Where the referendum is held on the recommendation of the Government, the latter shall make a statement before each 
House and the same shall be followed by a debate. 
Article 11(1) The President of the Republic may, on a recommendation from the Government when Parliament is in session, or on a joint 
motion of the two Houses, published in the Journal Officiel, submit to a referendum any Government Bill which deals with 
the organization of the public authorities, or with reforms relating to the economic, social or environmental policy of the 
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Nation, and to the public services contributing thereto, or which provides for authorization to ratify a treaty which, 
although not contrary to the Constitution, would affect the functioning of the institutions.  
Where the referendum is held on the recommendation of the Government, the latter shall make a statement before each 
House and the same shall be followed by a debate.  
A referendum concerning a subject mentioned in the first paragraph may be held upon the initiative of one fifth of the 
Members of Parliament, supported by one tenth of the voters enrolled on the electoral register. This initiative shall take the 
form of a Private Member’s Bill and shall not be applied to the repeal of a statutory provision promulgated for less than one 
year.  
The conditions by which it is introduced and those according to which the Constitutional Council monitors the respect of the 
provisions of the previous paragraph, are set down by an Institutional Act.  
If the Private Member’s Bill has not been considered by the two Houses within a period set by the Institutional Act, the 
President of the Republic shall submit it to a referendum.  
Where the decision of the French people in the referendum is not favourable to the Private Member’s Bill, no new 
referendum proposal on the same subject may be submitted before the end of a period of two years following the date of 
the vote.  
Where the outcome of the referendum is favourable to the Government Bill or to the Private Member’s Bill, the President 
of the Republic shall promulgate the resulting statute within fifteen days following the proclamation of the results of the 
vote. 
Article 12 The President of the Republic may, after consulting the Prime Minister and the Presidents of the Houses of Parliament, 
declare the National Assembly dissolved.  
A general election shall take place no fewer than twenty days and no more than forty days after the dissolution.  
The National Assembly shall sit as of right on the second Thursday following its election. Should this sitting fall outside the 
period prescribed for the ordinary session, a session shall be convened by right for a fifteen-day period.  
No further dissolution shall take place within a year following said election. 
Article 13 The President of the Republic shall sign the Ordinances and Decrees deliberated upon in the Council of Ministers.  
He shall make appointments to the civil and military posts of the State. Conseillers d’État, the Grand Chancelier de la Légion 
d’Honneur, Ambassadors and Envoys Extraordinary, Conseillers Maîtres of the Cour des Comptes, Prefects, State 
representatives in the overseas communities to which article 74 applies and in New Caledonia, highest-ranking Military 
Officers, Recteurs des Académies and Directors of Central Government Departments shall be appointed in the Council of 
Ministers.  
An Institutional Act shall determine the other posts to be filled at meetings of the Council of Ministers and the manner in 
which the power of the President of the Republic to make appointments may be delegated by him to be exercised on his 
behalf.  
An Institutional Act shall determine the posts or positions, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph, concerning 
which, on account of their importance in the guaranteeing of the rights and freedoms or the economic and social life of the 
Nation, the power of appointment vested in the President of the Republic shall be exercised after public consultation with 
the relevant standing committee in each House. The President of the Republic shall not make an appointment when the 
sum of the negative votes in each committee represents at least three fifths of the votes cast by the two committees. 
Statutes shall determine the relevant standing committees according to the posts or positions concerned. 
Article 14 The President of the Republic shall accredit ambassadors and envoys extraordinary to foreign powers; foreign ambassadors 
and envoys extraordinary shall be accredited to him. 
Article 15 The President of the Republic shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He shall preside over the higher national 
defence councils and committees. 
Article 16 Where the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its 
international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper functioning of the constitutional 
public authorities is interrupted, the President of the Republic shall take measures required by these circumstances, after 
formally consulting the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Houses of Parliament and the Constitutional Council.  
He shall address the Nation and inform it of such measures.  
The measures shall be designed to provide the constitutional public authorities as swiftly as possible, with the means to 
carry out their duties. The Constitutional Council shall be consulted with regard to such measures. 
Parliament shall sit as of right.  
The National Assembly shall not be dissolved during the exercise of such emergency powers.  
After thirty days of the exercise of such emergency powers, the matter may be referred to the Constitutional Council by the 
President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate, sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators, 
so as to decide if the conditions laid down in paragraph one still apply. The Council shall make its decision publicly as soon 
as possible. It shall, as of right, carry out such an examination and shall make its decision in the same manner after sixty 
days of the exercise of emergency powers or at any moment thereafter. 
Article 17 The President of the Republic is vested with the power to grant individual pardons. 
Article 18 The President of the Republic shall communicate with the two Houses of Parliament by messages which he shall cause to be 
read aloud and which shall not give rise to any debate.  
He may take the floor before Parliament convened in Congress for this purpose. His statement may give rise, in his absence, 
to a debate without vote.  
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When not in session, the Houses of Parliament shall be convened especially for this purpose. 
Article 19 Instruments of the President of the Republic, other than those provided for under articles 8 (paragraph one), 11, 12, 16, 18, 
54, 56 and 61, shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and, where required, by the ministers concerned. 
Article 20 The Government shall determine and conduct the policy of the Nation.  
It shall have at its disposal the civil service and the armed forces.  
It shall be accountable to Parliament in accordance with the terms and procedures set out in articles 49 and 50. 
Article 21 The Prime Minister shall direct the actions of the Government. He shall be responsible for national defence. He shall ensure 
the implementation of legislation. Subject to article 13, he shall have power to make regulations and shall make 
appointments to civil and military posts.  
He may delegate certain of his powers to Ministers.  
He shall deputize, if the case arises, for the President of the Republic as chairman of the councils and committees referred 
to in article 15.  
He may, in exceptional cases, deputize for him as chairman of a meeting of the Council of Ministers by virtue of an express 
delegation of powers for a specific agenda. 
Article 22 Instruments of the Prime Minister shall be countersigned, where required, by the ministers responsible for their 
implementation. 
Article 23 Membership of the Government shall be incompatible with the holding of any Parliamentary office, any position of 
professional representation at national level, any public employment or any professional activity.  
An Institutional Act shall determine the manner in which the holders of such offices, positions or employment shall be 
replaced.  
The replacement of Members of Parliament shall take place in accordance with the provisions of article 25. 
Article 24 Parliament shall pass statutes. It shall monitor the action of the Government. It shall assess public policies.  
It shall comprise the National Assembly and the Senate.  
Members of the National Assembly, whose number shall not exceed five hundred and seventy-seven, shall be elected by 
direct suffrage.  
The Senate, whose members shall not exceed three hundred and forty-eight, shall be elected by indirect suffrage. The 
Senate shall ensure the representation of the territorial communities of the Republic. 
Article 34 Statutes shall determine the rules concerning:  
- civic rights and the fundamental guarantees granted to citizens for the exercise of their civil liberties; freedom, diversity 
and the independence of the media; the obligations imposed for the purposes of national defense upon the person and 
property of citizens;  
- nationality, the status and capacity of persons, matrimonial property systems, inheritance and gifts;  
- the determination of serious crimes and other major offences and the penalties they carry; criminal procedure; amnesty; 
the setting up of new categories of courts and the status of members of the Judiciary;  
- the base, rates and methods of collection of all types of taxes; the issuing of currency.  
Statutes shall also determine the rules governing:  
- the system for electing members of the Houses of Parliament, local assemblies and the representative bodies for French 
nationals living abroad, as well as the conditions for holding elective offices and positions for the members of the 
deliberative assemblies of the territorial communities;  
- the setting up of categories of public legal entities;  
- the fundamental guarantees granted to civil servants and members of the Armed Forces;  
- the nationalization of companies and the transfer of ownership of companies from the public to the private sector.  
Statutes shall also lay down the basic principles of:  
- the general organization of national defense;  
- the self-government of territorial communities, their powers and revenue;  
- education;- the preservation of the environment;  
- systems of ownership, property rights and civil and commercial obligations;  
- Employment law, Trade Union law and Social Security.  
Finance Acts shall determine the revenue and expenditure of the State in the conditions and with the reservations provided 
for by an Institutional Act.  
Social Security Financing Acts shall lay down the general conditions for the financial equilibrium thereof, and taking into 
account forecasted revenue, shall determine expenditure targets in the conditions and with the reservations provided for 
by an Institutional Act.  
Programming Acts shall determine the objectives of the action of the State.  
The multiannual guidelines for public finances shall be established by Programming Acts. They shall contribute to achieving 
the objective of balanced accounts for public administrations.  
The provisions of this article may be further specified and completed by an Institutional Act. 
Article 35 A declaration of war shall be authorized by Parliament.  
The Government shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces intervene abroad, at the latest three days 
after the beginning of said intervention. It shall detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may give rise 
to a debate, which shall not be followed by a vote.  
Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government shall submit the extension to Parliament for 
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authorization. It may ask the National Assembly to make the final decision.  
If Parliament is not sitting at the end of the four-month period, it shall express its decision at the opening of the following 
session. 
Article 36 A state of siege shall be decreed in the Council of Ministers.  
The extension thereof after a period of twelve days may be authorized solely by Parliament. 
Article 37 Matters other than those coming under the scope of statute law shall be matters for regulation.  
Provisions of statutory origin enacted in such matters may be amended by decree issued after consultation with the Conseil 
d’État. Any such provisions passed after the coming into force of the Constitution shall be amended by decree only if the 
Constitutional Council has found that they are matters for regulation as defined in the foregoing paragraph. 
Article 37-1 Statutes and regulations may contain provisions enacted on an experimental basis for limited purposes and duration. 
Article 38 In order to implement its program, the Government may ask Parliament for authorization, for a limited period, to take 
measures by Ordinance that are normally the preserve of statute law.  
Ordinances shall be issued in the Council of Ministers, after consultation with the Conseil d’État. They shall come into force 
upon publication, but shall lapse in the event of failure to table before Parliament the Bill to ratify them by the date set by 
the Enabling Act. They may only be ratified in explicit terms.  
At the end of the period referred to in the first paragraph hereinabove Ordinances may be amended solely by an Act of 
Parliament in those areas governed by statute law. 
Article 39 Both the Prime Minister and Members of Parliament shall have the right to initiate legislation.  
Government Bills shall be discussed in the Council of Ministers after consultation with the Conseil d’Étatand shall be tabled 
in one or other of the two Houses. Finance Bills and Social Security Financing Bills shall be tabled first before the National 
Assembly. Without prejudice to the first paragraph of article 44, Bills primarily dealing with the organization of territorial 
communities shall be tabled first in the Senate.  
The tabling of Government Bills before the National Assembly or the Senate, shall comply with the conditions determined 
by an Institutional Act. 
Government Bills may not be included on the agenda if the Conference of Presidents of the first House to which the Bill has 
been referred, declares that the rules determined by the Institutional Act have not been complied with. In the case of 
disagreement between the Conference of Presidents and the Government, the President of the relevant House or the Prime 
Minister may refer the matter to the Constitutional Council, which shall rule within a period of eight days.  
Within the conditions provided for by statute, the President of either House may submit a Private Member’s Bill tabled by a 
Member of the said House, before it is considered in committee, to the Conseil d’État for its opinion, unless the Member 
who tabled it disagrees. 
 
Article 40 Private Members’ Bills and amendments introduced by Members of Parliament shall not be admissible where their 
enactment would result in either a diminution of public revenue or the creation or increase of any public expenditure.  
 
Article 41 If, during the legislative process, it appears that a Private Member’s Bill or amendment is not a matter for statute or is 
contrary to a delegation granted under article 38, the Government or the President of the House concerned, may argue that 
it is inadmissible.  
In the event of disagreement between the Government and the President of the House concerned, the Constitutional 
Council, at the request of one or the other, shall give its ruling within eight days. 
Article 42 The discussion of Government and Private Members’ Bills shall, in plenary sitting, concern the text passed by the committee 
to which the Bill has been referred, in accordance with article 43, or failing that, the text which has been referred to the 
House.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the plenary discussion of Constitutional Revision Bills, Finance Bills and Social Security 
Financing Bills, shall concern, during the first reading before the House to which the Bill has been referred in the first 
instance, the text presented by the Government, and during the subsequent readings, the text transmitted by the other 
House.  
The plenary discussion at first reading of a Government or Private Members’ Bill may only occur before the first House to 
which it is referred, at the end of a period of six weeks after it has been tabled. It may only occur, before the second House 
to which it is referred, at the end of a period of four weeks, from the date of transmission.  
The previous paragraph shall not apply if the accelerated procedure has been implemented according to the conditions 
provided for in article 45. Neither shall it apply to Finance Bills, Social Security Financing Bills, or to Bills concerning a state 
of emergency. 
Article 43 Government and Private Members’ Bills shall be referred to one of the standing committees, the number of which shall not 
exceed eight in each House.  
At the request of the Government or of the House before which such a bill has been tabled, Government and Private 
Members’ Bills shall be referred for consideration to a committee specially set up for this purpose.  
 
Article 44 Members of Parliament and the Government shall have the right of amendment. This right may be used in plenary sitting or 
in committee under the conditions set down by the Rules of Procedure of the Houses, according to the framework 
determined by an Institutional Act.  
Once debate has begun, the Government may object to the consideration of any amendment which has not previously been 
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referred to committee.  
If the Government so requests, the House before which the Bill is tabled shall proceed to a single vote on all or part of the 
text under debate, on the sole basis of the amendments proposed or accepted by the Government.  
 
Article 45 Every Government or Private Member’s Bill shall be considered successively in the two Houses of Parliament with a view to 
the passing of an identical text. Without prejudice to the application of articles 40 and 41, all amendments which have a 
link, even an indirect one, with the text that was tabled or transmitted, shall be admissible on first reading.  
If, as a result of a failure to agree by the two Houses, it has proved impossible to pass a Government or Private Member’s 
Bill after two readings by each House or, if the Government has decided to apply the accelerated procedure without the two 
Conferences of Presidents being jointly opposed, after a single reading of such a Bill by each House, the Prime Minister, or in 
the case of a Private Members’ Bill, the Presidents of the two Houses acting jointly, may convene a joint committee, 
composed of an equal number of members from each House, to propose a text on the provisions still under debate. 
The text drafted by the joint committee may be submitted by the Government to both Houses for approval. No amendment 
shall be admissible without the consent of the Government.  
If the joint committee fails to agree on a common text, or if the text is not passed as provided in the foregoing paragraph, 
the Government may, after a further reading by the National Assembly and by the Senate, ask the National Assembly to 
reach a final decision. In such an event, the National Assembly may reconsider either the text drafted by the joint 
committee, or the last text passed by itself, as modified, as the case may be, by any amendment(s) passed by the Senate. 
Article 49 The Prime Minister, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may make the Government’s program or possibly a 
general policy statement an issue of a vote of confidence before the National Assembly.  
The National Assembly may call the Government to account by passing a resolution of no-confidence. Such a resolution 
shall not be admissible unless it is signed by at least one tenth of the Members of the National Assembly. Voting may not 
take place within forty-eight hours after the resolution has been tabled. Solely votes cast in favour of the no-confidence 
resolution shall be counted and the latter shall not be passed unless it secures a majority of the Members of the House. 
Except as provided for in the following paragraph, no Member shall sign more than three resolutions of no-confidence 
during a single ordinary session and no more than one during a single extraordinary session.  
The Prime Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, make the passing of a Finance Bill or Social Security 
Financing Bill an issue of a vote of confidence before the National Assembly. In that event, the Bill shall be considered 
passed unless a resolution of no-confidence, tabled within the subsequent twenty-four hours, is carried as provided for in 
the foregoing paragraph. In addition, the Prime Minister may use the said procedure for one other Government or Private 
Members’ Bill per session.  
The Prime Minister may ask the Senate to approve a statement of general policy. 
Article 50 When the National Assembly passes a resolution of no-confidence, or when it fails to endorse the Government program or 
general policy statement, the Prime Minister shall tender the resignation of the Government to the President of the 
Republic. 
Article 52 The President of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify treaties.  
He shall be informed of any negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement not subject to ratification. 
Article 53 Peace Treaties, Trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international organization, those committing the 
finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, those relating to the status of 
persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory, may be ratified or approved only by an Act of 
Parliament. 
They shall not take effect until such ratification or approval has been secured.  
No ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory shall be valid without the consent of the population concerned. 
Article 53-1 The Republic may enter into agreements with European States which are bound by undertakings identical with its own in 
matters of asylum and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for the purpose of determining their 
respective jurisdiction as regards requests for asylum submitted to them.  
However, even if the request does not fall within their jurisdiction under the terms of such agreements, the authorities of 
the Republic shall remain empowered to grant asylum to any foreigner who is persecuted for his action in pursuit of 
freedom or who seeks the protection of France on other grounds.  
Article 53-2 The Republic may recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court as provided for by the Treaty signed on 18 
July 1998.  
Article 54 If the Constitutional Council, on a referral from the President of the Republic, from the Prime Minister, from the President 
of one or the other Houses, or from sixty Members of the National Assembly or sixty Senators, has held that an 
international undertaking contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, authorization to ratify or approve the international 
undertaking involved may be given only after amending the Constitution.  
Article 55 Treaties or agreements duly ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, with 
respect to each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party. 
Article 64 The President of the Republic shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Judicial Authority.  
He shall be assisted by the High Council of the Judiciary.  
An Institutional Act shall determine the status of members of the Judiciary.  
Judges shall be irremovable from office. 
Article 65 The High Council of the Judiciary shall be presided over by the President of the Republic. The Minister of Justice shall be its 
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ex officio Vice-president. He may deputize for the President of the Republic.  
The High Council of the Judiciary shall consist of two sections, one with jurisdiction over judges, theother over public 
prosecutors.  
The section with jurisdiction over judges shall comprise, in addition to the President of the Republic and the Minister of 
Justice, five judges and one public prosecutor, one Conseiller d’Étatappointed by the Conseil d’État, and three prominent 
citizens who are not members either of Parliament or of the Judiciary, appointed respectively by the President of the 
Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate.  
The section with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall comprise, in addition to the President of the Republic and the 
Minister of Justice, five public prosecutors and one judge, and the Conseiller d’Étattogether with the three prominent 
citizens referred to in the preceding paragraph.  
The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over judges shall make recommendations for the 
appointment of judges to the Cour de cassation, the Chief Presidents of Courts of Appeal and the Presidents of the 
Tribunaux de grande instance. Other judges shall be appointed after consultation with this section.  
This section shall act as disciplinary tribunal for judges. When acting in such capacity, it shall be presided over by the Chief 
President of the Cour de cassation.  
The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall give its opinion on the 
appointment of public prosecutors, with the exception of posts to be filled at meetings of the Council of Ministers.  
It shall give its opinion on disciplinary measures regarding public prosecutors. When acting in such capacity, it shall be 
presided over by the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Cour de cassation. 
An Institutional Act shall determine the manner in which this article is to be implemented. 
Article 65(1) The High Council of the Judiciary shall consist of a section with jurisdiction over judges and a section with jurisdiction over 
public prosecutors.  
The section with jurisdiction over judges shall be presided over by the Chief President of the Cour de cassation. It shall 
comprise, in addition, five judges and one public prosecutor, one Conseiller d’Étatappointed by the Conseil d’Étatand one 
practicing lawyer, as well as six qualified, prominent citizens who are not Members of Parliament, of the Judiciary or of the 
administration. The President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate shall 
each appoint two qualified, prominent citizens. The procedure provided for in the last paragraph of article 13 shall be 
applied to the appointments of the qualified, prominent citizens. The appointments made by the President of each House of 
Parliament shall be submitted for the sole opinion of the relevant standing committee in that House.  
The section with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall be presided over by the Chief Public Prosecutor at the Cour de 
Cassation. It shall comprise, in addition, five public prosecutors and one judge, as well as the Conseiller d’État and the 
practicing lawyer, together with the six qualified, prominent citizens referred to in the second paragraph.  
The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over judges shall make recommendations for the 
appointment of judges to the Court de cassation, theChief Presidents of Courts of Appeal and the Presidents of the 
Tribunaux de grande instance. Other judges shall be appointed after consultation with this section.  
The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall give its opinion on the 
appointment of public prosecutors.  
The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over judges shall act as disciplinary tribunal for judges. 
When acting in such capacity, in addition to the members mentioned in the second paragraph, it shall comprise the judge 
belonging to the section with jurisdiction over public prosecutors.  
The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall give its opinion on disciplinary 
measures regarding public prosecutors. When acting in such capacity, it shall comprise, in addition to the members 
mentioned in paragraph three, the public prosecutor belonging to the section with jurisdiction over judges.  
The High Council of the Judiciary shall meet in plenary section to reply to the requests for opinions made by the President of 
the Republic in application of article 64. It shall also express its opinion in plenary section, on questions concerning the 
deontology of judges or on any question concerning the operation of justice which is referred to it by the Minister of Justice. 
The plenary section comprises three of the five judges mentioned in the second paragraph, three of the five prosecutors 
mentioned in the third paragraph as well as the Conseiller d’État, the practicing lawyer and the six qualified, prominent 
citizens referred to in the second paragraph. It is presided over by the Chief President of the Cour de cassation who may be 
substituted by the Chief Public Prosecutor of this court.  
The Minister of Justice may participate in all the sittings of the sections of the High Council of the Judiciary except those 
concerning disciplinary matters.  
According to the conditions determined by an Institutional Act, a referral may be made to the High Council of the Judiciary 
by a person awaiting trial.  
The Institutional Act shall determine the manner in which this article is to be implemented.   
Article 67 The President of the Republic shall incur no liability by reason of acts carried out in his official capacity, subject to the 
provisions of Articles 53-2 and 68 hereof.  
Throughout his term of office the President shall not be required to testify before any French Court of law or Administrative 
authority and shall not be the object of any civil proceedings, nor of any preferring of charges, prosecution or investigatory 
measures. All limitation periods shall be suspended for the duration of said term of office.  
All actions and proceedings thus stayed may be reactivated or brought against the President one month after the end of his 
term of office.  
Article 68 The President of the Republic shall not be removed from office during the term thereof on any grounds other than a breach 
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of his duties patently incompatible with his continuing in office. Such removal from office shall be proclaimed by Parliament 
sitting as the High Court.  
The proposal to convene the High Court adopted by one or other of the Houses of Parliament shall be immediately 
transmitted to the other House which shall make its decision known within fifteen days of receipt thereof.  
The High Court shall be presided over by the President of the National Assembly. It shall give its ruling as to the removal 
from office of the President, by secret ballot, within one month. Its decision shall have immediate effect.  
Rulings given hereunder shall require a majority of two thirds of the members of the House involved or of the High Court. 
No proxy voting shall be allowed. Only votes in favor of the removal from office or the convening of the High Court shall be 
counted.  
An Institutional Act shall determine the conditions for the application hereof. 
Article 72-4 No change of status as provided for by articles 73 and 74 with respect to the whole or part of any one of the communities to 
which the second paragraph of article 72-3 applies, shall take place without the prior consent of voters in the relevant 
community or part of a community being sought in the manner provided for by the paragraph below. Such change of status 
shall be made by an Institutional Act.  
The President of the Republic may, on a recommendation from the Government when Parliament is in session or on a joint 
motion of the two Houses, published in either case in the Journal Officiel, decide to consult voters in an overseas territorial 
community on a question relating to its organization, its powers or its legislative system. Where the referendum concerns a 
change of status as provided for by the foregoing paragraph and is held in response to a recommendation by the 
Government, the Government shall make a statement before each House which shall be followed by debate. 
Article 89 The President of the Republic, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and Members of Parliament alike shall have 
the right to initiate amendments to the Constitution.  
A Government or a Private Member’s Bill to amend the Constitution must be considered within the time limits set down in 
the third paragraph of article 42 and be passed by the two Houses in identical terms. The amendment shall take effect after 
approval by referendum.  
However, a Government Bill to amend the Constitution shall not be submitted to referendum where the President of the 
Republic decides to submit it to Parliament convened in Congress; the Government Bill to amend the Constitution shall then 
be approved only if it is passed by a three-fifths majority of the votes cast. The Bureau of the Congress shall be that of the 
National Assembly.  
No amendment procedure shall be commenced or continued where the integrity of national territory is placed in jeopardy.  
The republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment. 
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Appendix 11 
Excerpts from The Polish Constitution 
Source: Poland’s Constitution of 1997 with Amendments thorugh 2009, generated from excerpt of texts from 
the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Projects, accessed at www.constituteproject.org  
Article 126 The President of the Republic of Poland shall be the supreme representative of the Republic of Poland and the guarantor of 
the continuity of State authority.  
The President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the 
State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory.  
The President shall exercise his duties within the scope of and in accordance with the principles specified in the Constitution 
and statutes.  
Article 127 
(1) 
The President of the Republic shall be elected by the Nation, in universal, equal and direct elections, conducted by secret 
ballot.  
The President of the Republic shall be elected for a 5-year term of office and may be re-elected only for one more term.  
Only a Polish citizen who, no later than the day of the elections, has attained 35 years of age and has a full electoral 
franchise in elections to the Sejm, may be elected President of the Republic. Any such candidature shall be supported by the 
signatures of at least 100,000 citizens having the right to vote in elections to the Sejm.  
A candidate who has received more than half of the valid votes shall be considered elected President of the Republic. If 
none of the candidates has received the required majority of votes, then a repeat ballot shall be held on the 14th day after 
the first vote.  
The two candidates who have received the largest number of votes in the first ballot shall participate in a repeat ballot. If 
one of the two such candidates withdraws his consent to candidacy, forfeits his electoral rights or dies, he shall be replaced 
in the repeat ballot by the candidate who received the next highest consecutive number of votes in the first ballot. In such 
case, the date of the repeat ballot shall be extended by a further 14 days.  
The candidate who receives the higher number of votes in the repeat ballot shall be elected President of the Republic.  
The principles of and procedure for nominating candidates and conducting the elections, as well as the requirements for 
validity of the election of the President of the Republic, shall be specified by statute.  
 
Article 128 (1) The term of office of the President of the Republic shall commence on the date of his assuming such office.  
(2) The election of the President of the Republic shall be ordered by the Marshal of the Sejm to be held on a day no 
sooner than 100 days and no later than 75 days before expiry of the term of office of the serving President of the 
Republic, and in the event of the office of President of the Republic falling vacant - no later than the 14th day 
thereafter, specifying the date of the election which shall be on a non-working day and within a period of 60 days 
of the day of ordering the election.  
Article 129 
(1) 
The Supreme Court shall adjudicate upon the validity of the election of the President of the Republic.  
A voter shall have the right to submit a complaint to the Supreme Court concerning the validity of the election of the 
President of the Republic in accordance with principles specified by statute.  
In the event of the election of the President of the Republic being judged invalid, a new election shall be held in accordance 
with the principles prescribed in Article 128, para. 2 in relation to a vacancy in the office of President of the Republic.  
 
Article 130 The President of the Republic shall assume office upon taking the following oath in the presence of the National Assembly:  
"Assuming, by the will of the Nation, the office of President of the Republic of Poland, I do solemnly swear to be faithful to 
the provisions of the Constitution; I pledge that I shall steadfastly safeguard the dignity of the Nation, the independence 
and security of the State, and also that the good of the Homeland and the prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my 
supreme obligation." The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God."  
Article 131 
(1) 
If the President of the Republic is temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, he shall communicate this fact to 
the Marshal of the Sejm, who shall temporarily assume the duties of the President of the Republic. If the President of the 
Republic is not in a position to inform the Marshal of the Sejm of his incapacity to discharge the duties of the office, then 
the Constitutional Tribunal shall, on request of the Marshal of the Sejm, determine whether or not there exists an 
impediment to the exercise of the office by the President of the Republic. If the Constitutional Tribunal so finds, it shall 
require the Marshal of the Sejm to temporarily perform the duties of the President of the Republic.  
The Marshal of the Sejm shall, until the time of election of a new President of the Republic, temporarily discharge the duties 
of the President of the Republic in the following instances:  
1) the death of the President of the Republic;  
2) the President's resignation from office;  
3) judicial declaration of the invalidity of the election to the Presidency or other reasons for not assuming office following 
the election;  
4) a declaration by the National Assembly of the President's permanent incapacity to exercise his duties due to the state of 
his health; such declaration shall require a resolution adopted by a majority vote of at least two-thirds of the statutory 
number of members of the National Assembly;  
5) dismissal of the President of the Republic from office by a judgment of the Tribunal of State.  
6) If the Marshal of the Sejm is unable to discharge the duties of the President of the Republic, such duties shall be 
discharged by the Marshal of the Senate.  
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7) A person discharging the duties of the President of the Republic shall not shorten the term of office of the Sejm.  
Article 132 The President of the Republic shall hold no other offices nor discharge any public functions, with the exception of those 
connected with the duties of his office.  
Article 133 
(1) 
The President of the Republic, as representative of the State in foreign affairs, shall:  
1) ratify and renounce international agreements, and shall notify the Sejm and the Senate thereof;  
2) appoint and recall the plenipotentiary representatives of the Republic of Poland to other states and to international 
organizations;  
3) receive the Letters of Credence and recall of diplomatic representatives of other states and international organizations 
accredited to him.  
4) The President of the Republic, before ratifying an international agreement may refer it to the Constitutional Tribunal with 
a request to adjudicate upon its conformity to the Constitution.  
5) The President of the Republic shall cooperate with the Prime Minister and the appropriate minister in respect of foreign 
policy.  
Article 134  1. The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.  
2. The President of the Republic, in times of peace, shall exercise command over the Armed Forces through the 
Minister of National Defense.  
3. The President of the Republic shall appoint, for a specified period of time, the Chief of the General Staff and 
commanders of branches of the Armed Forces. The duration of their term of office, the procedure for and terms 
of their dismissal before the end thereof, shall be specified by statute.  
4. The President of the Republic, for a period of war, shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on 
request of the Prime Minister.  
He may dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance with the same procedure. The authority of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as the principle of his subordination to the constitutional organs of the 
Republic of Poland, shall be specified by statute.  
5. The President of the Republic, on request of the Minister of National Defense, shall confer military ranks as 
specified by statute.  
6. The authority of the President of the Republic, regarding his supreme command of the Armed Forces, shall be 
specified in detail by statute.  
Article 135 The advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding internal and external security of the State shall be the 
National Security Council.  
Article 136 In the event of a direct external threat to the State, the President of the Republic shall, on request of the Prime Minister, 
order a general or partial mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces in defense of the Republic of Poland.  
Article 137 The President of the Republic shall grant Polish citizenship and shall give consent for renunciation of Polish citizenship.  
Article 138 The President of the Republic shall confer orders and decorations.  
Article 139 The President of the Republic shall have the power of pardon. The power of pardon may not be extended to individuals 
convicted by the Tribunal of State.  
Article 140 The President of the Republic may deliver a Message to the Sejm, to the Senate or to the National Assembly. Such Message 
shall not be a subject of debate.  
Article 141 
(1) 
The President of the Republic may, regarding particular matters, convene the Cabinet Council. The Cabinet Council shall be 
composed of the Council of Ministers whose debates shall be presided over by the President of the Republic.  
The Cabinet Council shall not possess the competence of the Council of Ministers.  
Article 142 1. The President of the Republic shall issue regulations and executive orders in accordance with the principles 
specified in Articles 92 and 93.  
2. The President of the Republic shall issue decisions within the scope of discharge of his other authorities.  
Article 143 The Presidential Chancellery shall be the organ of assistance to the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic 
shall establish the statute of the Presidential Chancellery and shall appoint and dismiss its Chief. 
Article 144 
(1) 
The President of the Republic, exercising his constitutional and statutory authority, shall issue Official Acts.  
Official Acts of the President shall require, for their validity, the signature of the Prime Minister who, by such signature, 
accepts responsibility therefor to the Sejm.  
The provisions of para. 2 above shall not relate to:  
1) proclaiming elections to the Sejm and to the Senate;  
2) summoning the first sitting of a newly elected Sejm and Senate;  
3) shortening of the term of office of the Sejm in the instances specified in the Constitution;  
4) introducing legislation;  
5) proclaiming the holding of a nationwide referendum;  
6) signing or refusing to sign a bill;  
7) ordering the promulgation of a statute or an international agreement in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland 
(Dziennik Ustaw);  
8) delivering a Message to the Sejm, to the Senate or to the National Assembly;  
9) making a referral to the Constitutional Tribunal;  
10) requesting the Supreme Chamber of Control to carry out an audit;  
11) nominating and appointing the Prime Minister;  
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12) accepting resignation of the Council of Ministers and obliging it to temporarily continue with its duties;  
13) applying to the Sejm to bring a member of the Council of Ministers to responsibility before the Tribunal of State;  
14) dismissing a minister in whom the Sejm has passed a vote of no confidence;  
15) convening the Cabinet Council;  
16) conferring orders and decorations;  
17) appointing judges;  
18) exercising the power of pardon;  
19) granting Polish citizenship and giving consent for renunciation of Polish citizenship;  
20) appointing the First President of the Supreme Court;  
21) appointing the President and Vice-President of the Constitutional Tribunal;  
22) appointing the President of the Supreme Administrative Court;  
23) appointing the presidents of the Supreme Court and vice-presidents of the Supreme Administrative Court;  
24) requesting the Sejm to appoint the President of the National Bank of Poland;  
25) appointing the members of the Council for Monetary Policy;  
26) appointing and dismissing members of the National Security Council;  
27) appointing members of the National Council of Radio Broadcasting and Television;  
28) establishing the statute of the Presidential Chancellery and appointing or dismissing the Chief of the Presidential 
Chancellery.  
29) issuing orders in accordance with the principles specified in Article 93;  
30) resigning from the office of President of the Republic.  
Article 145 
(1) 
The President of the Republic may be held accountable before the Tribunal of State for an infringement of the Constitution 
or statute, or for commission of an offence.  
Bringing an indictment against the President of the Republic shall be done by resolution of the National Assembly passed by 
a majority of at least two-thirds of the statutory number of members of the National Assembly, on the motion of at least 
140 members of the Assembly.  
On the day on which an indictment, to be heard before the Tribunal of State, is brought against the President of the 
Republic, he shall be suspended from discharging all functions of his office. The provisions of Article 131 shall apply as 
appropriate.  
Article 146 
(1) 
Chapter VI THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION  
The Council of Ministers shall conduct the internal affairs and foreign policy of the Republic of Poland.  
The Council of Ministers shall conduct the affairs of State not reserved to other State organs or local government.  
The Council of Ministers shall manage the government administration.  
To the extent and in accordance with the principles specified by the Constitution and statutes, the Council of Ministers, in 
particular, shall:  
1) ensure the implementation of statutes;  
2) issue regulations;  
3) coordinate and supervise the work of organs of State administration;  
4) protect the interests of the State Treasury;  
5) adopt a draft State Budget;  
6) supervise the implementation of the State Budget and pass a resolution on the closing of the State's accounts and report 
on the implementation of the Budget;  
7) ensure the internal security of the State and public order;  
8) ensure the external security of the State;  
9) exercise general control in the field of relations with other States and international organizations;  
10) conclude international agreements requiring ratification as well as accept and renounce other international agreements;  
11) exercise general control in the field of national defence and annually specify the number of citizens who are required to 
perform active military service;  
12) determine the organization and the manner of its own work.  
Article 147 (1)The Council of Ministers shall be composed of the President of the Council of Ministers (Prime Minister) and ministers.  
Vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers (Deputy Prime Ministers) may also be appointed within the Council of Ministers.  
The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers may also discharge the functions of a minister.  
(2)The presidents of committees specified in statutes may also be appointed to membership in the Council of Ministers.  
Article 148 The Prime Minister shall:  
1. represent the Council of Ministers;  
2. manage the work of the Council of Ministers;  
3. issue regulations;  
4. ensure the implementation of the policies adopted by the Council of Ministers and specify the manner of their 
implementation;  
5. coordinate and control the work of members of the Council of Ministers;  
6. exercise, within the limits and by the means specified in the Constitution and statute, supervision of local government.  
7. be the official superior of employees of the government administration.  
Article 149 
(1) 
Ministers shall direct a particular branch of government administration or perform tasks allocated to them by the Prime 
Minister. The scope of activity of a minister directing a branch of government administration shall be specified by statute.  
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A minister directing a branch of government administration shall issue regulations. The Council of Ministers, on the request 
of the Prime Minister, may repeal a regulation or order of a minister.  
The provisions applicable to a minister directing a branch of government administration shall apply, as appropriate, to 
presidents of the committees referred to in Article 147, para. 4.  
Article 150 A member of the Council of Ministers shall not perform any activity inconsistent with his public duties.  
Article 151 The Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers shall take the following oath in the presence of the President of 
the Republic:  
"Assuming this office of Prime Minister (Deputy Prime Minister, minister) I do solemnly swear to be faithful to the 
provisions of the Constitution and other laws of the Republic of Poland, and that the good of the Homeland and the 
prosperity of its citizens shall forever remain my supreme obligation."  
The oath may also be taken with the additional sentence "So help me, God."  
Article 152 
(1) 
The voivod shall be the representative of the Council of Ministers in a voivodship.  
The procedure for appointment and dismissal, as well as the scope of activity, of a voivod shall be specified by statute.  
Article 153 A corps of civil servants shall operate in the organs of government administration in order to ensure a professional, diligent, 
impartial and politically neutral discharge of the State's obligations.  
The Prime Minister shall be the superior of such corps of civil servants.  
Article 154 The President of the Republic shall nominate a Prime Minister who shall propose the composition of a Council of Ministers. 
The President of the Republic shall, within 14 days of the first sitting of the Sejm or acceptance of the resignation of the 
previous Council of Ministers, appoint a Prime Minister together with other members of a Council of Ministers and accept 
the oaths of office of members of such newly appointed Council of Ministers.  
The Prime Minister shall, within 14 days following the day of his appointment by the President of the Republic, submit a 
program of activity of the Council of Ministers to the Sejm, together with a motion requiring a vote of confidence. The Sejm 
shall pass such vote of confidence by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number 
of Deputies.  
In the event that a Council of Ministers has not been appointed pursuant to para.1 above or has failed to obtain a vote of 
confidence in accordance with para. 2 above, the Sejm, within 14 days of the end of the time periods specified in paras 1 
and 2, shall choose a Prime Minister as well as members of the Council of Ministers as proposed by him, by an absolute 
majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies. The President of the Republic shall 
appoint the Council of Ministers so chosen and accept the oaths of office of its members. 
Article 155 In the event that a Council of Ministers has not been appointed pursuant to the provisions of Article 154, para. 3, the 
President of the Republic shall, within a period of 14 days, appoint a Prime Minister and, on his application, other members 
of the Council of Ministers. The Sejm, within 14 days following the appointment of the Council of Ministers by the President 
of the Republic, shall hold, in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, a vote of confidence 
thereto.  
In the event that a vote of confidence has not been granted to the Council of Ministers pursuant to para. 1, the President of 
the Republic shall shorten the term of office of the Sejm and order elections to be held.  
Article 156 The members of the Council of Ministers shall be accountable to the Tribunal of State for an infringement of the 
Constitution or statutes, as well as for the commission of an offence connected with the duties of his office.  
On the motion of the President of the Republic or at least 115 Deputies, resolution to bring a member of the Council of 
Ministers to account before the Tribunal of State shall be passed by the Sejm by a majority of three-fifths of the statutory 
number of Deputies.  
Article 157 The members of the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Sejm for the activities of the Council of 
Ministers.  
The members of the Council of Ministers shall be individually responsible to the Sejm for those matters falling within their 
competence or assigned to them by the Prime Minister.  
Article 158 The Sejm shall pass a vote of no confidence in the Council of Ministers by a majority of votes of the statutory number of 
Deputies, on a motion moved by at least 46 Deputies and which shall specify the name of a candidate for Prime Minister. If 
such a resolution has been passed by the Sejm, the President of the Republic shall accept the resignation of the Council of 
Ministers and appoint a new Prime Minister as chosen by the Sejm, and, on his application, the other members of the 
Council of Ministers and accept their oath of office.  
A motion to pass a resolution referred to in para. 1 above, may be put to a vote no sooner than 7 days after it has been 
submitted. A subsequent motion of a like kind may be submitted no sooner than after the end of 3 months from the day the 
previous motion was submitted. A subsequent motion may be submitted before the end of 3 months if such motion is 
submitted by at least 115 Deputies.  
Article 159 The Sejm may pass a vote of no confidence in an individual minister. A motion to pass such a vote of no confidence may be 
submitted by at least 69 Deputies. The provisions of Article 158, para. 2 shall apply as appropriate.  
The President of the Republic shall recall a minister in whom a vote of no confidence has been passed by the Sejm by a 
majority of votes of the statutory number of Deputies.  
Article 160 
The Prime Minister may submit to the Sejm a motion requiring a vote of confidence in the Council of Ministers. A vote of 
confidence in the Council of Ministers shall be granted by a majority of votes in the presence of at least half of the statutory 
number of Deputies.  
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Article 161 
The President of the Republic shall, on the application of the Prime Minister, effect changes in the composition of the 
Council of Ministers.  
Article 224 The President of the Republic shall sign the Budget or interim Budget submitted to him by the Marshal of the Sejm within 7 
days of receipt thereof, and orders its promulgation in the Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland (Dziennik Ustaw). The 
provisions of Article 122, para. 5 shall not apply to the Budget or any interim budget.  
If the President of the Republic has made reference to the Constitutional Tribunal for an adjudication upon the conformity 
to the Constitution of the Budget or interim budget before signing it, the Tribunal shall adjudicate such matter no later than 
within a period of 2 months from the day of submission of such reference to the Tribunal.  
Article 231 
The President of the Republic shall submit the regulation on the introduction of martial law or a state of emergency to the 
Sejm within 48 hours of signing such regulation. The Sejm shall immediately consider the regulation of the President. The 
Sejm, by an absolute majority of votes taken in the presence of at least half the statutory number of Deputies, may annul 
the regulation of the President.  
Article 232 
In order to prevent or remove the consequences of a natural catastrophe or a technological accident exhibiting 
characteristics of a natural disaster, the Council of Ministers may introduce, for a definite period no longer than 30 days, a 
state of natural disaster in a part of or upon the whole territory of the State. An extension of a state of natural disaster may 
be made with the consent of the Sejm. 
 
 
Rosa Ristawati: Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A comparative Study 
 
405 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Rosa Ristawati (February 17, 1979) holds a Bachelor degree in Laws (SH) (Airlangga University, 
Indonesia, 2002). Her Bachelor thesis was “The Principle of Proportionality in Contract Law: a 
Case Study on Private Construction Contract”. In 2004, she got a Masters degree in Bussiness 
Law (MH) from Surabaya University, Indonesia. Her master thesis was “ The Implementation of 
Good Corporate Governance on the Banking System in Indonesia”. In 2010, Rosa got an LLM in 
International Law and the Law of International organizations from University of Groningen 
(Rijksuniversiteit Groningen) the Netherlands. Her LLM thesis was “Presidential Powers in Time 
of Terror: Comparative Study of the US and Indonesia”. 
Rosa started her academic career in 2003 as she joined the Catholic University of Widya 
Mandala in Surabaya, Indonesia. She taught Law and Psychology at the Faculty of Psychology. 
On April 2006, Rosa started working as lecturer at the Faculty of Law, Airlangga University. 
During the time, she taught Indonesian Constitutional Law and comparative constitutional law. 
Her research interests are including Constitutional Law, Comparative Constitutional Law, 
Constitutional design, and the Law of International organizations. 
In 2009, she was granted the University of Groningen Talent Grant, a scholarship by the 
University of Groningen. She got an opportunity to study Master of Laws  programmes (the LLM 
programme in International Law and the Law of International Organizations) at the Faculty of 
Law, Groningen University, the Netherlands (September 1, 2009‐ 31 August 2010).  
In September 2011, Rosa started her PhD project at Maastricht University, the Netherlands. The 
project was the three years PhD project under the Indonesian Ministry of Education. Her 
research focusses on the constitutional law and the comparative constitutional law. During the 
PhD program, she also joined the ius commune research school where she gained workshops, 
PhD trainings, and PhD conferences. She complished the ius commune PhD training program 
within three years and got the certificate as researcher from the ius commune research school 
on 2013.  
In her second year of PhD program, she was granted the 2012 SUN scholarship, a summer 
school scholarship by the Central European University where she got an opportunity attending 
summer school program on comparative regionalism at CEU, Budapest. In October 2012, she 
got an opportunity to be a visiting scholar at CEU, Budapest. Her PhD thesis at Maastricht 
University on “Modelling Executive Powers in the Indonesian Constitution: A Comparative Study 
of Constitutions” was approved on Summer 2017 and defended on Winter 2017. 
 
